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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyses the micro-economic process of 
technical change in one particularly successful agricultural area of 
Japan, the Saga Plain, between 1868 and 1939. It does so within a 
framework which relates the characteristics of the new techniques 
selected to the prevailing technical, economic and social 
environment, through the institutional mechanisms for the 
development of new technology. These characteristics themselves then 
influence the diffusion of new techniques and their effects.
The Saga Plain differs from much of the rest of Japan 
in its natural environment. Hence the technology employed in paddy 
rice cultivation at the beginning of the period also differed, 
especially in methods of irrigation. Economic and social relation­
ships between households centered on arrangements to meet the heavy 
labour and capital requirements of the irrigation technology and to 
ensure the subsistence of cultivators. The technical and economic 
system was disrupted by the rapid industrialisation of nearby areas 
after 1900. This raised the demand for marketed rice and caused a 
substantial outflow of small-scale cultivators. Shortage of hired 
labour forced larger cultivators to split up their holdings, and the 
proportion of middle-sized cultivators increased. Such farmers were 
under pressure to find ways of lessening the labour requirements for 
irrigation and raising output.
The solution to their problems was developed by local 
government and extension officials, who assisted the manufacturers 
in the design of an electric pump. This innovation was rapidly 
diffused through communal purchase of the pumps by village 
organisations. It was the breakthrough which permitted the adoption 
of other new techniques, leading to substantial rises in yields and 
labour productivity. It intensified the trend towards increasing 
proportions of medium-scale family farms. The study suggests 
conclusions as to the institutional requirements for the development 
of appropriate techniques and the relationship between technical and 
structural change in agriculture.
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CONVENTIONS
Romanis ation.
Japanese words are romanised according to the Hepburn 
System, but using double letters to indicate long vowel sounds. 
Exceptions are made where a different romanised form is very 
familiar to English readers, e.g. Tokyo is used instead of Tookyoo.
Measurements.
Japanese measurements have been converted into their 
metric equivalents. The Japanese area measure, the choo (= 10 tan) , 
is almost exactly equal to a hectare. One koku of rice is equivalent 
to 150 kilograms. Figures for yields originally calculated in koku 
per tan are therefore converted into kilograms per 10 ares (10 ares =
0. 1 hectares) .
Dates -
Western dates are given throughout, but occasionally 
Japanese era names are used, following the practice of Japanese 
writers, to denote periods of time. The Tokugawa period lasted from 
1603 until 1867, and the Meiji period from 1868 (the Meiji Restoration) 
until 1912.
References.
Works set out in the bibliography are indicated in 
the text and footnotes by the author's name, followed by a number 
showing position in the bibliography list.
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction and Framework
This study is an analysis of a particular process of 
technological change in agriculture. Its aim is to use the knowledge 
gained by Japanese agricultural historians and economists to try to 
improve our understanding of technological change and its relationship 
with the agricultural economy. It is hardly necessary to point out 
the significance of this issue in the light of the potential for 
advance in agricultural techniques which has arisen in recent years 
and the successful realisation of this potential in some areas of the 
developing world. Its significance is enhanced, however, by the fact 
that the discovery of this potential would seem to have generated 
almost as many problems as it has solved (Falcon,52). In particular, 
it has revealed our ignorance of the ways in which the development and 
diffusion of improvements in techniques are related to, and in turn 
affect, the economic characteristics and institutional structure of 
the agricultural society in which they take place. Considerable 
concern has arisen, for instance, over the effects of technical change 
on the distribution of income and wealth in rural areas, and the 
possible social tensions which may arise from this. This gives rise 
to the hope that further studies of cases of technical change may 
contribute to improving our understanding of the processes involved 
and hence our ability to deal with the problems created.
The particular relevence of studies of this process in 
Japan lies in the fact that Japan is frequently cited as an example 
of a successful case of agricultural development, in terms both of 
agriculture's positive contribution to output growth and overall 
economic development, and of the relative social and institutional 
stability of the Japanese agricultural sector (1) . It is not the 
purpose of this study to examine the overall validity of this view 
of agriculture's role in Japanese development, but rather to take one 
particular successful case of technical change and output growth within 
the Japanese context and examine how it occurred.
(1) See, for example, Ohkawa and Rosovsky, 66, and Johnston, 61.
For further discussion of agricultural development in Japan as a whole, 
see Chapter 2.
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In this chapter I shall set out the framework I have used 
in assembling and analysing the available information about the 
particular case in question. But it is important, first, to describe 
the issues and problems to which the study is relevant, since the 
framework is designed to show how the particular case relates to them. 
They can be summarised broadly in the form of two questions, the 
first more particular, and the second more general and to some extent 
subsuming the first:
1. How are the characteristics of newly-developed 
techniques determined in the case of a successful process of 
innovation?
2. How is technical change related to the processes of 
economic, social and institutional change?
Approaches to the first question begin from the now 
generally accepted assumption that the forces which determine the rate 
and direction of technical change cannot be regarded to any great 
extent as exogenous to the economic system in which the change takes 
place, and that therefore economic analysis is relevant to the study 
of the process. It follows from this assumption that we must be 
assuming that new techniques can be produced by the investment of 
resources in research activity. The rate of technical change will 
therefore be influenced by the size of the resources invested in 
research activities. The economic determinants of this investment 
allocation have been the subject of study by a number of economists 
but the present micro-level case study is not of particular relevance 
to this discussion, especially as the research in question was publicly 
financed. The more relevant issue in the present case is what 
determines the nature or economic characteristics of the new techniques 
produced by investment in research activities.
A common answer to this question is that the most 
significant determinant is changes in relative factor supplies and 
prices. The idea that firms will direct their research towards 
developing techniques which economise on relatively expensive factors 
was originally suggested by Hicks and has subsequently led to much 
theoretical discussion and argument. The most complete working out of 
the idea relative to agriculture is to be found in the work of 
Hayami and Ruttan (Hayami and Ruttan, 11).
Hayami and Ruttan's model is designed to explain the 
processes whereby a country makes an efficient choice from amongst
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alternative paths of technical development in agriculturec These 
paths are summarised as advance in either mechanical (labour-saving) 
or biological (land-saving) technology (1)0 The model hypothesises * 
that the following mechanisms determine the choice between them:
(i) Induced innovation in the private sectorQ
Here it is argued that a firm conducting research will 
allocate its funds towards developing new techniques which economise 
on factors which are becoming relatively more expensiveQ Summed up to 
the macro-level, this will mean that, overall, a country's private 
research will be directed towards developing techniques which economise 
on the factor which is becoming relatively more expensive in that 
country.
(ii) Induced innovation in the public sector .
Since much of the research relevant to the agricultural 
sector is carried out by publicly-financed organizations, Hayami and 
Ruttan argue that it is necessary in this case to extend the induced 
innovation idea to show how public research institutions might be led 
to respond to changes in relative factor scarcities. They argue that 
interaction between researchers and farmers will lead scientists, in 
response to the farmers' demands, to develop techniques which economise 
on factors which are becoming relatively scarce and substitute for 
them inputs which are becoming relatively abundant. The necessary 
condition for this is that there must exist an incentive mechanism 
whereby researchers are rewarded to the extent that their work helps 
solve farmers' problems.
(iii) Institutional innovation.
Hayami and Ruttan further postulate that, where deamand 
conditions are favourable, individuals will be induced to change those 
institutional arrangements which stand in the way of achieving the 
full potential of new technology. "Changes in market prices and 
technological opportunities introduce disequilibrium in existing 
institutional arrangements by creating profitable new opportunities 
for the institutional innovations" (Hayami and Ruttan, 11, p.61)0 
Nevertheless, they argue, there will be time lags in this process, 
arising from the economic and social conflict involved in institutional 
change. The greater these time lags the slower will be progress in
(1) The following draws mainly on Hayami and Ruttan, 11, pp. 53-63.
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selecting and achieving the efficient path of technical change.
(iv) Dynamic sequences.
Finally, they hypothesise that a major mechanism through 
which induced innovation works is the generation of disequilibrium or 
imbalance among the various parts of a technology. That is to say, the 
introduction of one innovation (presumably induced by changes in 
relative factor scarcities) creates bottlenecks within the technical 
system and through this leads to a cumulative sequence of technical 
changes as innovations to solve the bottleneck problems are introduced.
The Japanese case is one of the central examples cited 
by Hayami and Ruttan as evidence of the existence of the hypothesised 
mechanisms in the process of successful agricultural development. They 
suggest that the choice of a path of technical development in Japan 
was efficient in the sense that it represented a response to changes 
in the relative availabilities, hence prices, of factors of 
production. "Development of a continuous stream of new technology 
which altered the production surface to conform to long-term trends in 
factor prices was the key to success in agricultural growth in the 
United States and Japan" (Hayami and Ruttan, 11, p.135). This was 
achieved because the appropriate institutional mechanisms existed.
"The success in agricultural growth in both the United States and 
Japan seems to lie in the capacity of their farmers, research 
institutions and farm supply industries to exploit new opportunities 
in response to the information transmitted through relative price 
changes" (Hayami and Ruttan, 11, p.135). For the case of Japan, their 
hypotheses could therefore be summarised as:
1. The choice of technique was successful because it 
resulted in the development of innovations which economised on the 
factor which was becoming relatively scarce (land) by substituting for 
it a factor which was becoming relatively abundant (fertiliser), ie. in 
production function terms, techniques with appropriate factor bias 
characteristics were developed and selected.
2. Since most research in the agricultural sector was 
carried out by public institutions, this must have been achieved by 
means of the existence of mechanisms whereby these institutions were 
able to develop new techniques with appropriate factor bias character­
istics .
There are some theoretical problems associated with the 
induced innovation hypothesis (Salter, 27, pp.43-4), but our concern
-14-
is with its value in explaining evidence in a particular micro-economic 
case. Here there are broadly two sets of difficulties with the
hypothesis, which arise in trying to transpose it from the macro to •
the micro level. Firstly, at the empirical level, it seems more 
realistic, in the light of, for instance, Rosenberg's survey of the 
development of a number of industrial innovations (Rosenberg,67), to . 
regard firms as simply working to solve particular immediate problems, 
so that the issue comes down to asking what determines which amongst
the various problems facing the firm it invests resources to try
to solve. These problems include those arising from particular 
historical situations (such as wars, which lead to supplies of inputs' 
being cut off; accidents revealing problems with existing technology; 
government legislation; strikes) and those generated by the use of 
existing technology itself. "Complex technologies create internal 
compulsions and pressures which, in turn, initiate exploratory 
activity in particular directions" (Rosenberg,67,p.4).
Problem-solving of this last kind clearly resembles 
Hayami and Ruttan's dynamic sequences and it might be possible to 
trace the causes of a significant number of these cumulative 
processes, as of some of the other kinds of problems discussed by 
Rosenberg, back ultimately to changes in relative factor prices or 
supplies. The point that arises is simply that the step from relative 
factor prices to the firm's, or the research organisation's 
allocation of research funds is not a simple one. Making the step 
involves specifying how factor supply problems formulate themselves 
to the firm (and through the firm to the research organisations) in a 
particular technical and institutional environment. This involves 
relating the new technique to the existing economic and social 
conditions, as well as to the existing technology.
Secondly, it can be argued that there are other 
characteristics of new techniques, besides their factor bias, which 
are significant in determining their appropriateness to the environment 
into which they are introduced, and hence their diffusion and their 
effect on overall output. It would follow that the mechanisms 
whereby these characteristics are selected are also important. It is 
possible to list a number of such characteristics (Stewart,31,ch.4), 
but the following seem most relevant to new techniques in small-scale 
agriculture, especially where, as in the present case, they involve 
machinery:
1. Scale or divisibility, relative to the size structure 
of holdings and the institutional capacity to share the ownership
or use of production inputs.
2. Mobility, relative to the existing investment in 
infrastructure (eg. field layout, irrigation facilities).
3. Complexity, relative to farmers1 educational levels 
and their ability to use and maintain modern inputs and machinery.
The study therefore examines the development of a 
particular new technique, within the Japanese context, in the light 
of the induced innovation hypothesis and the problems with it. It 
considers which characteristics were important in the selection 
process, what determined the specific problems which the new technique 
was designed to solve, and how the institutional mechanisms linking 
farmers with research workers operated.
The development of theoretical approaches to the second, 
broader question of the relationship between technical, economic and 
social change is still in its early stages. There have, however, been 
studies of the determinants of the diffusion of new techniques amongst 
farms, which are relevant in that diffusion depends basically on the 
relationship between the characteristics of the new technology and the 
economic and social environment in which it becomes available. In the 
case of hybrid corn in the United States, as studied by Grilliches, 
the rate and pattern of diffusion could be explained quite simply in 
terms of the profitability of the new seeds to farmers in various 
regions, as measured by the size of the potential increase in yields 
and the average number of acres farmers planted to corn (Grilliches,54). 
In the case, again in the United States, of the diffusion of the 
reaping machine, a more complicated innovation in terms of its economic 
characteristics (involving scale economies and factor substitutions), 
David found that a more complex piece of reasoning was necessary to 
explain the time-profile of the diffusion, involving the interaction 
between scale economies, the demand for the product and relative 
factor prices- (David,48). In the same way as was suggested earlier, 
the step from the changes in relative factor scarcities, which were 
acknowledged to be an important factor in inducing the adoption of 
the reaper (since it substituted capital for labour), to profitability 
at the farm level is not a straightforward one.
Furthermore, while it may be permissable in the case of
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the United States to ignore differences between farm units in available 
factors and access to inputs, this is not the case in economies where 
markets are less highly developed. In less-developed countries, land, 
in particular, is valued as a source of power and influence as well 
as an input into agricultural production, and land markets, as markets 
for a production factor, are likely to be underdeveloped and imperfect. 
The distribution of access to supplies of irrigation water, a major 
factor conditioning the profitability of the adoption of many new 
techniques, is often institutionally rather than market determined 
and so also may be access to supplies of modern inputs like chemical 
fertilizer and technical advice. A technique which is profitable for 
one farmer, who has access to a particular set of factors or inputs, 
may not be profitable to another with access to a different set.
In such a case, where markets for important production inputs either 
do not exist or function imperfectly, the diffusion of new techniques 
amongst different kinds of farmers will be influenced by the 
institutionally-determined distribution of productive assets (1) .
If the diffusion of a new technique depends on the 
initial economic and institutional structure, then it is also likely 
that the reverse relationship will exist, so that the economic and 
institutional structure will be changed by the diffusion of the new 
technique. Hayami and Ruttan, with their institutional innovation 
mechanism, recognize that the availability of new technology affects 
the forces and incentives for institutional change. Gotsch (Gotsch,
53) has developed a framework of feedback mechanisms which specifies 
more explicitly the dynamic interactions involved. The characteristics 
of the technology, which are exogenously determined - the model is not 
designed to deal with the endogenous determinants of technical change- 
interact with the distribution of productive assets to determine the 
distribution of income and power. This in turn influences access 
to, and the characteristics of, organizations and institutions which 
serve agriculture, for instance, commodity markets, input markets, 
credit institutions, extension services. This feeds back to influence 
the distribution of productive assets as it interacts with the 
characteristics of (possibly newly-available) technology. For example, 
if technology which becomes newly available is labour-saving and has
(1) For examples of the influence of this factor on the diffusion of 
Green Revolution technology, see Griffin,7.
-17-
scale economies (eg. agricultural machinery), and if the distribution 
of land, and therefore of income and power, is relatively unequal, 
then larger farmers are likely to have best access to the organisations 
serving agriculture, and therefore are likely to be best able to 
utilise the new technology. So their relative economic positions 
will be further improved and they will have profitable opportunities 
open to them for improving still further their position in the 
distribution of assets and income, eg. by evicting tenants, dismissing 
workers, etc..
Professor Ishikawa has also worked on the problem of 
developing a framework for analysing the dynamic economic and institut­
ional effects of technical change in agriculture (1) . In his 
framework, technical change, again with exogenously determined 
technical characteristics, interacts with an initial agrarian 
structure defined in terms of (i) the land tenure system; (ii) the 
size distribution of cultivated holdings; (iii) the decision-making 
processes of the various constituent types of farm household (eg. 
profit maximisation, the maintenance of a minimum subsistence level, 
etc.). This interaction sets in motion the following series of 
stages of response:
1. Primary response: the interaction generates a 
group of innovators who are the first to be willing and able to 
adopt the new technique. The major factors determining the size
and character of this group are, on the one hand, the characteristics 
of the technology, especially the size of the increase in profitability
(shift in the production function) , factor bias and scale economies, 
and, on the other hand, the ways in which the initial structure 
determines access to and price of production inputs and risk-bearing 
ability amongst classes of farmers.
2. Secondary response: at this stage the effects of the 
initial introduction of the new technique spread through to alter the 
structure of the agricultural economy. This happens in two ways:
(i) the innovation spreads at a different rate amongst different 
groups in the agricultural society; (ii) changes in the demand for
(1) Ishikawa, 57. See also Ishikawa and Ohkawa, 59, in which the 
framework is used to analyse overall agricultural development in Japan, 
and in which also the possibilities of making technical change endog­
enous to the model are examined.
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factor inputs resulting from changes in factor productivities affect 
groups within the society in different ways, so that the distribution 
of income from the ownership of production factors (factor shares) 
changes.
3. Tertiary response: this involves farmers in modifying 
the initially exogenously-given new technology as a response to the 
changes generated by the primary and secondary responses.
The ideas embodied in these models have been adapted to 
form the framework subsequently used to analyse the particular case 
and to help explain the relationship between technical, economic and 
social change which it reveals.
The answers to the two sets of questions set out above 
are clearly inter-related. The forces which determine the nature of 
new technology, even where they can ultimately be traced back to 
exogenous changes in factor supplies, work through the initial 
institutional and economic structure of the agricultural economy, which 
is itself linked to the existing technology. The characteristics of 
the new technology so determined influence the speed and nature of its 
diffusion. This diffusion in turn alters the economic and institution­
al structure through which subsequent endogenous technical change is 
induced.
The diagram (Fig. 1) is an attempt to put these inter­
relationships into an analytical framework. It is not meant to be in 
any sense a working model, but is simply a device for relating the 
subsequent empirical case study to the theoretical questions and 
approaches suggested above. It is an attempt to show where the theories 
outlined above fit in, as explanatory hypotheses, in a particular 
story of technical change. It clearly draws heavily on the frameworks 
developed by Gotsch and Ishikawa and differs from them only in as far
as it tries to make the determination of the characteristics of
technical change from the start more explicitly endogenous to the 
system. This is more convenient, since the technical change under 
consideration was not an exogenous import to the particular area 
concerned but developed in response to the specific problems occurring 
there. Building this into the framework thus enables us to use the 
data to throw light on Question 1 as well as on Question 2.
I will begin by defining the items in the diagram and then
set out the major mechanisms of inter-action between them.
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Fig. 1.1: Diagram of the Framework
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1. Initial conditions of farm and village economies.
This term stands for the initial internal economic and
technical structure of agricultural production in the area or society 
under consideration. The basic micro unit of analysis is taken to be 
"the agricultural community", composed of farm households. In the 
present case, this is quite easy to distinguish as the village, which 
is the basic social and economic unit above the household in rural 
Japan. But a more general definition might involve specifying a group 
of farm households whose economic and social relationships with each 
other are of considerably greater significance to them than their 
relationships with households outside the group. The initial conditions 
in the community are defined principally in terms of:
(i) the characteristics of the technology in use, based 
on the available resource endowments.
(ii) the distribution of productive resources, especially 
land, amongst households, resulting from the historical development of 
the community as it inter-acted with environmental and economic 
conditions.
(iii) the internal economies of farm households, i.e. the 
ways in which different types of household make use of the available 
resources and technology.
(iv) the structure of economic relationships within the 
agricultural community, i.e. non-market economic relationships 
between households which influence the utilisation of resources by 
individual production units. It is assumed that market relationships 
between the households of the community are not significant.
2. The outside economy.
This refers to those economic units outside the agricultur­
al community with whom community households have economic relations.
The category includes:
(i) purchasers of the marketed output of the community.
(ii) firms supplying inputs to the community.
(iii) employers whose demand for labour is felt by the
community.
3. Government and research authorities.
This covers those >ublic organizations which are concerned 
with the development of agriculture and the diffusion of new techniques 
in the area of the communities in question, for instance, experiment 
stations, extension organizations, local government agricultural
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departments, etc.. These organizations may be connected with higher- 
level scientific and administrative organizations reaching up to the 
national (or even international) level.
4. Initial innovators.
This corresponds to Ishikawa's category of the same name 
and represents those production units (households) which are the first 
to adopt any given innovation. The box really represents the 
disequilibrium structure of the village economy resulting from the 
emergence of the initial innovators.
5. New structure.
This represents the situation, parallel to, and defined 
by the same characteristics as, the initial conditions, after the 
diffusion of the innovation beyond the initial innovating group, 
and the technical and institutional adaptation necessary to restore 
balance. Ishikawa's phases 2 and 3 have been compressed into one in 
this category. In a dynamic sense, the new structure becomes the 
initial conditions determining the next process of technical change.
Before examining the inter-actions between these five 
terms, a little more explanation of the reasoning behind the idea of 
the initial conditions of farm and village economies is needed. The 
characteristics listed (i)-(iv) in this category, taken together, 
largely determine the ways in which natural resources, technology and 
social and institutional arrangements inter-act in the process of 
production and economic survival of the agricultural community. A basic 
theme underlying this approach is the idea that it is useful to regard 
the technical system and the economic relationships within and between 
households as uniquely adapted to each other in such a way as to 
make production and survival possible in a given natural environment 
and historically-determined institutional conditions. The idea is 
quite common in analysis of purely technological systems. The 
technique for carrying out one process in the system of producing a 
final good must balance with the techniques for carrying out the other 
processes. Disturbance of this balance gives rise to the kinds of 
problems which generate Hayami and Ruttan's dynamic sequences of 
technical change, as attempts are made to restore balance among 
processes. On the other hand, instead of being a stimulus to technical 
change, existing balance within the technology may affect the 
profitability of adopting, and hence the rate of diffusion of, an 
innovation in one technical process. This was the case, for instance,
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with the reaping machine which was widely adopted in the United States 
but diffused much more slowly in Britain. David shows that a major 
factor in this was the existence on British farms of prior investment 
in the land (ridges and furrows, hedged fields, narrow roads, etc.) 
embodying the previous technology and incompatible with the use of the 
reaper. The need to alter field layouts and so on substantially 
raised the investment cost of the reaper so that it was profitable, at 
prevailing wage and interest rates, for far fewer farmers (David,49) .
Expanding this idea to cover institutional change 
involves making the assumption that, just as there is adaptation 
leading to balance within the technology, so there is adaptation 
leading to balance between the technology and the economic organization 
of production. A change in either will disrupt the balance and lead 
to pressure for further innovation on either the technical or the 
institutional side, dynamic sequences in technology or institutional 
innovation in Hayami and Ruttan's terms. Alternatively, the existence 
of balance may raise the cost of adopting a technical or institutional 
innovation and so slow up its diffusion.
Furthermore, when the balance is disrupted, the structure 
of the initial interlocking technical and economic system will 
condition the nature and direction of the innovations attempted in 
order to restore balance. This is analogous to the way in which an 
existing technical system will condition, via the problem points which 
become most pressing, the subsequent technical changes (Rosenberg,67, 
pp.3-5).
For all these reasons, the specification of the initial 
conditions in terms of the characteristics listed and the relationship 
between them is necessary for an understanding of the forces which 
generate and determine the nature of technical change and its effects.
The channels of interaction between the terms are 
represented by the numbered arrows in the diagram. They are:
1. The initial conditions and the outside economy 
interact via the medium of markets - factor markets, agricultural 
input and output markets. It is clearly along this route that changes 
in relative factor prices would come to be felt by the community.
It continues to operate throughout the process (arrow 7).
2. This route represents the forms of contact between 
the agricultural community and the research authorities, whereby 
researchers find out about farmers' problems and are pressed by them to
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find solutions. The way in which this route works (eg. the kinds of 
farmer with whom the research authorities have contacts) will condition 
the allocation of research funds and time towards the solution of 
particular problems. Its existence would be a condition for induced 
innovation in the public sector.
3. The link between the research authorities and the 
initial innovating group is made by the characteristics of the new 
technology, developed in response to the interaction between 
knowledge of farmers' problems and available scientific knowledge.
4. This represents the ways in which the initial 
structure conditions the nature and number of initial innovators in 
response to the characteristics of the new technology.. It works 
through the distribution, within the initial structure, of access 
to the inputs necessary for the adoption of the new techniques, 
including credit, ability to bear risk, educational attainments etc..
It represents Ishikawa1s "primary response".
5. This is the process of adapting to restore balance 
within and between the technology and the economic structure. On the 
institutional side it is likely to work through changes in the distrib­
ution of land, income and political and economic power. On the 
technical side it would involve alterations in the characteristics
of the new technology, in which case dotted arrow 6 may come into play, 
if the research authorities are brought into the process. It 
represents the institutional reaction to Ishikawa's "secondary 
response". Arrow 6 represents his "tertiary response".
The phases across the top of the diagram represent the 
sequence of changes in the system through time. In the initial 
conditions phase, the components of the internal farm and village 
economies (technology, distribution of assets, farm household economies, 
relationships between households) are in equilibrium with each other 
and with the outside economy and the governmental and research 
authorities. There might be, for example, a traditional technology 
utilised within a more-or-less unchanging structure of land distrib­
ution and economic relationships between households; static relation­
ships with outside markets, eg. large farmers and landlords sell 
agricultural output, everyone else produces for subsistence; and a 
relationship with outside authorities such that the government levies 
taxes on agriculture and maintains some of the infrastructure, but 
makes no attempt to introduce new techniques.
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The innovation phase occurs when something disrupts the 
equilibrium of the initial conditions phase. This disruption could 
stem, as in the present case, from the outside economy, via, for 
example, changes in demand or prices, or from within the agricultural 
economy itself, eg. population growth, or from the authorities, eg. 
introduction of new techniques, land reform. The disruption leads to 
pressure on the authorities and/or outside markets for the supply 
of new techniques. The results of this pressure will depend on the 
nature and strength of the relationships between the farm sector 
and the authorities and outside world. For instance, the relationship 
between farmers and authorities may not be strong enough for researchers 
to learn about or respond to the change in the conditions of the 
agricultural economy, in which case arrows 2 and 3 would not operate.
If an innovation emerges, it will act on the initial farm and village 
economy to produce the initial innovator group, thus disrupting the 
original structure.
During the final phase, this disequilibrium is removed 
through adaptation of either or both of the farm economy and the 
technology. In the latter case, the authorities might be involved 
again.
The following study will attempt to use this framework to 
examine how the routes worked in a particular successful case. But 
before doing that it is perhaps necessary to define that success by 
placing the particular case against the background of Japanese 
agricultural development in general, and this is the purpose of the 
next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
Technical Change and the Economic Organisation 
of Agriculture in Pre-war Japan
This chapter is designed to serve as introduction and 
background to the subsequent discussion of agricultural development 
in one area of Japan, the Saga Plain. It will give a general picture 
of the organisation of agriculture and of technical progress in 
Japan in the period between the Meiji Restoration in 1868 and the 
Second World War. The first part describes the progress of Japanese 
agriculture, and Saga's place within it, in macro-economic terms.
The second part outlines the background of technical, economic and 
institutional change in Japanese agriculture as a whole. The rest 
of the study will be concerned in detail with the nature of this change 
in the one particular region.
I . The Macro-economic Outline of Agricultural Development in 
Japan and in Saga.
This section is concerned with overall changes in agric­
ultural output and inputs, beginning with the national trends summarised 
in Table 2.1, and going on to contrast them with trends in Saga.
1. The Rate of Growth of Agricultural Output in Japan.
Studies of the growth of agric­
ultural output in Japan have revealed that, in two ways, the process 
is a more complex one than a first glance at statistical data might 
suggest.
Firstly, the statistical basis for growth rate calcul­
ations has been the subject of a great deal of controversy. Official 
government figures would give a growth rate of agricultural output of 
about 2.4% per annum for the period 1878 - 1922, slowing down to 
about 1% per annum in the subsequent inter-war period (Ohkawa et al. ,
23) . These figures were strongly challenged by James Nakamura 
(Nakamura,18) , who argued that they underestimated the level of 
output in the earlier part of the Meiji period because land areas 
and yields were concealed or misreported as a means of evading the
1880
1885
1890
1895
1900
1905
1910
1915
1920
1925
1930
1935
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Table 2.1
SUMMARY TABLE OF TRENDS IN AGRICULTURAL 
OUTPUT AND INPUTS IN PRE-WAR JAPAN.
(5-yearly averages centring on years shown)
Total Rice No. of Cultivated Commercial
Output* Output* Agricultural Land Area Fertiliser
{Million ¥ ) (Million ¥)
Workers
(1,000) (1,000 ha)
Input* 
(Million ¥)
1,332 970 15,588 4,735 29
1,471 1,025 15,603 4,821 28
1,594 1,075 15,629 4,924 28
1,631 1,035 15,685 5,033 32
1,845 1,167 15,830 5,193 40
2,025 1,266 15,929 5,307 57
2,269 1,390 15,875 5,574 101
2,572 1,518 15,312 5,784 131
2,735 1,619 14,001 5,983 177
2,771 1,594 13,536 5,927 217
2,975 1,662 13,971 5,975 266
3,146 1,725 13,776 6,108 293
*1934-6 constant prices.
Hayami, 10, Tables Al, A3, A4, and A6, from original data in 
LTES, 84.
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land tax. However, this underestimation declined over time so that 
its effect was to make the growth rate in the early stages appear 
faster than it really was. Nakamura attempted to estimate a correct 
output series, and this yields a growth rate for 1878 - 1922 of 
only 1% per annum.
Nakamura's estimates were not generally accepted, but 
it was agreed that the growth rate had to be scaled down somewhat.
This implied, firstly, that the levels of agricultural output and 
yields achieved before Japan began to industrialise were higher than 
previously thought, and, secondly, that the rate of growth of output, 
which had been thought to have resulted mainly from technical change, 
without any large-scale investment of resources in agriculture, was 
not as great as once thought. In addition, it is worth pointing out 
that Professor Ishikawa's work on the vital role played by irrigation 
facilities in bringing about yield increase through fertiliser- 
responsive seed varieties suggests that, whether or not high yields 
were already being achieved in Japan by the time of the Meiji 
Restoration, the potential for them had been created by the prior 
investment in the irrigation system (Ishikawa,12,ch.2,section 2).
This meant that the simple picture of satisfactory output growth, 
concurrent with industrialisation, through technical change without 
the need for investment of development resources in agriculture, 
which had been held up as an example to developing countries, needed 
to be modified. It suggested that, whatever the actual growth rate 
was, output increase was linked in a more complex way to the particular 
conditions of Japanese agriculture.
The latest estimates of agricultural output and inputs 
have appeared as Volume 9 of the series Chooki Keizai Tookei (Long-term 
Economic Statistics of Japan since 1868, LTES, 84) . They have not 
completely settled the argument, but in what follows LTES figures 
will generally be used when all-Japan totals are required. They yield 
an agricultural growth rate of about 2% per annum for 1878 - 1922, 
declining to 1% per annum after that. The slowing up of the growth 
rate in the period after the First World War is thus still apparent 
and the same kind of phasing can be observed in the LTES data for the 
output of rice, the most important crop and the one with which we 
shall be most concerned. The growth rate between 1880 and 1900 
was 0.9% per annum, rising to 1.7% in 1900 - 1920, and declining to
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0.4% in 1920 - 1935 (1).
Data for rice yields, another frequently-used measure 
of progress in Asian agriculture, present the same problems as the 
output data. Official figures for national average yields and for 
yields in the Saga area (Saga Prefecture or ken and Saga County 
or gun) are plotted in Chart 2.1. The original data for Saga are 
shown in Appendix Table 1. (For further discussion of the data used 
for Saga, see the note at the end of this chapter.) These may 
underestimate yields in the earlier years. According to Nakamura, 
whose estimates probably represent the maximum possible levels, 
national average yields in the 1870s ranged from 225 - 250 
kg./lOares (Nakamura,18,p.104). At any rate, the same phasing is 
observable in the growth of yields as in that of output as a whole, 
with steady increase up to about 1918 and stagnation thereafter. 
Inter-country comparisons of crop yields are always dubious, but it 
is clear that the yields achieved in Japan were, by international 
standards, high, even in the early years and even using the minimum, 
official figures. The chart shows national average yields rising 
from about 200 kg./lOares in the 1890s to about 300 kg./lOares by the 
mid-l930s. Hayami and Ruttan calculate that the average paddy rice 
yield in 1963-5 in India was 150 kg./lOares, in Pakistan 170, in 
Thailand 160 (2) . Ishikawa gives a figure for Mainland China in 
1952-7 of 254 (Ishikawa,12,p.70). Yields in Saga, as the chart shows, 
were always well above the national average.
The second complication to the picture of output growth 
in Japanese agriculture results from the fact that the apparently 
more-or-less steady process covers a number of distinct regional 
patterns of growth, whereby new methods, developed in particular 
areas, spread gradually throughout the country. It is often pointed 
out that Meiji Period growth was a process whereby the opening up of 
the country after 1868 led to the spread of the best locally- 
developed techniques. But Professor Sawada has shown that this 
process continued in cycles throughout the pre-war period, with
(1) Calculated by Hayami from 5-yearly averages of slightly adjusted 
LTES data. See Hayami, 10, p.20.
(2) Hayami and Ruttan, 11, p.195, using data from the F.A.O. 
production yearbook.
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Chart 2,1; Rice Yields, 1890-1935, 5-yearly averages.
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Sources: SKTS, 8 6 , Nooshoomu Tookeihyoo, 85.
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certain areas featuring as pioneers at every stage (Sawada,69).
The simple overall growth rate thus hides this .process of innovation 
and geographical diffusion.
In conclusion, then, we can probably say that agricultural 
output growth in pre-war Japan was steady, unspectacular by present- 
day standards, but adequate for the overall development of the 
economy. It would seem, though, that we need to disaggregate and 
look in greater detail if we are to further our understanding of 
the ways in which output growth occurred,•how it related to changes 
in inputs, how agriculture was linked to the rest of the economy in 
the process, and, in general, what other countries can learn from 
the Japanese experience.
2. Changes in Inputs.
What were the sources of the
output growth described above? In part they were the result of
changes in the quantities of inputs used and in part the result of 
changes in technique. Changes in technique will be described in a 
later section. Here we are simply concerned with the changes in
input quantities which occurred in generating the growth described
in the last section. (For basic data, see Table 2.1.)
The cultivated land area increased at an annual average 
rate of about 0.5% until about 1920 (Hayami,10, p.26, based on LTES,
84) . However, some of the new land consisted of non-paddy fields 
brought into cultivation in the northern areas of Japan. The area 
of paddy fields increased more slowly, at about 0.3% per annum. In 
the inter-war period this expansion came to an end. Thus increase in 
the cultivated area contributed something but not very much to the 
increase in output. Hayami estimates that at least 70% of the growth 
in output per worker is accounted for by increase in output per 
hectare, and therefore less than 30% by increases in land area per 
worker, in the period 1880 - 1935 (Hayami,10,p.30). The area 
actually planted to crops (i.e. allowing for double-cropping) grew 
at about the same rate as the cultivated area on average over the 
whole period 1880 - 1935. However, this conceals quite rapid growth 
in the rate of land utilisation in the period before the turn of the 
century, offset by some decline later on, in part caused by the fact 
that much of the expansion of the cultivated area was in northern 
parts of the country where double-cropping was impossible.
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The agricultural labour force changed very little before 
1900. It dropped quite sharply during the World War I boom and 
thereafter declined slowly. Over the period 1880 - 1935 it declined 
at the rate of 0.2% per annum. The estimation of actual labour input 
is a much more difficult matter. There are, as yet, no continuous 
estimates of labour input per hectare or labour days per worker.
But there are suggestions that, during the Meiji period, these may 
have been increasing. Tussing, in his study of data from Yamanashi 
Prefecture in the Meiji period, found that the categorisation of 
workers according to their primary occupation in the official 
statistics tended to overestimate agricultural labour input in the 
early years (when agriculture was primary and manufacturing secondary) 
and to underestimate it in later years (when manufacturing was 
primary and agriculture secondary). He calculated that labour input 
into agriculture actually increased until the closing years of the 
Meiji period (Tussing,74). Ishikawa and Ohkawa also suggest that, 
although labour hours per hectare in rice cultivation were declining, 
this may have been offset by increased labour input in other operations 
(Ishikawa and Ohkawa,59,pp.161-2 and their Appendix Chart 2). During 
the inter-war period, however, labour input probably declined in as 
far as the number of workers did.
LTES gives estimates of the fixed capital stock in 
agriculture in terms of machinery and tools, livestock and plants, 
and farm buildings. This stock changed little over the pre-war 
period growing at no more than 1% per annum. But throughout the 
period a continuous process of investment in land improvement must 
have been going on. The introduction of drainage systems, without 
which double-cropping and animal ploughing were difficult, was 
widespread. Such investment is difficult to measure and is not taken 
into account in most studies of agricultural production functions (1) .
Current inputs, most notably commercial fertilisers, 
grew more rapidly, especially after the turn of the century. The
(1) This is of some significance relative to the debate on the growth 
rate and agriculture's role in development, since investment in land 
improvement could help to explain a relatively rapid growth rate in 
the Meiji period, but would also mean that the inputs required for 
agricultural development in Japan were greater than otherwise 
thought.
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average annual growth rate was a little over 3% in the whole pre-war 
period but faster in the inter-war period than earlier. As an 
illustration, Table 2.1 shows increases in fertiliser input.
In terms of input combinations, the capital/land ratio 
must have been rising, and probably also capital per worker. Land 
per worker must have been rising a little but labour input per unit 
of land could have been increasing at least in the earlier period.
3. The Saga Plain in Comparison.
Detailed discussion of changes 
in inputs, output and technology in Saga, as compared with the 
national average, must wait until the major features of agricultural 
production on the Plain have been described. However, at this stage, 
it is worth making three points about the relationship between the 
overall pattern of growth in Saga and that in the rest of the 
country. Table 2.2 is designed to illustrate these points in a broad 
way. The nature of the data used for Saga is discussed in the note 
at the end of the chapter.
The first point concerns the rate of output growth on 
the Saga Plain. As Part 2 of the Table shows, the decade of the 
1890s was a particularly poor one for Saga, containing the disastrous 
year of 1893 (when rice output was less than a third of normal levels) 
and several bad years around 1900. During the pre-World War I period 
the rate of growth of rice output speeded up dramatically from these 
low levels and was substantially greater than the national average.
But what is really noteworthy about Saga's performance is the 
sustaining of relatively high growth rates of both rice output and 
total production during the inter-war period, when growth elsewhere 
slowed up markedly. For the period 1920-35, Saga achieved a growth 
rate of rice output of 1.3% per annum, compared with the national aver­
age of 0.4%, and of total output of 1.2% per annum, as compared with 
the 0.8% national average. This suggests that Saga did not follow 
the typical growth phasing observed elsewhere and that the rate 
of adoption of technical progress was sustained during the inter-war 
period, in contrast to the rest of the country. This is reflected 
also in the data on yields shown in Part 5 of the Table and in 
Chart 2.1.
The data used here for Saga are, however, precisely the 
official figures against which Nakamura launched his criticism.
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Part 1;
Part 2
Part 3
Table 2.2
MACRO-ECONOMIC TRENDS IN SAGA COMPARED 
WITH THE WHOLE OF JAPAN
Growth rates (% per annum) of the total value of all 
agricultural output, valued at 19 34-6 prices. 
(Calculations based on 5-yearly averages for years shown)
Japan Saga Prefecture
1880-1900 1.6
1900-1920 1.8
1920-1935 0 . 8 1.2
Source: LTES LTES Workbook
: Growth in rice output.
(% per annum between 5-yearly averages for years shown)
Japan Saga County
1890-1900 0 . 8 - 1.8
1900-1920 1.6 2.3
1920-1935 0.4 1.3
Source: LTES SKTS
Cultivated area per worker. -
(Ha./worker , male and female)
Japan Saga County
1890 0.34 0 . 2 2
1900 0.36 0.23
1920 0.42 0.43
1935 0.44 0.46
Source: LTES SKTS
/Continued
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Table 2.2 (Continued) 
Part 4; Rice output per worker.
(Kg., 5-yearly averages)
Japan Saga County
1890 409 583
1900 448 504
1920 638 1,405
1935 684 1,842
Source: LTES SKTS
Part 5: Rice yields.
(Kg./lO ares, 5-yearly averages)
Japan* Saga County
1890 215 211 294
1900 226 222 246
1920 286 282 378
1935 297 294 444
Source: LTES Official SKTS
Part 6 : Rice as a proportion of ■the total value of agricultural
production. (%)
Japan Saga Prefecture
1880 62.8
1900 55.9
1920 56.7 70.81
1935 50.2 6 6 . 38
Source: LTES LTES Workbook
. Sources: LTES, 84? LTES Workbook, 87; SKTS, 8 6 ; official = Noorinshoo
Tookei Hyoo, 85.
* LTES does not give figures for areas planted to individual crops.
The LTES yield figures have been calculated using LTES production 
figures and official crop areas. As described in the text, LTES 
figures are not strictly comparable with the unadjusted SKTS figures. 
In the crucial area of yields, therefore, the official national 
data have been included for comparison.
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There is, therefore, a suspicion that output and yields in the earlier 
years shown may have been higher than the official estimates. Bearing 
this out, Yamaha found average rice yields in the villages in two 
areas of the Plain to have been recorded as 339 and 327 kg./lO ares 
respectively in 1857 (Yamada,81). The agricultural survey (Nooji 
Choosa) carried out in 1888 gave 358.5 kg./ 10 ares as the average 
yield for Saga County (Xsobe,76,p.8). This is considerably higher 
than the first official figures shown in Chart 2.1. However, in the 
Saga-ken Choobunsho (Saga Prefecture Government Report) of 1909, the 
yield for Saga County is given as 370.5 kg./lO ares, which is 
closer to the trend of the official figures (Isobe,76,p.8). This 
would all suggest that yields did not rise as fast in the period up to 
the mid-1900s as the official figures show, but short of much more 
detailed study it is not possible to be conclusive. From our point
of view though, this simply increases the significance of the
relatively rapid growth observed in Saga in the '20s and '30s.
This significance is confirmed by Professor Sawada's 
findings on regional variation in the pattern of output growth 
(Sawada,69) . He discovered that there were three points during the 
pre-World War II period when variation in rice yields amongst 
prefectures was at a peak. He took these points to represent times 
when new techniques adopted in the most advanced areas had not yet 
been diffused throughout the country. During the intervening periods 
other areas caught up with the advanced areas, narrowing the 
variation in yield. The prefectures with the highest yields at the
times of peak variation (1887-93, 1903-7, 1933) were labelled
pioneering prefectures. A few prefectures were pioneers at all three 
peak variation times. Saga was not a pioneer at the first peak but 
became one for both peaks after the turn of the century. At the first 
peak (1887-9 3), she was one of a number of prefectures achieving 
above-average yields but was not one of the five pioneering 
prefectures achieving over 250kg./10 ares. By the time of the second 
peak (1903-7) , she had moved into the top group, now achieving over 
300 kg./lO ares, with only Osaka and Nara prefectures, containing 
areas which had long been the most advanced and commercialized in the 
country, achieving higher yields. By the time of the third peak 
(1933), Saga had the highest yields in the country. This confirms 
Saga's significance in generating a relatively rapid rate of technical 
advance, especially in the inter-war period, and we can conclude that
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Saga was unusual, in the context of the overall progress of Japanese 
agriculture, for both the speed and the phasing of its technical 
development.
The second point concerns the nature of this technical 
development. Japanese writers have named the mid-1930s the "Saga 
stage" (Saga Dankai) of Japanese agricultural development. This is 
not only because of Saga's rapid rate of output growth, which 
resulted in its having the highest rice yields in the country in the 
19 30s, but also because of the distinctive nature of its technical 
change. This resulted in the development of a specialised rice- 
producing technology, which generated both high yields and high 
labour productivity within a structure of small- or medium-scale 
family farms. This is the main subject of the subsequent chapters, 
but the impact can be seen in Parts 4 and 5 of the table. Rice yields 
on the Saga Plain were always above the national average for climatic 
and environmental reasons. But the difference rapidly increased after 
the turn of the century and continued to do so during the inter-war 
period when growth in national average yields was slowing down 
markedly. (See Chart 2.1) Rice output per worker shows the same 
comparative trends. Trends in total output and income per worker 
would not show quite such a marked divergence, however, because 
other areas were diversifying into other crops and activities to a 
greater extent than Saga. Nevertheless, the distinctive trends in the 
technology of rice production on the Saga Plain can clearly be seen.
The third contrast at the macro-level between Saga and 
the national average lies in the differences in the resource structure 
on which changes in technology were based. Part 3 of the table shows 
the rapid rise in cultivated area per man in Saga, as opposed to the 
whole country. This is partly the result of the low initial level in 
Saga, arising from the initial resource endowment and cultivation 
methods, and partly the result of the very rapid decline in the labour 
force. The number of agricultural workers in Saga was declining at
1.4% per annum in the period 1888 - 1935, as compared with the
0 .2% national average, while the cultivated area increased rather 
more slowly than average. The peculiarities of Saga's natural 
environment, in particular the very high proportion of the cultivated 
area which could be irrigated, affected the output structure, relative 
to the national average, as well. They resulted in the specialisation
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in rice cultivation which is revealed, in Part 6 of the table, in the 
much higher proportion contributed by rice to the total value of 
agricultural production.
Thus we can conclude that, as compared with the national 
average, output growth in Saga was rapid, especially in the inter-war 
period, techncial change took a distinctive form, and peculiarities 
in the nature and relative availability of resources underlay the 
differing trends.
II. Technical, Economic and Institutional Change in Pre-war 
Japanese Agriculture.
This section examines the economic and organizational 
changes which accompanied the pattern of growth described above, 
and the technical changes which generated it.
1. The Socio-economic Organization of Agricultural
Production.
(i) the household.
The basic unit of production in 
Japanese agriculture has always been the household (ie) , that is to 
say, the members of a family living together under one roof. At times 
it is necessary to interpret "family" quite widely in order to 
include unrelated people adopted into the household, but even in 
such cases the fiction of a family relationship was more-or-less 
closely maintained and the adopted person lived as a member of the 
household. Families with larger holdings would also take into their 
households members of other poorer families. They were employed as 
household servants and agricultural labourers and lived within the 
employer's household. There may have been as many as a million of 
these workers (out of an agricultural labour force of 14 or 15 
million) in the middle of the Meiji period, but, as we shall see later, 
this form of farm management became less common over the course of the 
pre-war period, and the number of agricultural labourers had declined 
to 384,000 by 1920 (Ishikawa and Ohkawa,59,pp.168-9). Increasingly 
larger landowners came to rent out land which they did not cultivate 
themselves to tenant households, rather than incorporate additional 
members into the household.
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Thus the typical farm unit in pre-war Japan was based 
on the household, which both managed the cultivation of the land 
(whether owned or rented) and supplied the labour to work it. At 
the centre of the household was the nuclear family of the household 
head, the headship passing to his eldest son when he became too 
old to manage the farm. If the family had enough land, younger 
sons and their families would be given a portion of the main family's 
land and set up as more-or-less independent branch households.
If they could not be supported in this way, they would either have 
to become adopted sons, tenants or household servants of other 
families, or remain unmarried and supported as far as possible by 
their original families. With the progress of industrialisation, 
non-agricultural employment opened up other opportunities for the 
younger children of rural households.
The basic household unit, whatever its size, did not 
farm a compact holding centring on the house in which the family 
lived. It usually farmed a number of separate plots scattered 
about within the land area controlled by the village in which it 
was located or, occasionally, by other nearby villages. In almost 
all areas some of the plots would consist of paddy land, fitted into 
the village's irrigation system, on which paddy rice could be grown. 
Other plots consisted of so-called upland fields, i.e. fields 
which were not included in the irrigation network and were not 
therefore suitable for rice cultivation.
The household was regarded as a body with a continuous 
life of its own, independent of, though not unaffected by, the lives 
and deaths of its individual members. It was the household, not 
its members or even its head, which was socially, administratively 
and legally regarded as the basic unit of the village community.
The household might expand the holding it cultivated here or 
decrease it there, its fortunes might rise or fall, but it would 
remain in existence as an agricultural production unit. The 
number of agricultural households in Japan remained almost constant 
at about 5^ million over the entire pre-war period.
(ii) the village.
The village was the basic 
social and administrative unit in Japanese rural areas throughout 
the Tokugawa period and, despite subsequent changes in the structure
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of local government, has remained so ever since (1). Typically it 
consisted of a group of households, not usually exceeding 200, with 
their house sites collected together and surrounded by the fields 
cultivated by the village members. The number of villages in Japan 
has changed very little since 1868.
The most important basis of village cohesion was the 
irrigation system. Irrigation facilities were normally constructed 
in such a way that each plot formed part of an interlocking system 
around which water flowed from one plot to the next. The irrigation 
system therefore had to be maintained and managed by the village 
members as a group to ensure that, barring cheating and stealing, 
the available water supply would be equitably distributed to every 
paddy field, hence to everyone's scattered holdings. The village 
often also owned and managed land from which fertiliser could be 
collected and this provided another material basis for cohesion 
and collective security. Membership of the village brought with 
it, along with rights to village-owned facilities, duties which were 
communally shared. These included the repair of village roads 
and the organisation of festivals. A household's membership of a 
village community was thus a kind of citizenship, giving it rights and 
duties which were essential to the security of the whole group.
This overall village community was broken down into 
a number of constituent groups. Chief among these were those 
based on family relationships between households (doozoku). The 
practice of giving younger sons, and sometimes even long-serving 
household servants, parcels of the family's land on which to set 
up their own farms created ties between households. The branch 
household (bunke) and the main household (honke) continued to help 
each other economically, supplying labour, tools, financial 
assistance and so on. More complex structures developed as branch 
households themselves formed branches. Similar kinds of relationship 
between households could be found (e.g. between landlord and 
tenant households) even where they were not based on family ties. 
Neighbourhood groupings also existed, within which households
(1) The term village is used to refer to the basic village unit 
called mura in Tokugawa times. The word mura now applies admin­
istratively to a larger area often containing several former mura, 
which are now called buraku, ooaza or ku.
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supplied each other with all kinds of assistance. Altogether, the 
village community was interwoven with mutual relationships, of a 
more-or~less hierarchical kind, between independent households.
These relationships cemented the various layers of 
village society because they were mutually beneficial to
both superior and inferior constituents of the hierarchy. The
branch household/tenant/small farmer was obliged by the relationship 
to provide workers when the larger-scale main household needed them, 
thus assuring it of its labour supply. In return, the richer house­
hold had a duty to give assistance when it was required, in the form
of meals, gifts, loans, rent reductions in bad years, and so on,
thus assuring the survival of the poorer household (Nakane,19, 
pp.112-3). These relationships formed the basis of the kind of 
insurance of subsistence that the village community provided for 
its members.
(iii) Landownership and tenure.
Before the Meiji Restoration in 
1868, private ownership of land did not technically exist'. Each 
cultivating household farmed by custom an area determined by the 
history of the family. It owed allegiance to a feudal lord and his 
retainers (samurai), who did not cultivate land but lived, in castles 
and their surrounding towns, on the taxes and dues paid by the 
cultivators. Land could not be sold, and cultivators were forbidden 
to leave their villages and their traditional plots, or to take up 
other occupations. Tenancy was also forbidden, but in practice it 
arose in a number of ways, especially as the economy became more 
commercialised towards the end of the Tokugawa period. Cultivators 
who got into debt to moneylenders or traders ended up losing owner­
ship of their land and came to pay what was, in effect, rent to their 
creditors. Labourers who were originally household servants of 
larger landowners came to be given land to cultivate themselves as 
tenants (1) . It has been estimated that, through these and other 
means, about 2 0% of households might have been pure tenants after the 
Meiji Restoration, and perhaps 35% part-tenants (Dore,4,p.17).
After 1868, legal titles to land were distributed, and it
(1) For a full description of this process, see Smith,29, especially 
chapters 8 and 9.
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became possible for cultivators to sell their land or to change 
occupation. The feudal dues were abolished and, in their place/ the 
government levied a land tax. The burden on the cultivator remained 
much the same but the new tax had to be paid in cash instead of kind 
and this drew farmers more and more into commercial markets, as they 
strove to raise the money to pay their taxes.
The land tenure structure which emerged from the changes 
of the Meiji Restoration was a mixture of pure owner, pure tenant, 
part-owner/part-tenant, and cultivator/landlord households. There 
were some completely absentee landlords, whose business, even where 
they did do some cultivation, essentially lay in the management of 
their property. But most landlords were not like this. They ranged 
from the relatively large-scale village landowner who cultivated some 
of his land and rented out the rest, and who was an influential 
person within village society, to the government official who had not 
enough time to cultivate all his land, or to the man who rented out 
a distant plot in order to rent in a more convenient one.
In terms of size, the distribution of land ownership was 
such that only a small proportion of landowners owned holdings which 
could be considered large. Table 2.3 shows that in 1908 less than 
10% of households owned more than 3ha.. For cultivation purposes, the 
predominant farm unit was the household cultivating less than a 
hectare. As Table 2.4 shows, about 70% of farm households fell into 
this category throughout the pre-World War II period, and the effect 
of the renting out of land was to even out the distribution of 
cultivated holdings as opposed to owned ones (1) .
However, it was the group of larger landowners who both 
cultivated and rented out land (known as tezukuri j inushi in 
Japanese) which provided the leadership of village society at this 
time. Village chiefs, heads of agricultural associations, co-opera­
tives, and so on, tended to come from the one or two larger land­
owning families to be found in most villages. However, in spite of
(1) By contrast, Professor K.N. Raj has pointed out (in his series of 
Radhakrishnan Memorial Lectures, delivered at the University of 
Oxford in April and May, 1977) that in India the leasing in and out 
of land does not have this effect. There, land is usually leased to 
medium- or larger-scale cultivators, so that the distribution of cult­
ivated holdings is similar to that of owned holdings.
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Table 2.3
THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BY AREA OWNED 
(Whole Country, %)
Under h *2-1 1-3 3-5 5-10 10-50 Over ;
ha. ha. ha. ha. ha. ha. ha.
1908 46.1 26.1 18.8 5.6 2.5 0 . 8 0.05
1910 47.4 25.7 17.9 5.5 2 .6 0 . 8 0.06
1915 48.5 24.8 18.1 5.3 2.5 - 0 . 8 0.07
1920 49.3 24.3 18.1 4.7 2.5 1.0 0.09
1925 49.8 24.4 17.8 4.6 2.3 0.9 0.08
1930 49.8 24.8 17.7 4.4 2.2 0.9 0.07
1935 49.6 25.3 17.6 4.3 2.2 0.9 0.07
1940 47.6 26.3 18.6 4.4 2.1 0.9 0.10
Source: Kayoo, 83.
Table 2.4
THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BY AREA CULTIVATED
(Whole Country, %)
Under h *5-1 1-2 2-3 3-5 Over 5
ha. ha. ha. ha. h a . ha .
1908 37.3 32.6 19.5 6.4 3.0 1.2
1910 37.6 33.0 19.3 5.9 2.9 1.3
1915 36.6 33.4 20.0 6.1 2.7 1.2
1920 35.3 33.1 20.7 6.2 2 .8 1.7
1925 34.8 33.9 21.5 5.9 2.5 1.4
1930 34.3 34.3 22.1 5.7 2.3 1.3
1935 33.7 34.3 22.5 5.8 2.3 1.4
1940 33.4 32.8 24.5 5.7 2 .2 1.4
Source: Kayoo, 83.
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their influential position within the village, most of these land­
owners were not highly privileged within Japanese society in general.
In 1936, according to Dore, the rent from 6*5 ha. would have been 
necessary to generate the income of an urban civil servant or 
teacher (Dore,4,p.29). Admittedly, by that time the position of 
agricultural income-earners may have declined relative to that of 
urban earners as compared with earlier periods, but nevertheless very 
few landowners owned as much as 6*5 ha ..
There was no marked or revolutionary change in the basic 
features of this structure in the pre-war period. The small-scale 
family farm remained the basic unit throughout. Nevertheless, gradual 
changes can be observed and are significant in terms of their relation­
ships with technical change. These will be examined later. For the 
moment, the changes will simply be outlined. To do this, it is 
convenient to split the period into two, with the division falling 
roughly at the time of the First World War. This corresponds to the 
phases in output growth observed earlier. The pace of change varied 
considerably amongst regions, and the phasing is thus only approx­
imate. In the less-developed parts of the country, particularly in 
the north-east, traditional patterns of landownership and economic 
organization, centring on the doozoku system, were still in existence 
at the time of the post-war land reform. In more developed areas, 
the distribution of land ownership and the nature of relationships 
between households had begun to change even before 1868. Neverthe­
less, Japanese writers have distinguished the following two general 
phases:
1. 1868 - World War I
This period saw what Japanese writers have called a 
bi-polarization of the agricultural structure. Tenancy continued to 
increase and there was probably some rise in the proportion of 
households in the lowest size scales. Reliable data for this period 
are hard to come by, but Oouchi estimates that the proportion of 
owner-farmer households fell from 37.3% to 33.3% between 1883/4 and 
1908, while the proportion of pure tenant households rose from 20.9% 
to 27.6% (Oouchi,39,p.91). Ishikawa and Ohkawa estimate that the 
proportion of tenanted land rose from 29% in 1872 to 45% in 1908 
(Ishikawa and Ohkawa,59,p.167).
The mechanisms behind this process were complex.
Abstracting for the moment from the influence of technical progress,
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the changing economy of Japan at this time generated a number of 
forces which tended to worsen the position of the small-scale 
farming household, driving it into tenancy, whilst at the same time 
improving the position of the larger landowner. The changes of the 
Meiji Restoration did nothing to alleviate the burden of taxes and 
rent on the small-scale owner or tenant fanner, and in some ways made 
it harder to bear. The new tax, unlike the old ones, did not vary with 
the state of the harvest and in order to raise the cash to pay it 
the small farmer often had to sell rice immediately after the 
harvest, when the price was at its lowest. On the whole, the price 
of rice was rising during this period, as the commercialization of 
the economy raised the demand for it. But this was not so during the 
deflation caused by the government in the 1880s, when many small
farmers fell into difficulties. In general, the rising price of rice
benefitted the small farmer only marginally, since there was little 
rice left for him to sell after payment of rent, taxes, interest, etc.,
and after meeting the family’s food needs.
Increasing tenancy was the result of the impact of these 
economic forces on the smaller farmers. They would find themselves 
in difficulty as a result of a bad harvest, a poor price for rice, a 
wedding or a funeral that had to be paid for. They would borrow 
money, mortgage their land and gradually lose ownership of it.
In this situation there was little to do but hope to continue farming 
as the tenant of the new landowner. Industrial employment was never 
able, in the pre-war period, to make any impression on the absolute 
numbers on the land. At this stage, it might have been possible to 
find employment for a farm daughter for a few years in one of the 
silk-reeling factories springing up in the countryside, but the 
demand for permanent male industrial labour was not great. Thus 
tenancy increased and the small-scale farmer struggled.
The larger landowner, on the other hand, faced no such 
problems. Having more rice to sell, both from his own produce and 
from what he received as rent, he was able to benefit from good prices, 
and he had no difficulty paying his taxes. As we shall see, the 
larger-scale cultivating landlords were the leaders in adopting 
improved techniques in this period, and, as output rose, the burden 
of the more-or-less fixed land tax payment declined. As landlords, 
the larger landowners also benefitted from increased yields obtained 
by tenants. Even if it was difficult to raise customary rent levels,
-45-
the need to reduce rents in bad years declined as tenants came to 
achieve higher and more stable yields, and, with the continued 
pressure of population on the land, rents did not decline as a 
proportion of rising total output in this period. Thus economic 
change benefitted the larger-scale cultivating landlords through 
higher yields on the land they farmed, a high price for the rice they 
had to sell, and high levels of rent on the land they leased out.
2. World War I - the late 19 30s
This period saw something of a reversal of the trends of 
the previous one. The increase in the proportion of pure tenants was 
halted and the part-owner/part-tenant group became predominant.
There was also a tendency for the proportion of households farming 
middle-sized holdings to increase at the expense of larger and 
smaller landowners and cultivators. The period has thus been charact­
erized as that of the rise of the medium-scale, owner/tenant farmer. 
Table 2.5 shows the gradual increase in the proportion of owner/ 
tenant households from about 39% of all households in 1908 to about 
42*5% by the time of the Second World War. Meanwhile, as Table 2.3 
shows, the proportion of households farming 1-2 ha. rose from about 
19*s% in 1908 to 24*5% in 1940, as the proportions in the largest and 
smallest size scales declined. Chart 2.2 is designed to illustrate 
the same tendency for the purposes of subsequent comparisons.
The causes of these trends must, in many respects, lie
in the spread of new techniques amongst smaller-scale farmers
towards the end of the previous period, and this will be examined in
greater detail later, but other factors intensified the trend.
Four years' school attendance became compulsory in 1886 and, by 
the turn of the century, at least 80% of school-age children were 
enrolled (Japan, Ministry of Education, 14). Thus by the inter-war 
period, a majority of farmers would have had some education and 
would probably be literate. This not only affected their ability to 
adopt new techniques but also lessened their political and social 
dependence on the leading village landowners. Their economic and 
social position was also strengthened, at least in some areas, by 
the increasing demand for permanent, full-time, male labour in the 
now expanding heavy industries. These factors made the period one 
of increasing conflict between landlords and tenants. Tenants' 
unions were formed throughout the country, countered by the formation
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Table 2.5
THE DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL 
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of landlords' federations, and there was an increasing number of 
disputes between landlords and tenants which had to be resolved by 
legal or police measures. Given the increased power of the tenant, 
higher yields, combined with customary rent levels which were hard 
to raise, meant that a decreasing proportion of the harvest was being 
paid as rent.
These factors tended to worsen the position of the larger 
landowner. Those who cultivated some of their land were finding it 
harder to obtain the necessary non-family labour and, with the spread 
techniques which made careful cultivation even more vital, farming 
of larger holdings became increasingly difficult. Non-cultivating 
and absentee landlords became much more common in this period.
However, rents from leased-out land were not keeping up with increases 
in output. The price of rice was very high around the time of the 
First World War, but thereafter, with depressed conditions in the 
economy as a whole, demand was less buoyant and the price was also 
being held down by increased imports from Taiwan and Korea. These 
factors made land a much less attractive investment than it had been, 
especially given the alternative opportunities for investment in 
industry.
The rise of the middle-scale farmer can be seen as the 
result of the conjunction of these forces. As larger cultivator/ 
landlords reduced the area they farmed and larger landowners began 
to take their money out of land, small-scale farmers began to acquire 
the released land, either to rent or to buy, raising the scale of 
their cultivation and probably moving into the owner/tenant category. 
One of the principal arguments of this regional study is that this 
trend was related to, and re-inforced by, technical change.
After the war, the land reform, executed under the American 
Occupation, drastically re-inforced the pre-war trend by achieving 
the transfer of the ownership of almost all leased-out land to the 
former tenants, and setting a ceiling (on average 3 ha.) on the area 
a household could own. The small- to medium-scale family farm was 
thus firmly entrenched as the basis of the agricultural structure.
It remains so to this day, although the picture is complicated by the 
fact that almost all Japanese farms are now cultivated on a part-time 
basis.
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(iv) The village and the outside world.
So far we have considered only the 
internal structure of the village and the farm household. But the 
development of Japanese agriculture in the pre-war period is in part 
the history of the inter-relationships between agriculture and the 
developing industrial sector, between the village and the outside 
world. At the time of the Meiji Restoration, the commercial develop­
ment of the economy was already exerting an influence on agriculture, 
and, indeed, agricultural productivity was high enough to support 
what was, by the standards of contemporary under-developed countries, 
a relatively large urban or non-cultivating population. In the areas 
supplying the larger urban centres, commercial farming was already 
developing and leading to the adoption of improved cultivation 
methods. Nevertheless, the production of most farms was still 
essentially for subsistence. This pattern was broken by the intro­
duction of land tax payments in cash, as we have seen, and by the 
impact of industrialisation, which developed in earnest after the 
turn of the century.
The village economy was drawn into relationships with 
outside markets that fall broadly into two kinds. Firstly, it was 
drawn into commercial markets for goods, partly by the need to sell 
agricultural produce in order to be able to pay taxes, and partly by 
the -wish to buy consumer goods and production inputs as they became 
available. The increased marketed output of Japanese agriculture 
was sufficient to meet the demands of the expanding urban and 
industrial population until about the time of the First World War, 
when boom conditions, fuelled by speculation, forced the price of rice 
up to unprecedented levels and the government launched its scheme to 
expand the production and import of Japanese-type rice from Taiwan 
and Korea. At their peak in the inter-war period, colonial imports 
supplied 20% of the Japanese demand for rice. Meanwhile, Japanese 
farm households were beginning to substitute industrially-manufactured 
consumer goods for those they had previously made themselves, and to 
expand their purchase of commercial fertiliser.
As farmers became more and more involved in commercial 
markets, they began to diversify and specialise their production. 
Before World War I this was chiefly to be observed in the expansion 
of sericulture. The depressing effect of imports on rice prices and 
the collapse of the market for silk in the inter-war period,
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encouraged farmers to diversify a little further into fruit, 
vegetables, livestock and so on. Nevertheless, rice retained its 
dominant position.
The second way in which the industrial development of 
Japan affected the village economy was by way of the demand for 
labour. This was never sufficient to cause a large-scale reduction 
in the agricultural population, which remained roughly constant 
throughout the pre-war period. But it drew off the increase in that 
population and its regional impact was at times, as we shall.see, 
sharp. In the early stages of industrialisation, factories 
succeeded in tapping resources of under-utilised labour time in agric­
ulture. The early silk-weaving factories were located in the country 
and employed the unmarried daughters of farm families. But as 
urbanisation increased younger sons and daughters left the farms 
altogether and went to live in the cities.
Such market relationships were not, however, the only 
form of contact between the village and the outside world. From 
earliest times government authorities had taken an interest in 
agriculture, it being the most important source of revenue, and 
had encouraged irrigation and land-improvement projects. On the 
other side, there were, throughout the country, farmers who were 
interested in working to develop new techniques and improve 
agriculture. After the Meiji Restoration these farmers began to 
form "agricultural discussion groups" and "seed exchange societies" 
in order to spread their knowledge and interest. The Meiji 
government developed institutions which harnessed and built on this 
experience and enthusiasm, as a means of spreading new techniques 
down to the village level.
To begin with, the local agricultural organisations 
were encouraged and developed and eventually made official under 
the pyramidal structure of the National Agricultural Association 
(1894), which later became the Imperial Agricultural Association. 
Skilled farmers were encouraged to travel around the country, 
lecturing to local groups on improved techniques. After the turn of 
the century the establishment of co-operatives also began to be 
encouraged by means of subsidies and other kinds of assistance, 
and these provided farmers with credit, marketing and purchasing 
facilities.
Having thus organised and, at times, forced the
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enthusiasm of the farmers for agricultural improvement, the 
government began to put something into the system from its side by 
means of expenditure on the research and development of new 
techniques. The National Agricultural Experiment Station was set 
up in 1893. In 1899 a law was passed to permit subsidies for the 
setting up of prefectural experiment stations. By the inter-war 
period this network of research facilities had developed sufficient 
expertise to be able to produce significant results (e.g. cross-bred 
seed varieties) which it was able to diffuse to farmers through the 
agricultural societies (1).
2. Technology.
(i) resources and production techniques.
Japan is a small and crowded 
set of islands of which only 14% of the land area is at present 
cultivated. Its man/land ratio has been unfavourable throughout 
its development process, even when compared with some of today's 
developing Asian countries (2). Paddy rice has always been by far 
the most important crop grown by Japanese farmers. Before 1900 
it was generating between 50 and 60% of the value of agricultural 
output and continued to produce 40 to 50% up until World War II 
(Calculated from LTES, 84). So we can begin to view Japanese 
agricultural technology as a response to the requirements of 
paddy rice cultivation in Japanese conditions.
In order to grow paddy rice it is necessary to be able 
to provide standing water in the fields during the growing period 
of the plant. There are few places in Japan where this can be 
achieved naturally, as it can in monsoon climates and on the flood 
plains of rivers elsewhere irr Asia. From earliest times, therefore, 
the construction of irrigation systems has been a precondition for 
successful agriculture in Japan. Professor Sawada has calculated
(1) For more detailed accounts of the research and extension system 
in Japan, see Ogura, 21, pp. 299-330, or Hayami and Ruttan, 11,
pp. 153-162.
(2) Agricultural land area per male worker was around one hectare 
at the end of the nineteenth century, rising to 1.3 ha. by the 
thirties in Japan. In 1957-62, it averaged 1.9 ha. in India, 1.3 in 
Sri Lanka, 2.0 in the Philippines. See Hayami, 10, p.8.
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that 70.9% of the ponds and 73.7% of the river irrigation facilities 
in existence in the 1960s were first constructed before 1868 
(Sawada,69,pp.124-5).
This huge investment in land improvement created the 
ability to provide a controlled and regulated supply of water to 
the paddy fields and reduced somewhat the influence of the weather 
on the harvest. Within the framework of this irrigation system rice 
cultivation techniques developed and changed in ways which will be 
described in the next section, but their central features remained 
much the same throughout the pre-war period. Rice seedlings were 
first grown from seed in seed beds and then transplanted into the 
ploughed, irrigated and fertilised paddy field. Hoeing and weeding 
were meticulously carried out, using at first simple and later more 
sophisticated hand-powered tools. Planting and harvesting were 
carried out by hand throughout the period, although some other 
operations, notably threshing, were becoming mechanised during the 
1930s. Ploughing using human power was replaced by the use of 
draught animals during this period, but the technology remained 
characterised throughout by the, intensive use of labour to produce 
high rice yields on limited land areas.
Where drainage facilities were adequate and climate 
suitable, winter crops could be grown on the paddy fields, and, 
with improvements in irrigation facilities, there spread rotations 
in which other grain crops (wheat, barley or naked barley) were 
grown on the paddy fields after the rice crop. Elsewhere the water 
remained in the fields, which were fallow throughout the winter.
On the 40-50% of the cultivated area which is not suitable for rice 
cultivation a large variety of other crops could be grown. These 
included subsistence crops such as vegetables and beans, commercial 
crops such as tea and industrial crops such as mulberry. Except 
in Hokkaidoo, domestic animals were almost always stall-fed, and 
although the production of livestock products increased rapidly 
over the pre-war period it never generated a very significant 
proportion of the value of agricultural output.
The inputs which these techniques required were, at the 
beginning of the Meiji period, largely self-supplied within the 
farm or the village. The household had available to it its land 
holding, embodying the investments of generations, and the household 
labour force, sometimes supplemented, in the case of larger-scale
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farmers, by hired labour. Irrigation water was supplied to all by 
the communal village system. Fertiliser was of great importance, 
especially as double-cropping of paddy land increased. Throughout 
the period much fertiliser was self-supplied, mainly in the form 
of grass and leaves collected from communal village land. However, 
the use of commercial fertilisers, at first organic and later chemical, 
became more and more important. The household's capital stock 
consisted mainly of buildings and tools, along with fruit trees, 
tea bushes and so on. Larger farmers owned draught animals, smaller 
ones hired or borrowed them.
The various changes in inputs and techniques which 
produced the rise in output of the pre-war period will be outlined 
next. But it must be remembered that alongside them there 
remained the basic facts of Japanese agriculture: small fields 
making up small holdings; intensive cultivation by the labour of the 
household; the predominance of paddy cultivation of rice with hand 
techniques; and the framework of the village irrigation system and 
co-operative functions.
(ii) technical change in the pre-war period.
The set of improved agricultural 
techniques which was spreading throughout Japan during the period 
after 1868 and was widely in use by the 1910s is known, by Japanese 
scholars, as the Meiji Noohoo (Meiji agricultural methods). It 
can be characterised as the development and diffusion of the best 
techniques available within the traditional system. The opening 
up of communications throughout the country after 1868 facilitated 
the spread of ideas, and we have seen how the government encouraged 
skilled farmers to develop and teach the best techniques then 
known. The inputs required for this process were largely generated 
within the agricultural sector itself. The main lines of technical 
progress in rice cultivation in this period can be summarised 
as follows:
i. Improvement and spread of the best known seed 
varieties combined with the application of increasing amounts of 
fertiliser. The best-known of these varieties, called shinriki 
(power of God), was selected by a fanner in 1877. It was highly 
fertiliser-responsive, and usable over a wide variety of areas, so 
that it was more widely diffused in Western Japan than any variety
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before or since. Commercial organic fertilisers were beginning to 
meet some of the increased demand which went with the use of better 
seeds, but in the main it was still met from self-supplied sources 
within the village.
ii. Improvements in cultivation practices. A number of 
methods of increasing the yield of a given piece of land and quantity 
of seed were discovered and/or diffused during this period. These 
included the selection of the best seeds to plant by soaking them in 
a salt water solution; the use of improved oblong-shaped seed-beds 
which made pest control easier; planting out seedlings in straight 
lines; improvements in methods of pest control. In general, these 
techniques required much meticulous work and could be thought of as 
means by which increased labour hours could be translated into 
increased yields.
iii. Improvements in irrigation and drainage facilities. 
These made it unnecessary in many areas to leave the field water­
logged throughout the winter, and thus permitted double-cropping.
They also facilitated the use of animals for ploughing, which was 
necessary for land preparation if double-cropping was to be practical.
iv. Improvements in tools and implements. The most 
important of these consisted in advances in the design of ploughs. 
Combined with the shift from human to animal power, they made deep 
ploughing possible. Better weeding tools, which speeded up and 
improved weeding operations, were also developed.
These changes represent advances within four different 
categories of inputs embodying an agricultural technology. These 
could be described as: (1) basic infrastruture, (2) tools and
equipment, (3) current inputs, and (4) cultivation practices or 
labour skills. The Meiji Noohoo illustrates the ways in which these 
elements of an agricultural technology are related to each other in 
a complementary way, so that a change in one will have a greater 
effect on output when combined with a change in the others than it 
would have on its own. The link between infrastructure investment, 
especially in irrigation and drainage facilities, and the response 
of output to current inputs (fertilisers and improved seed 
varieties) in the context of Asian agriculture has been examined in 
detail by Professor Ishikawa (Ishikawa,12,chapter 2,section 2).
The Meiji Noohoo demonstrates this and other links between the 
components of an agricultural technology. Fig. 2.1 tries to
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illustrate these relationships, which may be summarised as follows:
i. Infrastructure investment, in the form of irrigation, 
drainage and land-reorganisation schemes, made double-cropping 
possible, and it was often also necessary for the introduction of 
deep ploughing using animal power, since the fields had to be 
drained for this. Double-cropping increased the capacity to grow 
fodder crops for draught animals.
ii. Improved design of ploughs made deep ploughing possible 
and deep ploughing was essential for full absorption of increased 
amounts of fertiliser.
iii. More meticulous cultivation practices became 
profitable when applied to higher yielding seed varieties because 
the resulting increases in output were significant. This is also true 
of labour-intensive pest control techniques. Straight-line planting 
was essential for the use of the new weeding tools.
iv. High-yielding seed varieties have their full effect 
on output only when combined with increased fertiliser input and 
adequate and controlled water supplies. Therefore, their use is 
linked to infrastructure investment and deep ploughing.
Thus the Meiji Noohoo was a package, whose total effect 
was greater than the sum of its parts. The adoption of one aspect of 
it would tend to induce the adoption of the others. This kind of 
analysis of the interaction between the components of a technology 
will be used in describing both the initial and the changed technology 
of Saga Plain agriculture in relation to the general picture given 
here.
Technical change during the later stages of the pre-war 
period largely involved the continued diffusion of these same kinds 
of technique, though by now the rate was slowing up. The major 
difference lay in the fact that the inputs required by this kind of 
change came increasingly to be supplied commercially rather 
than self-supplied within the village. Cross-bred seeds developed 
by experiment stations began to take over from varieties selected by 
farmers. The consumption of commercial organic and later chemical 
fertiliser expanded. Towards the end of the period, the first steps 
towards greater mechanisation were being taken in some areas, with 
the introduction of mechanical threshing machines, electric engines 
for drainage and irrigation pumps, and, here and there, the power
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Fig. 2.1: Technical Complementarities in the Improved Meiji 
■Agricultural Methods (Meiji Noohoo).
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tiller which was to spread so widely after the war.
3. Links between Technical and Structural Change.
It is only possible at this stage to suggest tentatively 
the ways in which the story outlined so far can be fitted into the 
analytical framework of Chapter 1. The purpose of the subsequent study 
is to try to make the mechanism clearer. In this section, therefore,
I shall analyse the process of technical change described in the 
previous sections in terms of its economic characteristics, and then 
suggest ways in which these characteristics provide a clue to the 
explanation of the process of economic and institutional change 
outlined earlier.
The economic characteristics of pre-war technical change 
in Japanese agriculture could be summarised as follows:
i. rate of change of output per unit of-input. As we
have seen, output increase was probably faster in the pre-World War I
period than it was in the inter-war period, while input increase
may have speeded up. So the overall efficiency of th’e technology 
was rising relatively fast in the earlier stages but subsequently 
less so.
ii. factor bias. The description of the technical
changes which occurred suggests that the general trend was for
increasing inputs of current capital items, principally fertiliser, 
and, at least in the early stages, labour input per unit of land*
Output growth therefore arose mainly through increases in yields.
iii. divisibility and economies of scale. There is no 
quantitative evidence that the technical changes of the period 
resulted in any scale economy effects. They were largely embodied 
in new forms of input which, to an increasing extent, were produced 
outside the village economy. But these inputs were, for the most 
part, highly divisible (seeds, fertilisers) and did not represent
a particularly large outlay to the farmer. There are three excep­
tions to this: (1) draught animals, (2) land improvement, irrigation
and drainage facilities, (3) in the later part of the period, 
mechanical pumps, threshers and hullers. The impact of these inputs 
is difficult to assess at the macro level, but it seems likely that, 
on the whole, institutional arrangements were such that the benefits 
of any scale economies which existed were reaped by most sizes of
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farm. Examples of this, and of some exceptions to it (particularly 
in access to the use of horses) will appear later on.
iv. complexity. Since the changes in technology did 
not, on the whole, involve the use of machinery, the application of 
new techniques did not require high levels of education or 
mechanical skill. New practices could be taught by example.
Correct application of fertiliser for the new seeds required a 
certain amount more learning ability and literacy would clearly 
be an advantage here. What the new techniques required to an even 
greater extent was care and patient, diligent labour on the part of 
the farmer.
Does the available information about economic change in 
pre-war Japanese agriculture provide any explanation as to why a new 
technology with characteristics such as these should emerge, or any 
evidence as to how the change in technology was related to the 
economic and institutional developments occurring? The data regard­
ing changes in relative factor prices confirm Hayami and Ruttan's 
hypothesis that the factor bias of the new technology, in terms of 
its substitution of current inputs for land, can be explained by the 
fact that the price of fertiliser was declining quite rapidly 
relative to land prices and rents, as the progress of Japanese 
industrialisation lowered its production cost. However, it is not so 
easy to explain trends in the relative use of land and labour in this 
way. Rents and wages seem to have risen roughly in line with each 
other until the inter-war period when wages began to rise faster 
(Ishikawa and Ohkawa,59,appendix chart 3, p.193). If labour input did 
increase as a result of the adoption of the Meiji Noohoo, then the 
explanation would have to lie either in the technical complementari­
ties between increased labour input and the use of more current 
inputs (i.e. in a more complex specification of the economic 
characteristics of the technology), or in the factors determining 
the marginal opportunity cost of family labour within the household 
economy (i.e. in a more detailed analysis of the initial economic 
conditions) . Nor is it possible to explain the emergence of the 
other characteristics straightforwardly in terms of relative factor 
prices.
As a first step towards an expanded explanation of the 
process of technical change, it is possible to put together a 
sequence of hypothetical links between the characteristics of the
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new techniques and changes in economic and social organisation in 
pre-war Japanese agriculture. This could add to the induced factor 
bias explanation of the determinants of technical change and help 
explain the other characteristics and their effects.
We can begin with two sets of facts. Firstly, we know 
that the initial conditions of Japanese agriculture in 1868 were 
incompatible with the use of the kinds of large-scale, land-using 
techniques which represented the most advanced agricultural 
technology then available. The existing investment in irrigation 
infrastructure and the scale of farms made the use of large equipment 
impossible. This was discovered early on after the failure of the 
new Meiji government’s attempts to introduce Western farming methods. 
This meant that improved technology had to emerge from within the 
available technological potential (though aided by advances in some 
scientific fields such as genetics) and as a result of indigenous 
economic forces.
Secondly, we have evidence that it was from amongst the 
class of cultivating landlords, the tezukuri jinushi, that the initial 
innovators of the Meiji Noohoo emerged (Dore,50). Through their 
leadership of village agricultural organisations, they would have 
had best access to information about new techniques and to new forms 
of inputs. They were able to organise land improvement schemes 
where necessary to the use of new techniques. They were probably 
relatively well educated and able to experiment and take risks. So 
it seems likely that it was landowners of this sort who selected and 
developed the characteristics of the techniques they wanted to adopt 
and to diffuse to their tenants and other cultivators.
So we could hypothesise that the characteristics of the 
new techniques developed and diffused in the period before the First 
World War were the result of the interaction between the initial 
conditions, especially where embodied in existing investment in land 
improvements, and the economic forces, including the buoyant market 
for rice, operating on landowners of the tezukuri jinushi type. The 
characteristics of the Meiji Noohoo appealed to these landowners 
because: (1) they offered quite rapid increases in yields on
cultivated land while fitting reasonably well into the existing 
economic and technical structure (although involving a certain amount 
of investment in land improvement) ; (2) the inputs required were
available to them at relatively low cost - current inputs were
-60-
becoming relatively cheap and it was still possible to draw on 
supplies of labour from within the household and from other house­
holds, both through ties of obligation and through hiring? (3) the 
divisibility and lack of complexity of the new techniques meant 
that they could, with a certain amount of persuasion and teaching, be 
diffused to tenants and other farmers within the village - this 
benefitted the tezukuri jinushi from an economic point of view, 
through possible higher and certainly more stable levels of rents on 
the land they leased out, and perhaps from a social and psychological 
point of view, given the nature of their role as village leaders 
(Ishikawa, 58) .
The characteristics of the Meiji Noohoo thus emerged, 
as the larger-scale landowners selected and improved available 
techniques, aided by the government's research and extension organisa­
tion, the itinerant lecturers and so on, with which they had contact. 
In their turn, the new techniques affected social and economic 
organisation. The initial adoption of yield-increasing techniques by 
larger-scale landowners enabled them to acquire ownership of the land 
of smaller-scale farmers, struggling with the increasingly commercial 
economy and unable as yet to adopt new techniques.
However, as outside economic conditions changed around 
the time of the First World War - as sources of labour supply outside 
the household became harder to find, as wages rose relative to rents, 
as tenants became better educated and socially stronger - and as 
improved techniques spread from larger to smaller-scale cultivators, 
the ultimate effect of the characteristics of the Meiji Noohoo may 
have been to increase the relative efficiency of the small- to 
medium-scale farmer. Such a farmer's family labour supply was 
probably adequate for the needs of his holding and motivated to 
carry out new cultivation practices meticulously. Such farmers, 
especially after the First World War boom in agricultural prices, 
had become sufficiently entrenched in the commercial economy to be 
able to buy new inputs from it and to sell more output to it. They 
were now, educationally and socially, able to become involved in the 
agricultural organisations which promoted new techniques. So, by 
this time, they were perhaps better able than the larger-scale 
cultivator to benefit from the characteristics of the Meiji Noohoo.
The increasing diffusion of new techniques and of the 
ability to innovate among small- to medium-scale farmers can then be
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seen as related to subsequent changes in the economic and social 
organisation of agriculture between the wars, in particular to the 
increasing concentration in the middle ranges of the size scale of 
cultivated holdings. The rising relative efficiency of smaller-scale 
farmers with the new technology would, in the first place, have 
strengthened their economic position vis-a-vis larger cultivators. 
Wataya has some evidence that the middle-scale owner/tenant group 
had higher land and labour productivities and invested more in 
inputs per hectare during the inter-war period than did those 
above or below them in the size distribution (Wataya,80). Secondly, 
this divergence in productivity levels would have encouraged larger 
farmers to rent out their land rather than cultivate it themselves, 
and would thus have strengthened the trend towards absentee 
landlordism, intensified the decline of the tezukuri jinushi, and 
made land available to those rising up the size scale. Ohkawa has 
shown theoretically that it is divergences in yields between larger 
and smaller farms (resulting from varying levels of labour input per 
hectare) that induce larger landowners to rent out their land 
rather than cultivate it themselves (Ohkawa,22,pp.277-292). Thirdly, 
as the potential of the family labour force became exhausted and 
the rate of growth and technical progress slowed up in the inter-war 
period, the first steps were taken towards forms of mechanisation 
which could ease labour constraints within the context of the small- 
to medium-scale family farm. It is thought that, by this time, it 
was from the group of middle-scale owner/tenants that the initial 
innovators came and that it was the economic forces operating on 
them which influenced the development of mechanical threshers, 
hullers, pumps and ultimately the power tiller, towards the end 
of the inter-war period (Ishikawa and Ohkawa,59,p.172). Thus, 
coming round full circle, the results of the adoption and spread 
of the Meiji Noohoo themselves influenced the direction of the next 
stage of technical progress.
The particular case dealt with in this study did not 
follow this pattern exactly because it was influenced by the 
peculiarities of the natural and economic environment of the area.
It does not, therefore, provide evidence of general trends, but 
rather of the existence of the hypothesised interactions between 
changes in technology and changes in economic and social organisation. 
It does this by trying to reveal the mechanisms whereby such
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interactions operated within the Japanese context. It therefore 
looks at the micro-economic roles played in the process of technical 
change by Japanese institutional mechanisms such as the group 
organisation of investment in new techniques and the official 
institutions which helped develop and select the characteristics 
of new techniques.
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A Note on Data Sources.
The information on which the following study is based 
derives from two types of source. A certain amount of basic 
statistical data can be assembled from the relatively accessible 
Saga Prefecture Statistical Yearbook (Saga-ken Tookei Sho). The 
major series go back to 1888 and are broken down to county (gun) 
level. For the agricultural sector, they cover subjects such as the 
labour force, cultivated area, output, and so on, along with some 
less comprehensive data on institutional organisation, such as the 
scope of tenancy and the size structure of holdings. However, the 
much more important sources for the present study are secondary 
ones - the works of agricultural economists and historians who have 
gathered together information from a wide range of primary sources.
A major problem for present purposes with the prefectural 
statistical data is their geographical coverage. The Saga Plain is 
a distinct area from the point of view of its natural environment.
The prefecture contains, in the south, other plain areas more 
recently reclaimed from the sea, and, in the north and west, hilly 
areas. Both of these differ in natural conditions and agricultural 
technology from the area known as the Saga Plain. However, admin­
istrative boundaries do not co-incide with these environmental 
differences. Although the Saga Plain lies entirely within the 
jurisdiction of Saga Prefecture, it falls into several of the admin­
istrative sub-divisions of the prefecture called gun (county) and 
shi (city). Most of it lies within Saga and Kamisaki counties and 
Saga city, but parts of it stretch into two other counties of the 
prefecture (see Map 2) .
To deal with this problem, data for Saga-gun have been 
used to represent the Plain in the present study, where they are 
available in the Yearbook. Other sources sometimes use other areas 
(e.g. Saga-gun + Saga-shi) and, where nothing more detailed exists, 
data for the whole prefecture are presented. Saga-gun covers about
13,000 ha. of cultivated land and Saga- and Kamisaki-gun together 
with Saga-shi cover about 20,000 ha., that is to say, about a quarter 
of the approximately 70,000 ha. of cultivated land in the whole 
prefecture. Inclusion of the two part-Plain counties puts the 
proportion up to almost 50% of the cultivated area. In the pre-war 
period, about 30% of the value of all agricultural output of the
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prefecture was produced in Saga- and Kamisaki-gun and Saga-shi, 
about 50% if the two other counties are included. These proportions 
are roughly the same for rice output. Saga-gun alone produced about 
a quarter of the prefecture's rice. The Plain was the most important 
agricultural area of the prefecture and, as can be seen, must have 
exerted a considerable influence on the overall trends. But this 
influence is diluted and complicated by the, at times unavoidable, 
inclusion in the data of other parts of the prefecture whose exper­
ience was somewhat different.
Turning to the secondary sources, there exists quite a 
long history of studies of Saga Plain agriculture. Work on the 
available official data had begun before the Second World War and 
Tanaka had already produced a famous analytical study, based on 
surveys of individual villages (Tanaka,42 and 79). Kamagata's 
book (Kamagata, 34), published in 1946, is the earliest of the large- 
scale sources used for the present study. It draws heavily on 
official surveys, documents, regulations, and so on, and on the records 
of research and extension workers in the Saga Prefecture Experiment 
Station. These are put together to make a descriptive history 
of changes in agricultural techniques in Saga. Dr. Isobe's long 
article (Isobe,76) is a more analytic work, written as part of a 
collection of studies of regional aspects of Japan's agricultural 
development. He draws on previous work, such as Kamagata's, but also 
makes considerable use of regional breakdowns of national surveys 
and locally collected official statistics. Yamada and Oota, in their 
large-scale history of agriculture in Saga Prefecture (Yamada and Oota, 
46), use similar sources, but, being local agricultural historians 
devoting lifetimes to the collection of materials about the Saga 
area, they are able to draw on local records and documents, even down 
to the level of individual households. Dr. Miyajima is a research 
officer at the Saga Experiment Station, and his book (Miyajima,36) is 
a somewhat more popular account of the development of new techniques 
in Saga. It is written rather as the story of the work of the 
Experiment Station and so gives a more vivid and detailed account of 
the way research workers actually went about developing and diffusing 
new techniques.
In general, the primary sources used in these and other 
works referred to in the study could be summarised as follows:
i. Regional data collected for the purposes of national
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surveys, e.g. the 1940 Tekisei Kiboo Choosa (Survey of Appropriate 
Scales of Farm).
ii. Surveys and reports made by official institutions at 
the local level, particularly the Experiment Station, local govern­
ment departments and the prefectural agricultural association, e.g. the 
Experiment Station's 1915 survey of seed varieties used in Saga 
Prefecture.
iii. The work of individual agricultural economists 
working in local research organizations, such as the Saga Prefecture 
Agricultural Labour Research Institute, the agricultural economics 
departments of Saga and of Kyuushuu Universities.
iv. Local records made by individual farms, villages, 
co-operatives, etc., e.g. the records of the Oide Irrigation 
Association.
Further reference to the nature of sources will be made 
where appropriate in the detailed description of events in the Saga 
Plain area, which now follows.
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CHAPTER 3
The Initial Conditions of the Saga Plain Area.
The first component of the framework of analysis 
developed in Chapter 1 was the concept of the initial conditions.
This chapter aims to examine this concept as it operated in the 
case of the Saga Plain area. It seeks to isolate and describe the 
various factors making up the initial conditions, as listed in 
Chapter 1. As was argued then, we need to appreciate the interlocking 
technical and economic systems of the initial conditions period in 
order to understand the effects both of the coming of market 
relationships to the village from outside and of technical changes 
within the production system.
The technical and economic organisation described here 
is broadly that in existence on the Saga Plain throughout the 
nineteenth century. The major components of that system were in 
operation long before this, but for present purposes the relevant 
economic and technical relationships were those in existence around 
the time of the Meiji Restoration in 1868. These represent the 
distillation of the results of the long experience of agricultural 
conditions during the slowly-changing Tokugawa period of Japanese 
history. The final section of the chapter, however, deals with 
the response of Saga farmers to the new techniques which became 
available during the Meiji period.
1. Technology and Resource Endowments.
(i) environmental conditions.
Saga Prefecture lies in the 
north-western corner of the island of Kyuushuu (see Map 1) . To 
its North lies the Sea of Japan, and in the South it reaches down 
to the Ariake Sea, a large bay protected from the open ocean by 
the curved peninsula of Nagasaki Prefecture. To its East and West 
lie mountain ranges, separating it from Fukuoka and Nagasaki 
Prefectures. Its north-western area is hilly, but drops down to a 
coastline of sandy beaches, small holiday resorts and fishing 
harbours, reaching from the port of Imari, long famous for its 
pottery-ware, in the West, to the fishing port of Karatsu in the
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East. Along its south-eastern border with Fukuoka Prefecture flows 
the river Chikugo, and westwards and northwards from this river 
stretches its alluvial plain, surrounded by mountains away to the 
North and East, and reaching down to the sea in the South (see Map 2).
The alluvial plain of the Chikugo covers a wide area of 
land over which the natural environment varies toward the sea and the 
mountains. It is the central part of this plain, an area of about
20,000 ha. of reasonably homogeneous natural conditions, which is 
known- as the Saga Plain and is the subject of this study.
The most crucial environmental feature of the Saga Plain, 
from the point of view of paddy rice cultivation, is its flatness.
The centre of the Plain is no more than 3 metres above sea level.
Its landscape, a wide, flat, green expanse with the distant mountains 
apparent only as shadows on the horizon, appears less unfamiliar to 
the western observer than does the more typical landscape of Japanese 
agriculture, with its narrow coastal plains and terraced hillsides. 
Considerable amounts of reclamation and drainage work were a pre­
condition for agriculture on such a flat plain. This process has 
continued from the beginnings of agriculture in the area until the 
present day, but the bulk of what is known as the Saga Plain was made 
cultivable during the Tokugawa period. As compared with other parts 
of the Chikugo basin, it is a relatively old-established area.
Being an alluvial plain, the soil of the area is rich 
and fertile. The climate is also favourable to grain cultivation, 
with long sunny summers and relatively mild winters. However, the 
soil is heavy and difficult to work and, although it holds water and 
fertiliser well, good ploughing and land preparation are hard to 
achieve without a horse or some other source of power. The area is 
also subject to storms and heavy rain which lead to flooding on the 
flat land. But despite these problems, soil and climate are, by and 
large, favourable to rice cultivation and, indeed, to high yields. 
Furthermore, a much larger proportion of the cultivated area is 
suitable for paddy cultivation in Saga than in the rest of the country, 
where many fields are too high up the hillsides to be reached by the 
flow of irrigation water. 85-90% of the cultivated area of Saga 
County is and was paddy land, compared with about 70% in Saga 
Prefecture and a little over half in the country as a whole (SKTS,86 
and LTES,84).
Nevertheless, although the environment was in the above
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respects well suited to rice cultivation, it presented two severe 
problems which Saga farmers had to overcome. The first was the supply 
of irrigation water to the fields.
Typical methods of irrigation in Japan involve the use 
of the slope of the land which the generally mountainous nature of 
the country's geography provides. Water is collected in reservoirs 
or ponds or is held behind dams in the upper reaches of rivers.
When it is needed it is allowed to flow down into the fields and 
through the interconnected paddies by utilising the slope of the land 
and the various levels of the fields.
Such a system is impossible on the Saga Plain, and in 
response to this environmental problem, a rather different system 
of irrigation grew up there as land was reclaimed and made cultivable. 
As paddies were constructed, ditches were dug to drain away water into 
the more-or-less distant rivers. As the rivers rise in the spring, 
and as rainwater collects, these ditches fill up with water which can 
be used to irrigate the paddy. Thus, all over the Plain, there 
exists a network of interconnected ditches in which water collects 
(see Map 3). These ditches are somewhat larger than the usual 
irrigation channels to be observed in Japan, being anything from 
six feet upwards in width. This is the result of the fact that their 
function is also different in that they are required to store water, 
in place of ponds or reservoirs, as well as bring it to the field.
They are known in all the Japanese literature by the English word 
"creek". Their overgrown banks, making bright green lines across the 
flat fields, make them the distinctive feature of the landscape. As 
sources of water for the home as well as the farm, even as a means of 
communication, they have played a vital role in the life of the Saga 
villages.
Creek irrigation is to be found in some other areas of 
Japan besides Saga. It is practised, for example, on the opposite 
bank of the Chikugo River in Fukuoka Prefecture. It is not possible 
to disaggregate the data so as to discover what proportion of the 
paddy area of Japan was irrigated from creeks during the period with 
which we are concerned, but it must have been small. Creek 
irrigation presented severe technical problems and was only practised 
where environmental conditions made it absolutely unavoidable, that 
is where there was no slope or flow to force water on to the fields.
The most important of the difficulties faced by farmers
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Map 3 (overleaf)
THE CREEK NETWORK
Source: Detail of the Japanese equivalent of an Ordnance Survey
map (1 : 25,000) , covering the Saga Plain area (1967) .
Notes: The built-up area in the top left-hand corner is part of
Saga City. The river Chikugo is shown in the bottom right-hand 
corner. The road and railway run diagonally across from top left 
to bottom right. The shaded streams are creeks enclosing the paddy 
fields.
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in creek irrigation areas was that there water had to be lifted, using 
some power source, and transferred from creek to field. The technology 
therefore had to embody some means of lifting water. This was unnec­
essary in most kinds of environment found in Japan, at least as a 
permanent feature, since water would simply flow into the fields.
It conditioned, as we shall see, the whole technical and economic system 
in use on the Plain.
The second major problem presented by the environment 
was that of pest damage. The Chikugo basin provided ideal conditions 
for an insect called the Sankameichuu or Three-brooded Rice-borer. 
Relatives of this pest were common throughout Japan. As moths (the 
Pearl Moth), they layed eggs amongst rice seedlings. The larvae 
hatched out and lived on the stems of the growing rice plants, caus­
ing severe damage. The variety of this insect prevalent in Saga was 
able, under the conditions there, to go through three life-cycles 
in a year. It could therefore cause more severe harvest loss than its 
single- or two-brooded relatives. 20-30% losses were not uncommon and 
in the disastrous year of 1893, the prefecture's harvest, which 
usually averaged about 120,000 tonnes at this time, was reduced to
51,000 tonnes by rice-borer damage (SKTS,86). The risks involved in 
rice cultivation were therefore greater in Saga than they were else­
where in Japan, and this fact also, as we shall see, conditioned 
the technology used in highly significant ways.
To summarise, the natural environment of the Saga Plain 
provided farmers with potentially very good conditions for grain 
cultivation. But it presented two major problems which made the 
application of the basic cultivation techniques of Japanese agricult­
ure difficult. The first of these was the problem of supplying 
irrigation water to the paddy field, and the second was the high risk 
resulting from the prevalence of the rice-borer.
(ii) technology
It was argued in Chapter 1 that 
the technology in use in an agricultural area during the initial 
conditions period will be uniquely adapted, by long experience, to the 
resource endowments of that area. It was also suggested that, along­
side this, there would be technologically complementary relationships 
amongst the various processes making up the whole production system.
In the previous section the major environmental peculiarities of the
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Saga Plain area were outlined. The aim of this section is to 
illustrate the ways in which the technology in use was adapted to 
this environment and to describe the interlocking technical relation­
ships embodied in the production system.
To begin with the problem of supplying irrigation water, 
we have seen how the network of creeks covered the Plain bringing 
water to every paddy field. Each field adjoined a creek from 
which water could be drawn onto it. The simplest method of doing 
this was simply to lift water in. buckets and throw it on the fields, 
and this was the technique used from the earliest days of agriculture 
on the Plain until around the 1770s and 80s. At this time, the 
bucket method was superceded by the use of treadle-wheels which 
quickly spread over the Plain and were used almost universally there 
until the 1920s.
Treadle-wheel irrigation was central to the technical 
system in operation during the initial conditions period. The wheels 
were made of wood, criss-crossed with a complex arrangement of 
spokes, and were about 5 feet in diameter (Fig. 3.1) . They were 
designed to be turned by one person, treading on the slats of 
the revolving wheel and balancing himself on long poles. At least 
one wheel was an essential item of capital equipment for all Saga 
Plain farmers. Often, where water had to be raised some distance from 
creek to field, two or three wheels were operated in sequence.
Treadle wheels were used elsewhere as supplementary means of 
irrigation, but perennial reliance on them for raising water onto 
the fields was peculiar to creek areas.
The work involved in using the treadle wheel was long 
and very hard. According to Miyajima, it was backbreaking and 
demoralising. It wore callouses on the feet and ultimately ruined 
the health (Miyajima, 36,p. 15) . The meaning that the wheels held for 
the farmers of the Saga Plain is indicated by the fact that they 
are still to be seen, 50 years after going out of use, employed as the 
equivalents of pub and shop signs, even decorating the foyer of a 
hotel. They were not just pieces of equipment but symbols of the 
gruelling work which Saga people had to perform in order to grow 
rice in their environment.
From the economic point of view, the most important 
difference between the use of the treadle-wheel and more typical 
Japanese irrigation methods lay in the labour requirements per
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hectare which it demanded. Although treadle-wheels were an 
advance on buckets/ they still required man’s labour for days on end 
throughout the spring and summer. They meant that one man could 
manage only about 40 ares of land when the average size of holding 
was over 1 hectare (Isobe/76,p.15). Where two or three wheels were 
necessary, the major part of a family's labour force would be tied 
up with pumping during the busiest months of the farmer’s year, 
when numerous other operations needed to be carried out.
The labour requirements of treadle-wheel irrigation 
exerted, as we shall see, a profound influence over the economic 
system of Saga Plain agriculture for two reasons. Firstly, they 
created pressure to try to spread out the labour demands of the 
irrigation technology over as long a period as possible in order 
for a family to be able to cultivate a reasonable area. Secondly, 
they meant that, even with labour demand spread out, the average 
family did not possess enough labour to farm a holding of average 
size or upwards. The need to mitigate the effects of these two 
facts led, as we shall see, to adaptive adjustment both within 
the technology and in the economic and social relationships 
between households.
In addition to the difficulties of irrigation there was 
also the problem of the rice-borer. At this stage, very little 
was known about the life-cycle and habits of the insect. As far 
as the farmers were concerned, the occurrence of rice-borer damage 
was an act of God, against which they were more-or-less powerless. 
The only control technique known was the holding of torchlit 
processions through the fields, luring the moths away to the sea or 
the mountains (Kyuushuu Noosei Kyoku,35,p.239). This was not an 
entirely ineffective method as the farmers recognised, reciting 
sutras for the souls of the moths they had thus destroyed. But its 
effect was not great enough to stop the farmers from inferring that 
the size of the harvest depended on whether or not the rice-borer 
struck, rather than on the agricultural techniques used.
In this situation, one of the farmers1 main concerns was 
to minimise the risk of severe harvest loss. His other concern, as 
we have seen, lay in spreading out the labour demands of the 
irrigation technology over as long a period ,as possible. The 
combined result of these two concerns was the development of an 
unusual crop rotation system, which was well established during the
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initial conditions period. The majority of the cultivated area 
of the Plain being converted into paddy fields, rice was obviously 
the most important crop grown in this rotation. But farmers whose 
land could be drained when necessary and who had access to sufficient 
labour and horse power were able to grow winter crops of wheat, 
barley, and other grains, or vegetables. In 1888, for instance, 
the second grain crops absorbed 21% of the total labour days in 
agriculture in Saga Prefecture, and produced 18% of the total 
harvest (Isobe,76,Table 6,p.9). But the principles of the rotation 
set out below, designed as it was with the aim of reducing the risk 
of rice-borer damage and spreading out the labour requirements, 
were applied by all farmers, whether or not they grew second crops.
The characteristic feature of this rotation was that 
it involved the farmer in dividing his land into two sections, 
usually in the proportion 60:40. Each was planted with rice at a 
different time during the spring. Different rice varieties, suitable 
for early or late planting, were used in each section. The rice 
growing in each of the two sections was thus always at a different 
stage of its growth. The basic form of the rotation and its phasing 
system are set out in Fig. 3.2.
This rotation produced two results. Firstly, each 
operation of the cultivation process could be performed at a 
different time on each section. Most significantly, it was not 
necessary to pump water on to both sections at the same time. This 
therefore increased the area which, during the course of a year, 
one man's labour could irrigate. Secondly, with the rice in each 
section at different stages, it was not likely that, if the rice- 
borer struck, it would affect both sections with equal severity.
The risk of heavy loss was therefore reduced. The rotation thus 
served to adapt the technology both to the available endowments of 
land and labour and to the peculiar features of the natural 
environment.
There were other ways also in which the technology was 
adapted to the demands of the natural environment. These were 
principally to do with land preparation. The human effort required 
to raise water on to the field made such water very precious, and 
everything possible was done to preserve it in the field and 
minimise leakage. Ploughing techniques were specially adapted so as 
to create a kind of base to the soil in the paddy through which
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Fig. 3.2
TYPICAL ROTATION IN OPERATION ON THE SAGA PLAIN 
DURING THE INITIAL CONDITIONS PERIOD.
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Source: Adapted from Isobe,76,p.12.
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water could not leak. The field needed to be ploughed many times and 
for the final ploughing a special kind of plough was used, designed 
to form this base to the field. This final ploughing was called 
"tokojime" and required considerable skill on the part of the plough­
man. If it was not carried out well, the farmer could wake up in the 
morning to find that all the water had leaked from his field, that 
he was the laughing-stock of the village and was faced with the un­
bearable task of pumping the water back again (Miyajima,36,pp.18-19).
The complete ploughing system made further heavy demands 
on the capital and labour resources of the farmers. Many hours of 
skilled labour were called for, in the autumn as well as the spring 
if a second crop was to be grown. A complement of three different 
kinds of plough was necessary. Above all, such ploughing was 
greatly facilitated by the use of a horse. Horse-ploughing was by 
no means standard practice in Japan at this time, and ploughing using 
human labour was still common. But the use of horses had originated 
in Kyuushuu and was widespread on the Saga Plain by the end of the 
Tokugawa period. The heavy capital requirements of these cultivation 
methods combined with the economics of horse ownership to necessitate 
the development of particular economic relationships between house­
holds .
One final way in which technology was adapted to environ­
ment might also be mentioned. In Tokugawa Japan the most common 
source of agricultural fertiliser was leaves and grass collected in 
upland areas owned by the village community. On the Saga Plain there 
were no upland areas but the natural environment provided an excellent 
substitute in the mud which was carried down and deposited in the 
creeks by the flow of water from the rivers. In the winter, during 
the phases of the crop rotation when land lay fallow, groups of 
farmers would lift mud from the bottoms of the empty creeks, standing 
chest deep in the icy mud, using buckets and pulleys to transfer it 
onto the field. There was no escaping this unpleasant job since, 
besides providing fertiliser, it was essential if the creeks were not 
to silt up and it thus formed an integral part of the technical system.
Aside from the peculiarities of irrigation methods, 
rotations and land preparation, actual rice cultivation techniques 
resembled those typical throughout Japan. Seedlings were grown in
i
seed beds from numerous local varieties of seeds and transplanted 
into the prepared and fertilised paddy-field. Water stood in the
field during the three to four month growing period of the plants. 
Enthusiasts weeded their fields anything up to five times, by hand 
or with a hoe. The grain was harvested by hand and threshed, 
using a simple wooden tool.
To summarise, then, the technology in use on the Saga 
Plain during the initial conditions period represented an adaptation 
of standard cultivation techniques to the natural conditions and 
factor endowments of the area. The links between the various parts 
of the resulting technology, and the differences between it and the 
more typical technology described in the previous chapter, are 
illustrated in Fig. 3.3, which uses the same format as Fig. 2.1.
The irrigation method embodied both in infrastructure and in water- 
raising equipment was a response to the flatness of the environment. 
Cultivation practices were a response to the risk posed by the rice- 
borer, both through the rotation and through the use of relatively 
inexpensive current inputs (e.g. low-quality seed varieties).
The irrigation method, together with the ploughing techniques it 
necessitated, created heavy peak labour and capital demands, which 
could only be accomodated within the framework of the special 
rotation, which simultaneously minimised rice-borer risk. It 
also made double-cropping feasible. The rotation included the 
fallow period necessary for the clearing from the creeks of the 
mud used as fertiliser. The result of all these interconnections 
between aspects of the technology was that fundamental change was 
impossible unless both major environmental problems were solved 
simultaneously.
The next step is to consider how the economic structures 
of villages and households were adapted to the demands of this 
technology. For this purpose it might be useful to summarise the 
factor requirements of the technology. Essentially, the demands for 
labour, and to some extent capital, per unit of land were made unusually 
heavy by the necessary technological adaptations. Although this 
was mitigated by the lengthening of the growing season involved in 
the rotation, it remained true that labour requirements per hectare 
over the spring and summer were unusually heavy and that therefore 
the area of land which one family could manage with its own labour 
was less than that in areas where technology was more typical. This 
is reflected in the fact that cultivated area per worker on the
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Fig. 3.3
THE INITIAL TECHNOLOGY OF SAGA PLAIN AGRICULTURE, 
showing the interconnections between aspects of the technology 
in spreading out labour demand and minimising risk.
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Plain was unusually low. During the 1890s, for instance, it stood 
at about 22-24 ares per man compared with a national average of 
around 35 (SKTS,86, and LTES,84). But we are now moving away from 
purely technological considerations and must turn to considering the 
economic relationships which were built onto this technology.
2. The Distribution of Productive Assets among Households.
The most important resource to consider here is land, the 
principal basis of economic, political and social power in most 
agricultural societies. This section will deal first with the 
distribution of land ownership and the structure of land use. It 
will then show how the pattern which emerges from this was re-inforced 
by variations in the quality of land owned and used, and by the 
distribution of capital assets.
(i) land.
In Saga, as elsewhere in Japan, the 
distribution of land ownership and the tenancy system contained every 
gradation of holding type, from the smallest tenant farmer up to the 
very large landowner, although it must not be forgotten that, in the 
Japanese context, someone owning 5 ha. was a very large-scale land­
owner, and the majority of households cultivated holdings of less 
than a hectare. There is little statistical data for the initial 
conditions period, so it is difficult to go beyond this general 
picture except in terms of qualitative impressions and deductions. On 
this basis, the structure of land ownership and use on the Saga Plain 
could be characterised as follows:
i. In terms of landownership, there were heavy concentrat­
ions of households in the smallest categories of the size distribution 
and a relatively high proportion of medium- and upper medium-sized 
landowners, but a smaller proportion of very large-scale landowners 
than was typical for the country as a whole.
ii. In terms of the size distribution of cultivated 
holdings, there was similarly a large proportion of very small-scale 
cultivators, and a relatively large proportion of upper middle-scale 
cultivators, but very few large-scale farms.
1
The reasoning behind this characterisation is as follows:
i. There is scattered statistical evidence to suggest
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that a high proportion of households owned very small areas (e.g. less 
than *5 ha.) and a very small proportion owned anything over 3 ha.. 
Table 3.1 shows some data on the size distribution of landownership 
in the early Meiji period, collected from records kept in individual 
villages.
ii. The policy of the government of Saga prior to the 
Meiji Restoration had tended to stifle the development of large-scale 
landownership (1). Towards the end of the Tokugawa period, the 
feudal lords who governed local areas were falling into increasing 
financial difficulties. The rulers of Saga were in a particularly 
difficult situation because they were called upon to provide ships 
for the defence of the country. Saga being an agricultural area with 
no large urban centres, there were few businessmen or merchants who 
could be taxed or who could lend money to the government. The Saga 
clan therefore depended on income from agriculture and took a 
considerable interest in the prosperity of the farmers. Irrigation 
work, for instance, was often organised by the clan government. As 
the rule of the Tokugawa government began to break down in the mid­
nineteenth century, however, and as commercial relationships 
(especially tenancy) began to break into the village economy/ it was 
felt that some more drastic measures were needed to preserve the 
welfare (and tax-paying capacity) of the farmer.
What resulted can only be described as a land reform, 
aimed at halting the development of absentee landlordism. In 1842 
an order was issued postponing the payment of all rent and interest 
for ten years. The period was extended in 1852, but the protests 
of landlords made it necessary to come to a permanent arrangement 
and in 1861 regulations were issued for dividing the land of 
non-resident landowners in fixed proportions between landlord and 
tenant. The effect was to confiscate the land of non-resident 
landholders and place a ceiling of six ha. on the land holdings of 
resident landlords and cultivators. This high ceiling, along with 
various exceptions applicable to newly-reclaimed land, meant that 
the amount of land handed over to cultivators was only about 3% of the 
cultivated area of present-day Saga Prefecture. But it tended to slow 
down the development of large-scale landowning and strengthen the
(1) The following is based on the description given in Saga-ken Noochi 
Kaikaku Shi Hensan Iinkai,41, chapter 8, section 3.
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Table 3.1
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP IN A GROUP 
OF SAGA PLAIN VILLAGES.
A. At the beginning of the Meiji period.
Under 0.3 - 0.5 - 1.0 - 1.5 - 2.0 - Over Total
0. 3ha 0. 5ha 1 .Oha 1. 5ha 2. Oha 3. Oha 3. Oha
Number of 
Households
49 75 91 52 23 18 3 411
Percentage 36.2 18.2 22.1 12.6 5.9 4.3 0.7 100
B. In 1881.
Under 0.3 - 0.5 - 1.0 - 1.5 - 2.0 - Over Total
0. 3ha 0. 5ha 1 .Oha 1. 5ha 2. Oha 3. Oha 3. Oha
Number of 
Households
150 18 38 37 27 13 5 288
Percentage 52.0 6.3 13.2 12.9 9.4 4.5 1.7 100
Source: Yamada and Oota, 46, pp. 271 and 288.
N.B. Some villages appear in both parts of the Table, but some 
different ones are also covered each time.
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position of the small-scale farmer at precisely the time when the 
tendency for small farmers to fall into tenancy to large-scale 
landlords was setting in elsewhere in the country. The protests of 
the small-scale farmers of Saga were sufficient to prevent the 
Meiji government, when it came to power in 1868, from carrying out 
its aim of returning the confiscated land to its former owners.
iii. The characteristics of the technology would tend 
to imply this kind of a structure. These would, firstly, tend 
to make cultivation on a large scale difficult. Large-scale 
cultivation has always been difficult and rare in Japan (excluding 
Hokkaidoo). In a situation in which the layout of plots is largely 
determined by the irrigation system and in which any one farmer's 
plots are scattered throughout the village land, a large cultivator 
is simply one who owns more by-and-large identical plots than other 
people. There are, therefore, few scale economies to be obtained 
from farming a large number of plots. With the technology in 
operation on the Saga Plain, large-scale cultivation was made even 
more difficult because the larger the area a household farmed, 
the more labour it had to find from outside the family. The skill 
and care demanded by Japanese rice cultivation techniques make the 
management of a large labour force for efficient cultivation difficult. 
For these reasons cultivation by one household of an area greater 
than about 3 hectares was rare. Secondly, the characteristics of 
the technology would have tended to keep a higher-than-average 
proportion of farmers at the lowest end of the size distribution.
The small-scale farmer could manage his holding with his family's 
labour and borrowed equipment and horse power. As a holding became 
larger, this would become increasingly difficult and the household 
would begin to need to acquire its own ploughs, its own horse and 
so on. When we come to consider the household economy of the small 
farmer we shall see that he would rarely be in a position to 
accumulate the capital necessary to.make the shift into larger-scale 
farming.
The structure which emerges from this view of the influ­
ences on the distribution of land ownership and use in the Meiji 
period is thus one consisting of, on the one hand, a group of medium- 
to large-scale cultivators and landowners, and, on the other, a much 
larger group of very small-scale cultivators of owned or rented 
land. The available evidence suggests that about a third of
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households farmed enough land to put them into the first group, 
with the remaining two-thirds mostly to be found in the second 
group {Kamagata,34,p .182).
(ii) land quality.
Land quality on the Saga Plain 
was largely a question of the ease with which a field could be 
irrigated and drained. The most valuable fields were those which 
could be drained in the winter and those where the distance between 
field level and creek was small. Also, although all fields adjoined 
a creek, the right to raise mud from a given creek belonged to the 
owner of a particular field. So fields that brought with them 
this right were more valuable than others. It is likely, in the 
light of our knowledge of the ways in which Japanese villages developed, 
that it was the larger landowning households which owned the most 
valuable fields (1) . They were likely to be the households of the 
main village families, descended from the original inhabitants of the 
village, and therefore original owners of the land farmed by their 
branch households and by other families initially dependent on 
them (2) . They would have retained within the main family both the 
best available land and control over the use of mud from creeks, 
as well as a larger proportion of the cultivable land than they had 
given to branch households or tenants. So the pattern of land 
distribution would have been re-inforced by the distribution of the 
best quality land4
(iii) horses and other capital assets.
A horse was the most important 
capital input required by Saga Plain farmers. One horse could cover 
the ploughing of about one hectare. It was necessary for a household 
to cultivate at least 1^ hectares to have the capacity to keep and 
feed a horse (Isobe,76,p.14). So only medium- to large-scale
(1) Dr. Isobe expressed the same view in converstion with me.
(2) See Smith, 29, pp. 54-59, on the pervasiveness of the distinction 
between "old" and "new" families in Tokugawa villages, and pp. 41-43 
on the practice of retaining major assets within the main family
when establishing a branch.
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cultivators were able to keep horses of their own and utilise them to 
capacity. In a village studied by Isobe, it was still true in 1939 
that every household owning a horse farmed more than one hectare 
(and only 5 out of those 26 farmed less than 1^ hectares), while of 
the 11 households not owning a horse, only one farmed more than a 
hectare (Isobe,77,table 6).
The scale economies inherent in horse ownership therefore 
meant that small-scale cultivators had to gain access to the use of 
horses owned wholly or partly by others. Horse time could be rented, 
or borrowed from larger-scale cultivators with whom the small farmer 
had ties. Sometimes those who had insufficient land to provide 
fodder for a horse all year round would own one but send it away to 
be looked after elsewhere in the prefecture during the winter. Some 
horses were owned communally by groups of households. These sorts 
of arrangement did provide the smaller farmer with access to horses. 
But he did not have the advantage, gained by the farmer with suffic­
ient land to own his own horse, of having a horse available whenever 
he wanted it. This was especially important during the autumn, 
when land had to be ploughed in a limited length of time if a second 
crop was to be grown. It meant that it was difficult for those who 
did not own horses to double-crop.
The concentration of horse-ownership amongst the medium- 
to large-scale cultivator group therefore strengthened the relative 
economic position of such farmers, both by enabling them to use the 
technology most efficiently and by giving them control over an asset 
which they could rent out or lend in return for other services. 
Ownership of other relatively large-scale pieces of equipment, such 
as ploughs, strengthened this group still further, as did their 
possession of the rights to use mud from the creeks. So the 
ownership of capital assets in general intensified the division of 
village society which emerged from consideration of the distribution 
of land.
The structure of the distribution of productive assets 
which has begun to be pieced together here can be summarised and 
simplified by considering it as made up of two groups of households: 
the group, comprising about two-thirds of village households, who 
cultivated small holdings (owned or rented) of at most a hectare, 
the majority cultivating less than half a hectare; and the remaining
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third of households, mostly cultivating somewhere between one and 
three hectares, a few owning and/or cultivating more, who owned the 
best land and the bulk of the capital assets of the village. This 
division will recur later on when we consider the differences in the 
way the economies of these two types of household worked. The aim 
of this section has been to show that the basis of these differences 
lay in the distribution of productive assets amongst households.
3. Economic Relationships within the Village.
The Japanese village community was, and to some extent 
still is, a closely-knit body, self-governing in many aspects of its 
life. To this day a majority of Japanese villages have communal 
arrangements for such things as road works, repair of irrigation 
facilities and so on. The communal ownership and management by the 
village as a whole of irrigation systems and of woodland from which
to collect fertiliser formed a basis.for this. Where plots were
scattered throughout the village land everyone's interest lay in 
ensuring an even supply of water throughout the system, and the 
order and timing of the flow of irrigation water to individual fields 
was managed by the village as a whole. The irrigation facilities 
and the village woodland were thus run as kinds of public good, so 
as to ensure a fair supply to all.
On the Saga Plain, however, neither communal woodland
nor the irrigation system served as a basis for mutually beneficial
ties between the households of the village. There was no mountain 
land from which to collect fertiliser. Creek irrigation involved 
no communally-owned ponds or reservoirs for storing water and no 
village organisation of the flow of irrigation water. Although the 
village organised the opening and closing of the sluice gates which 
controlled the entry of water into the village creek network, the 
supply of water to any individual household's fields depended on 
that household's efforts at pumping. Indeed, there was even 
competition between farmers over the supply of water. Enthusiasts 
would get up very early, moving quietly so as to avoid waking their 
neighbours, and would begin pumping before everyone else, while the 
level of water in the creeks was at its highest and so the distance 
through which it had to be raised at its least (Miyajima,36,pp.14-15).
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So Saga Plain villages were not held together by the 
ownership or management of communal resources. Nevertheless, 
households were linked by relationships based on mutual need. These 
arose from the ways in which the labour requirements of the technology 
were met. As we have seen, almost all households with above-average 
sized holdings and normal-sized families had insufficient family 
labour to operate their farms. Hiring of labour was therefore 
necessary to a larger extent than was typical in Japan. The demand 
for hired labour was met by members of families wi-th small holdings, 
many of whom, it will later be argued, would have had difficulty in 
feeding their families on the output of their farms. The character­
istics of the way in which this employment was organised created 
economic and social ties between the two groups of households which 
emerged from the discussion of the distribution of assets, that is 
to say, between the upper-medium sized cultivators, who were 
labour employers, and the small-scale cultivators, who were labour 
suppliers. These ties held village society together despite the 
relative lack of communal functions and property.
Employment of non-family workers was not uncommon in 
Japan during the Meiji period, and even up to the Second World War. 
There were two ways in which it was typically organised. Permanent 
deficiencies in the family labour force relative to the area 
cultivated were made up by bringing workers into the household as 
members of it. The worker lived with the household, being fed and 
housed by it, and rewarded, perhaps, after a number of years, with 
a plot of land to farm himself (Nakane,19,ch.3, or Smith,29,ch.2) . 
Short-term demand for outside labour would be met by hiring temporary 
workers, who lived and worked on other holdings, on a daily or 
seasonal basis. By far the largest part of all hired labour was 
of this sort.
The employment system on the Saga Plain fell between 
these two types. The technology in use meant that there was a 
heavy demand for labour for a relatively long period throughout the 
spring and summer and into the autumn, even for families farming 
little more than a hectare. This demand was met by members of 
families from the small-scale cultivator group. But despite working 
for about nine months of the year on holdings which were not their 
own, they did not go to live in their employers' households. They 
continued to live with their families, who operated their own small
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holdings. For their nine month period of work they received an a'greed 
quantity of rice, in just the same way as short-term hired labour did. 
They fall into a category generally known as nenko (annual employees), 
who typically made up only a small proportion of the hired agricultur­
al labour force in the country as a whole. On the Saga Plain, the 
major part of the hired labour force was made up of male nenko who 
became skilled and experienced workers, especially in the difficult 
operation of tokojime ploughing in which they often specialised.
The nenko system also fell between the two typical 
employment methods in other respects. Although the nenko were wage 
labourers, the relationship between employer and employee resembled 
in some ways that between the worker who was taken into the household 
and his master. Each employing household would usually have more-or- 
less permanent relationships with the families supplying it with 
labour. Even when this was not the case, it was rare to employ 
someone from outside the immediate area of the village. By the 
second half of the nineteenth century, employer/employee relationships 
were becoming more formal, with contracts being written listing duties 
and payments, but real wages varied little. As long as the outside 
economy offered little alternative employment for those whom the 
family holding could barely support, then there was an abundant supply 
of nenko and employment was decided, not on the basis of price, but 
through social contact between households. Thus it was not really a 
market system.
This point is emphasised by the fact that employment 
arrangements were only part of a complex of relations between house­
holds, some economic, some not. Arrangements for the supply of 
horses and other pieces of capital equipment were often linked up with 
employment arrangements. So was the granting of permission to raise 
mud from creeks and the organisation of the necessary groups to carry 
it out. These economic arrangements were based on family ties or on 
old patron/client relationships between households, involving 
obligations on the part of the main households to protect the small 
ones, in return for an obligation on the part of the small households 
to supply labour when necessary. Village society was interwoven 
with relationships between households whereby each helped the other 
at difficult times, at weddings, funerals, roof-thatchings and so on, 
as well as in agricultural operations, and employment relations were 
part of this.
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So for the employer households, the system meant an 
assured supply of skilled labour, without the need to provide 
permanent subsistence and accomodation for employees within the 
household. This would have been a considerable burden, given the 
relatively large number of workers needed and the relatively small- 
scale holdings of some employers. The worker, on his side, had 
some guarantee of employment, of help with the supply of horses and 
equipment, and of other forms of assistance when required. He had 
the greater independence of his own holding, but the greater risk 
involved in not being part of a larger landowner's household.
The political and social structure of village society 
reflected the pattern of these employment relationships. It was the 
medium- to large-scale, employer households who provided village 
leadership, including leadership of agricultural organisations, like 
co-operatives, when they came to be formed towards the end of the 
nineteenth century. In the village analysed by Isobe (see Table 6.12), 
this can be seen in the almost complete monopoly of the major 
village offices held by the larger-scale, main families (honke). 
According to the villagers who spoke to Isobe, these families had 
been the main employer households. They were also, from the point 
of view of village social structure, the central households in the 
doozoku family groupings, and most of the other significant culti­
vating households were branches of their families. The large-scale 
cultivating household whose economy is considered in the next section 
(Family N) similarly provided leaders of the local co-operative.
The employment system provided the link which made 
the technology workable within the structure of land ownership. 
Employment relationships were part of a wider set of economic and 
social ties between households which helped to ensure security of 
subsistence for the village as a whole. Thus we have the complementary 
relationships between technology, the distribution of assets and the 
connections between households which were postulated as features of 
the initial conditions period in the framework. As was argued 
there, their underlying function seems to have been to provide 
security and the means of survival for the village group.
It is difficult to use standard economic theories to 
analyse a system such as this, within which economic decisions are 
heavily conditioned by the whole structure of village economic
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relationships. Professor Ishikawa has attempted to develop a 
theoretical model to use in the analysis of traditional agricultural 
systems such as this (Ishikawa,58). He shows that, given limited 
employment opportunities outside the village and scarce resources of 
land, capital and technical knowledge leading to low productivity 
levels, a market employment system would not necessarily ensure all 
village members of at least a minimum subsistence level of income. 
Although, from the point of view of the larger employing farmer, wage 
costs might be lower if there was full-scale competition for employ­
ment, the resulting disruption of village life, with the unemployed 
unable to make a living, would not be in his interests. This is 
especially so when inter-connected irrigation systems operate and 
plots are scattered around village land. It is not, therefore, 
necessary to argue that larger farmers, in guaranteeing employment 
at least at a minimum subsistence level of income, act altruistically. 
Rather it is simpler to say that, in an economic environment of very 
great insecurity and risk, and in which the production activities of 
households are closely inter-connected, the welfare of individual 
households depends to some extent on the welfare of the whole 
village community.
This idea seems to provide an economic explanation of the 
non-market or semi-market relationships between households in the 
village in areas such as employment, the use of larger items of 
capital equipment, etc.. They survived from earlier periods of 
agricultural development in the area because of their value in 
providing security in the face of great risk and of the mutual inter­
dependence of the welfare of members of the village group. Their 
breakdown, as market forces and changes in technology removed their 
basis, is traced in subsequent chapters.
4. The Operation of Farm Household Economies and some
Examples.
So far, the division of Saga farmers into a group of 
larger-scale employer/cultivators and a group of small-scale 
cultivator/agricultural workers has been described in terms of the 
distribution of land and other assets and relative positions within 
the economic and social structure of the village. The next step is 
to consider what can be deduced from this about differences in the
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household economies of the two groups.
There is no evidence to suggest that such differences 
arose from significant variations in the technology employed on 
different scales of farm. Larger-scale farmers who owned horses 
and fields with better drainage stood more chance of being able to 
grow a second crop, but in other respects more-or-less the same 
techniques were used on all village land. The basic cause of the 
division was the difference in the factor proportions available to 
the two sorts of household, i.e. the difference between households 
with little land but more than adequate family labour forces, and 
households with more land than the family could work on its own. 
Household economies therefore divide into those making up thp 
demand side of the labour market, as a result of the technology and 
the size of their holdings, and those making up the supply side, 
as a result of the fact that their holdings were not big enough 
to employ, and to some extent feed, the family. We can see this in 
operation if we piece together the information available in the 
sources so as to describe the general accounting frameworks facing 
the two sorts of household:
i. the small-scale cultivating household: the income
of this type of household would consist almost entirely of rice - 
the rice it grew on its own holding and the rice it received as 
wages for those members who worked for other households. It might 
have grown vegetables and other crops for its own consumption, but 
was unlikely to be able to grow a second grain crop, e.g. of fodder 
for a horse. From this income in kind it had to meet its own 
consumption needs, together with payments for rent, interest, hire 
of equipment and the cost of any inputs which had to be bought 
commercially. According to Smith, in Tokugawa times 150kg. of rice 
was only just enough to feed an adult for a year (Smith, 29,p. 25) .
In the late 1880s and 1890s, the earliest years for which the 
prefectural yearbook gives data, average yields in Saga-gun varied 
in the region of 250-300 kg./10 ares. For a household renting half 
a hectare at normal rental rates of about 50% of the rice crop, 
somewhere between 500 and 750 kg. of rice would remain to meet all 
other expenses and family consumption needs. This would represent 
little more than bare subsistence for a family of four, and income 
from outside would be essential if the household were larger than 
this (e.g. containing unmarried siblings of the househead, or
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grown-up children). Many cultivated less than half a hectare arid, 
for them, survival depended on the relationship with the larger-scale 
household which provided employment and other forms of assistance.
The only other extra employment open to them was in the manufacture 
of straw goods at home.
ii. the larger-scale employer/cultivator: the income 
of this sort of household would also consist mainly of the rice 
it grew, some of which it would probably sell for cash. It would 
also probably be able to grow a second grain crop, to sell, consume 
or use as fodder, as well as vegetables and so on. In addition it 
might receive rent for any land it leased out, and payments for the 
use of horses and equipment and the right to collect mud from its 
creeks. Its outlays included wages in kind to its hired workers, 
taxes, and the cost of any purchased inputs, such as a new horse 
or plough. As a very rough guide, the available evidence suggests 
that it was necessary to hire at least one nenko for every hectare 
cultivated in excess of what the family could manage (on average 
about 1 hectare) (1). In 1906, the first year for which SKTS gives 
wage data, the annual rate for a nenko was 90 yen. At the prevailing 
rice price and yield levels, a hectare of paddy would produce an 
income from rice of about 325 yen. So wage costs would take, at a 
minimum, a little under a third of the income from rice cultivation 
on each extra hectare. This would rise if temporary labour was 
needed as well. Employer households were probably responsible for 
feeding a more extended family than the small-scale farmer, and had 
certain obligations to help their workers and tenants (e.g. to 
provide them with meals sometimes). In early Meiji times at least, 
the uses to which they put what remained after these needs had been 
met would have been mainly traditional ones - purchase of land, 
improvements to the house, entertaining, dowries, traditional food 
and clothing, trips to shrines, etc..
These hypothetical accounting frameworks can be illustrated 
by looking at available records of the operation of individual farm 
household economies. Yamada and Oota have found records of the 
economic operations of two families belonging to the medium- to 
large-scale group (Yamada and Oota,46,p.299-311) . In both cases the
(1) For evidence on this point, see pp. 129-30.
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information refers to periods after the beginning of this century, 
when the initial conditions were beginning to be disturbed by 
outside developments. Nevertheless, the basic features of both 
households' activities still had many traditional aspects.
The information about one family, referred to as Family S, 
comes from a record book kept during the period 1907-12. Family S 
farmed 1.89 hectares on the Saga Plain. At the beginning of the 
period it owned 0.74 hectares of this. By the end it had come to 
own another 0.65 hectares of it. The rest was rented. Family S 
was thus essentially a medium-scale, owner/tenant household.
Family N, on the other hand, was a very large-scale 
landowning household. It owned 17 hectares, of which the family 
farmed 5.2 hectares and rented out the rest. It therefore represents 
very much the upper level of resident cultivating landlords.
During 1917 it kept a record of the labour days worked on its farm, 
and it is from this that Yamada and Oota draw their information.
The economies of both households retained many elements 
of self-sufficiency. Even the members of the wealthy Family N grew 
cotton and mulberry to make their own clothes, vegetables for their 
own consumption and so on. Both sets of records were kept at a time 
when Saga farmers were beginning to market increasing amounts of 
rice and to buy increasing quantities of commercial fertiliser. 
Nevertheless, the economic operations of even these relatively 
large-scale farmers were still subsistence-oriented. Grain cultiv­
ation was the main occupation of the male members of the household 
and of employed workers, as is shown for Family N in Table 3.2, but 
mixed in with this were all kinds of other operations concerned with 
the household as well as the farm, and production activity is not 
clearly separated from the running of the household. This would be 
even clearer had Family N recorded the labour of its women members 
in the house and on the farm.
Turning to the technical aspects of the production 
system, the records only cover Household S. Household S's 1.9 
hectare holding consisted of 18 separate plots. It used the rotation 
described earlier and planted a wide range of seed varieties, some 
improved, some not. It ploughed in the traditional way. By this 
time, however, it was using commercial fertilisers in quite large 
quantities. It obtained yields above the average for Saga County, 
but with wide variation, presumably resulting from the rice-borer.
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Table 3.2
THE DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR TIME IN HOUSEHOLD N.
(Units ~ days)
Acting His Nenko 1 Nenko 2 Nenko
Househead Brother
Grain
Cultivation
129.2 125.1 122.55 129.75 166.8E
Ancillary
to Grain 71.25 98.35 86.3 89.1 73.8
Cultivation
Miscellaneous 26.8 10.75 24.55 22.55 12.IE
Household
Activities
27.0 14.4 21.6 24.55 18.2
Help Given 
to Neighbours
4.5 4.0 5.0 3.0 9.0
Public Work - 5.5 1.5 6.25 -
Other 16.25 1.9 7.75 7.0 5.5
Holidays 39.0 74.0 23.0 22.5 22.0
Missed Days - - 41.75 29.5 26.5
Total Days
Ta7 id 275.0 260.0 269.25 282.0 285.5
The period covered is February to December 1917. 
Source: Yamada and Oota, 46, p.303.
Thus the overall technology consisted of the basic features of the 
traditional system (rotation, irrigation method, tokojime ploughing) 
overlaid with some of the technical improvements which were spreading 
through the country during the Meiji period and whose impact on the 
Saga Plain will be examined in the next section.
Let us now turn to the patterns of labour use employed 
by these households on their given land holdings. Household S 
consisted of the househead and his wife, his eldest son with his wife 
and three babies, and his two daughters. In addition, two nenko were 
employed. Although the individuals employed varied each year, they 
always came from within the local area (mura) . The head of Household 
N was an official of the local co-operative (sangyoo kumiai), so the 
farm was run by the next eldest brother. Another younger brother 
also worked on the farm and they employed three nenko and some other 
temporary hired labour. The labour of the temporary workers and of 
the women members of the household is not recorded. Household N had 
employed the same three men as nenko for some years and all three 
came from the local area. Neither household's nenko lived with their 
employer's families, even in the case of one nenko who had no holding 
of his own to farm.
Family N's records tell us something about the way these 
labour forces were used. One nenko did 73% of the horse-ploughing, 
this being 66% of his work in grain production and 40% of his total 
working days. He was clearly a specialised ploughman. Family 
members did most of the pumping. The acting househead did the 
largest amount, although the women probably also did a good deal. 
Despite their wealth, the members of Family N worked as hard and as 
long as their hired workers.
These examples have shown something of the operation of 
the farm household economies of the larger-scale group of farmers.
It is much harder to find evidence to describe the workings of the 
economies of the smaller farmers in the village, the two-thirds who 
did not employ labour and the half of those who farmed less than half 
a hectare. Two examples of the kind of household which relied on 
employment as nenko labour are, however, provided by the cases, 
described by Isobe, of two farmers who became cultivators of 
reclaimed land during the 1930s (Isobe,76,p.32). One was born in 1873 
and his family worked 0.7 ha. on the Saga Plain. He worked as a 
nenko and day labourer until he was 30. The other was born into a
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family which cultivated 0.4 ha. (0.2 owned, 0.2 rented) on the Plain. 
He had four brothers. Clearly, such a small holding could not support 
them, and all five worked as nenko. The growing mobility of 
agricultural labourers in search of better employment as communicat­
ions improved is illustrated by the movement of the first nenko. He 
moved from his village to become a tenant farmer and then farmed in 
Korea for a time before settling on the reclaimed land. But both ' 
men described here were lucky enough to live to see a time when 
alternative employment opportunities had greatly increased. During 
the nineteenth century there was no choice but to remain tied to the 
village and to nenko employment.
A little more evidence about the household economies of 
Saga Plain farmers can be gained from the results of the Rice Economy 
Survey of 1913-15. Five Saga Plain households were selected to 
represent the area for this survey of the economic conditions of 
rice cultivation, and some of the information collected from them is 
shown in Table 3.3. All five belonged to the medium- to large-scale 
cultivator class. The yields they obtained were a little above the 
average for Saga-gun in the official statistics. It is interesting 
that there appears to be no correlation between yield and area 
cultivated. The very large-scale cultivator obtained the highest 
yield of the highest quality rice. The usual tendency in heavily- 
populated countries like Japan is for smaller farms to generate 
higher yields (and lower labour productivity) than larger farms.
The Rice Economy Survey provides a little evidence for the absence 
of this relationship in Saga Plain farming at this time. This would 
help to explain the co-existence of the relatively large-scale 
cultivator, like Family N, farming as large an area as its managerial 
capacity would permit, the medium-scale owner/tenant cultivator, like 
Family S, and the very small cultivator/labourer. Following 
Ohkawa’s reasoning, this would tend to occur only where yields did not 
vary greatly between different scales of farm (Ohkawa,22,pp.277-292) .
The labour requirements of the Rice Economy Survey 
households seem to vary enormously. It is possible that the hiring 
of temporary labour or the use of unpaid labour from branch households 
explains the variation. Alternatively, employment of nenko, being 
part of a wider social and economic relationship between households, 
might not have been related strictly to labour requirements on a 
given size of holding. It is also possible that, by the 1913-15
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Table 3.3
RESULTS OF THE 1913-15 RICE ECONOMY SURVEY. 
(Saga Plain area)
Paddy Culti­
vated (ha.)
Proportion 
Tenanted (%)
Yield
(kg./lO ares) 
Value
(Yen/150kg.)
H o u s e h o l d s  
A B C D
5.98 2.0 2.0 2.5
95.3 30.0 50.0
Workers:
family 5 6 4 4
nenko 4 - 1 1
total 9 6 5 5
460 433 433 366
14.00 12.00 13.25 11.76
E
2.6
46.2
4
4
408
12.00
Source: Isobe, 76, p.18.
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period, Saga Plain employers were beginning to try to economise -on 
hired labour in response to the temporary rise in wages which 
occurred in 1907 and 1908.
The accounting frameworks described here and the 
evidence, on such things as labour requirements, given by the 
examples will be used later in assessing the impact of market economy 
forces on the different types of household. For the moment, however, 
this is an appropriate -point to bring together the main features of 
the internal village and household economies of Saga Plain farmers, 
from the point of view of the framework, before going on to look 
at their relations with the outside world. In summarising, then, 
the preceding sections linking technology with the natural environment 
and with the social and economic conditions of Saga Plain villages 
and households, the following conclusions can be drawn:
i. Technology and natural environment were linked 
through the adaptations made to the standard techniques of paddy 
rice cultivation in Japan in response to the two major problems 
posed by the conditions of the area: low, flat land and the rice- 
borer.
ii. The adaptations made (treadle-wheel irrigation, 
special ploughing, the phased rotation) meant adaptation of the whole 
technical system to complement them, as in Fig. 3.3, so that it was 
difficult to make fundamental changes without solving both major 
environmental problems at once.
iii. The distribution of land and other assets which 
existed on the Saga Plain after the Meiji Restoration was such that 
it is possible to regard village society as divided into roughly 
two groups. The first, containing about a third of households, 
consisted of those farming above-average sized holdings of a hectare 
or more, and the second, containing the remaining two thirds, 
consisted of households farming, on the whole, very small holdings, 
the majority less than half a hectare.
iv. This land tenure structure was made compatible with 
the demands of the adapted technology through economic and social 
arrangements between households which ensured, for larger cultivators, 
a supply of hired labour to meet the heavy requirements of the tech­
nology and, for smaller cultivators, a guarantee of employment and 
help in bad times. The overall principle guiding these economic
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arrangements was the need to ensure the stability and survival of the 
village group, upon which the welfare of each individual household to 
some extent depended.
5. The Saga Plain and the Outside World during the
Initial Conditions Period.
This section will consider the relationships between 
Saga Plain villages and the outside world, as represented by outside 
markets and by government and research authorities, during the 
initial conditions period. It will deal in detail with the attempts 
to diffuse Meiji Noohoo techniques and improved methods of pest 
control. These reveal, firstly, the obstacles to the adoption of 
standard new techniques posed by the interrelationships between the 
various aspects of the initial technology and, secondly, the building 
up of the relationship between farmers and research and extension 
officials as they tried to overcome the problems involved in diffusing 
new techniques. The extent of such a relationship is a crucial 
element in the working of the framework model in Chapter 1, and is 
a precondition for the existence of an induced innovation mechanism.
(i) the village and outside markets.
As can be seen from the discussion 
of the household economies of Saga Plain farmers, contact with 
outside markets was limited, at least before the turn of the century. 
From the point of view of agricultural inputs and output, village 
self-sufficiency was high. Most inputs were self-supplied and, with 
a few exceptions, food requirements were met from the farm's own 
produce. Some farmers were selling rice, though. Saga rice was 
known in the main markets of Tokyo and Osaka, and, as we shall see in 
the next chapter, the quantity and proportion of rice shipped out 
to these markets was increasing quite fast towards the end of the 
nineteenth century.
On the labour market side, we have seen that most 
workers tended not to move out of the village to find employment. 
However, it became clear, by the time that labour outflow began to 
speed up after the turn of the century, that some workers did have 
experience of finding work, at least temporarily, outside their 
villages, and that this opened up the paths for others to leave when
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the outside demand for labour increased. Nevertheless, the majority 
were confined within the village labour market.
Communications were a vital factor in determining the 
relatively closed nature of the Saga village economy. Travel by 
water was possible, but there are no good ports on the Ariake Sea 
coast of Saga Prefecture. Travel overland was limited by the diffi­
culties of keeping horses. All this was changed, however, by the 
opening, during the 1890s, of railways connecting Saga City with 
Nagasaki and with Tosu, hence with Fukuoka and the rest of northern 
Kyuushuu. These were built in part to facilitate the movement of 
troops and supplies to the naval port at Nagasaki, but they clearly 
made the transport of goods and people from Saga into the outside 
world far easier. The impact of the opening up of the Saga Plain 
economy to outside influences, which this facilitated, is the subject 
of the next chapter. Before this, however, during the initial 
conditions period, the difficulties of communication meant that contact 
with the outside world was limited.
(ii) the village and the authorities.
We have already seen that 
governmental involvement in Saga Plain agriculture goes back beyond 
the Meiji Restoration, with official interest in drainage and irriga­
tion projects, land tenure, and so on. This tradition was carried on 
after 1868 by the agricultural department of the new prefectural 
government, which continued to be involved with the study and 
administration of Saga agriculture.
We saw in Chapter 2 how, during the 1880s, farmers began 
to form discussion groups, co-operatives and seed exchange societies 
at the local level. They were eventually brought together in a 
pyramidal state system by the Agricultural Societies Law of 1899. 
Through this network the authorities were able to diffuse information 
about the new Meiji Noohoo techniques down to the village level.
The same kind of network was built up in Saga, with the 
prefectural agricultural authorities working through the agricultural 
societies of Saga Prefecture and Saga County to reach Plain farmers.
In 1901, the Saga Prefecture Experiment Station was established on a 
site by the station in Saga City. Its task was to adapt and develop 
new techniques for the Saga area and, before World War II, it was 
responsible for diffusion as well as research. In 1904 the prefectural
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agricultural department issued "7 Major Points for Agricultural .
Improvement", which summarised the new technology as it applied to Saga
and represented the package the authorities were trying to promote.
The 7 points were:
i. more attention to insect control
ii. the cultivation of better seedlings
iii. unification and improvement of seed varieties
iv. improved use of fertiliser
v. selection of seeds by using brine
vi. use of check-row planting
vii. use of deep ploughing
The attempts made by research and extension officials, 
from the Agriculture Department and later from the Experiment Station, 
to diffuse this package of standard Meiji Noohoo techniques, with its 
added emphasis on pest control, are worth considering in some detail 
because they provided the basis for the relationship between farmers 
and officials out of which subsequent and more dramatic changes in 
technology emerged. The sheer difficulty involved in trying to induce 
Saga farmers to adopt standard Meiji Noohoo techniques and to use 
known pest control methods forced extension officials into close 
contact with cultivators and this, it will later be argued, was a 
crucial precondition for the success of subsequent technical 
developments. This difficulty arose, firstly, from the incompatibility 
of some parts of the Meiji Noohoo package with the initial technical 
system on the Saga Plain, and, secondly, from the impossibiblity, 
within that system, of adopting any solution to the rice-borer- problem 
other than the use of extremely laborious, unpleasant and not entirely 
effective methods. To see this, we must look at the main lines of 
research and extension work on Saga Plain agriculture during the Meiji 
period.
The rice-borer was the most pressing problem facing 
farmers in the second half of the nineteenth century and it was, there­
fore, to this that the representatives in Saga of the new breed of 
enthusiastic farmers turned their attention. On the basis of their 
individual experience, they built up a considerable body of knowledge 
about the rice-borer's life-cycle and habits. In 1878, the prefectural 
government backed this work up by financing a study trip to Saga by a 
noted expert on insect pests and, on the basis of his advice and the 
accrued knowledge of the farmers, the first regulations for insect
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control were issued. These included measures to enforce the use of 
luring-lamps, the burning of stubble after the harvest, the collecting 
of eggs and damaged stalks from among the growing plants and so on.
Such measures were not effective unless everyone in the 
village applied them. They also involved a great deal of painstaking 
work. It was not, therefore, an easy matter to enforce their use over 
the whole Plain area. Many sets of regulations were issued and it 
was possible for the police to fine or imprison those who did not 
obey them. But the most effective method of enforcement was to send 
officials round to each village instructing and exhorting.
The work of these officials was not easy. Each was 
assigned a certain area over which he travelled from village to vill- 
age, lecturing to farmers, showing them how to carry out the control 
techniques, and checking that they did so. The museum of the Saga 
Experiment Station possesses photographs of them, incongruously 
dressed in boaters and stiff collars, lecturing villagers or working 
with them in the fields collecting rice-borer eggs or damaged stems.
They often met with hostility and opposition in their efforts to 
persuade farmers to undertake these extremely laborious tasks. There 
are stories of attacks on them, of their being pursued and besieged 
by angry farmers. Villagers would watch out for them, signal each other 
when they saw them coming and quickly appear to be doing whatever it 
was they were supposed to be doing. They were said to use 
check-row planting while the officials were watching ' over them, but 
next year revert to their old ways (1).
Nevertheless, this work did succeed in spreading the 
new control techniques sufficiently widely to achieve visible results 
in the stabilisation of yields, although they could not prevent 
really disastrous years like 1893. More significantly, extension 
officials were building up contacts with villages and beginning to 
earn the respect of farmers through the success of the methods they 
advocated. This served to back up the other research and diffusion 
work of the authorities - the testing of seed varieties, the 
experimentation to find optimum fertiliser levels, the circulation of 
information, advice and regulations to farmers, the holding of 
ploughing competitions, the awarding of prizes for high yields, and
(1) See Miyajima,36,pp.35-36, including photographs of the officials 
at work.
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so on. For instance, the winner of the 5 koku per tan (750kg./10. ares) 
prize in 1913 was greatly assisted in his efforts to achieve this 
phenomenal yield from one of his plots by a technician from the 
prefectural authorities. This according to Eguchi, greatly increased 
the other villagers' respect for their technician (Eguchi,33, Vol.l, 
pp. 142-6) .
On the research side, the work of the authorities also 
produced highly significant results. After the establishment of the 
research station, scientific experiments were carried out which confirm­
ed what was previously thought to be true about the life-cycle of the 
rice-borer. The most important result of this research was the 
discovery that the moth virtually never appeared from its chrysalis 
after the last two weeks in June. This meant that the insect must 
breed, develop and hatch from the early crop. This was a crucial 
discovery because it meant that if one single rice crop were planted 
over the whole Plain area after the middle of June there would be no 
rice-borers to attack it. The research authorities had therefore 
found the solution to the rice-borer problem.
It is at this point that we find our first evidence of 
the barriers to technical change imposed by the complementary 
structure of the initial conditions. The head of the prefectural 
agricultural society decided to launch an experiment to see whether 
this solution to the rice-borer problem would work. He used for the 
experiment the village of which he was head and the village of which 
a close friend was head, and in 1913 these villages planted one single 
late rice crop.
The experiment was a dismal failure. Since it was only 
carried out over a limited are; , moths hatched in adjoining villages 
could come to lay eggs in the crop, and no significant reduction in 
damage was observed. But more fundamentally, the villagers found 
that they were unabie to pump enough water to cover the whole of their 
paddy area at one time. Thus the only complete solution ran up 
against the bottleneck of labour supply for pumping and transplanting, 
with the given irrigation technique.
We find the same barriers at work, though less dramatic­
ally, when we come to consider the diffusion of the rest of the 7 
points, the basic Meiji Noohoo technology. The clearest conflict 
came over deep ploughing. This was simply not adopted at all. The 
important criterion for ploughing on the Plain was not depth but the
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formation of a good base, and tokojime ploughing was an essential part 
of the technical system as long as the raising of irrigation water 
required so much human labour. As in the case of Family S, Saga Plain 
farmers were beginning to use increasing quantities of commercial 
fertiliser. The use of commercial organic fertiliser spread through­
out Japan, especially after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), and in 
Saga Prefecture the consumption of soy-bean cake fertiliser rose from 
1,653 tonnes in 1905 to 9,183 tonnes in 1909, and that of dried fish 
fertiliser from 1,428 tonnes to 2,720 tonnes in the same period 
(Yamada and Oota,46,Table vii 8) . By 1917 approximately half of the 
value of fertiliser consumed in Saga Prefecture came from commercially 
purchased fertilisers (SKTS,86). But because they continued to use 
shallow ploughing, Saga farmers did not reap the full benefit from this 
increased input.
The return to this investment was also below what it 
could have been had farmers consistently used improved seed varieties. 
Family S, for instance, used both traditional and improved seed 
varieties. A survey of rice varieties in Saga County in 1915 found 
about 80 different varieties in use, of which 4 could be classed as 
improved (Isobe,76,p.13). At the end of the Meiji period, the most 
widely used early variety was planted on only 16% of the prefecture's 
paddy area (Yamada and Oota,46,p.249). The reluctance to use the new 
varieties stemmed from the fact that their resistance to the rice-borer 
was felt to be less than that of the traditional local varieties.
Similar objections operated against the use of better 
cultivation methods. It was thought that the healthy-looking seed­
lings produced by more careful seed selection, oblong seed-beds and 
check-row planting simply attracted rice-borers all the more strongly. 
Without check-row planting it was impossible to use improved weeding 
tools, and so the vicious circle continued. The research authorities 
did eventually succeed in inducing farmers to use these improved 
cultivation methods, but they met with considerable resistance, and 
their spread was slower than elsewhere. Again the results were not 
what they could have been had the entire package been adopted.
Another factor which limited the incentive for Saga Plain 
farmers to adopt Meiji Noohoo techniques was the fact that they could 
not, like farmers elsewhere, reap the combined benefits of the new 
technology and investment in improving irrigation facilities. The 
problems of irrigation and drainage posed by the creek system were
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not such as could be solved by known methods of improving land infra­
structure. So the majority of land projects carried out in Saga 
Prefecture in the early 1900s, for instance, were in non-Plain 
areas (Yamada and Oota,46,chapter 6, section 2), and Plain farmers 
lacked this additional incentive to adopt the Meiji Noohoo.
So it is clear that research and extension officials faced 
severe problems in trying to raise output and reduce pest damage on the 
Saga Plain. The fact that rice yields did begin to show a steady 
rise after the 1890s is therefore a measure of the amount of work and 
effort that was expended in overcoming farmers’ resistance. Farmers 
had been persuaded to adopt those parts of the Meiji Noohoo package 
that were compatible with the basic structure of their technical 
system, but further change was blocked until new solutions to the 
fundamental environmental problems could be found. The longer-term 
results of the 30-40 years' experience of contact with farmers which 
this represented will become clearer later. By now, we have reached 
the period after the turn of the century when the initial conditions 
were beginning to be disrupted by outside forces, and this is the 
subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4
The Impact of Industrialisation on the Initial Conditions.
This chapter concerns the impact on the villages of the 
Saga Plain of the rapid industrialisation of the northern Kyuushuu 
area. The argument is that industrialisation altered the demand for 
marketed agricultural output and the relative availabilities of 
production factors to agriculture, and that this led to changes in 
the socio-economic organisation of agricultural production in the 
villages. The initial conditions equilibrium between economic 
organisation and technology was thus disrupted, resulting in 
pressure for development of new techniques which would be compatible 
with the new structure. The growth of industry and of the market 
economy' are seen as the primary stimuli for the development of new 
techniques.
The industrialisation of northern Kyuushuu was part of 
the upsurge in industrial growth which took place in Japan at around 
the turn of the century. On the basis of the widespread development 
of small-scale industry in the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
the stimulus provided by military demands during the Sino-Japanese 
War (1894-5) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), along with the 
expanding trade opportunities opened up for non-belligerent countries 
during the First World War, launched Japan on the road towards 
becoming a fully-fledged industrial country. Her remarkable victory 
over Russia in 1904-5 marked her entry into the warring world of the 
great western industrial powers and the development of her heavy 
industrial base proceeded rapidly from then on.
Despite its remoteness from the other industrial, 
administrative and cultural centres of Japan, northern Kyuushuu was 
in the forefront of this development. This was the result of two 
factors, one the extensive coal fields of northern Kyuushuu, and the 
other the commercial and naval importance of the port of Nagasaki.
In 1901 the Yawata ironworks was set up in Fukuoka and this was 
followed by the establishment of more heavy industry in the Fukuoka/ 
Kita-Kyuushuu area during the first decade of this century. In 189 3 
the existing dockyard of the Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Company in 
Nagasaki w a s ‘enlarged and another yard constructed. In 1895 it was
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electrified and improved in other ways, in 1905 a third dockyard 
was built and in 1907 further enlargements were carried out. After 
the Russo-Japanese War shipbuilding development spread to other 
centres, notably Sasebo.
This rapid expansion of heavy industry led to large 
influxes of labour and rapid urbanisation. Over the whole country 
the population of the six largest towns more than doubled between 1886 
and 1903. The population of Fukuoka was about 50,000 in 1889, and
80,000 by 1908. Table 4.1 shows the increase in the labour force 
of the Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Company in Nagasaki. The growth of 
urban industry led, in the familiar manner, both to the withdrawal 
of labour from agriculture in the neighbouring countryside and to 
the expansion of demand for marketed agricultural produce to supply 
the industrial work force.
1. The Demand for Saga Rice.
The impact of industrialisation in northern Kyuushuu on 
the demand for the output produced by Saga villages revealed itself 
in two ways: in the quantity and price of rice marketed and shipped
out of the prefecture, and in the destinations to which it went. In 
the early Meiji period, Saga rice was known in the major rice markets 
in the big cities of Honshuu and it would appear that rice marketing 
was increasing. In the mid-1890s, however, the quantity of rice 
shipped out of the prefecture rose sharply (see Chart 4.1, the 
original data for which are given in Appendix Table 2). According 
to the Nooji Choosa (Survey of Agriculture) of 1888, 24,150 tonnes 
were shipped out in that year (Isobe,76,p.23). According to the 
prefectural data shown in the chart, the level in 1892 was much the 
same, but by the end of the decade levels of 55,000 tonnes were being 
reached.
The causes of this rapid increase in rice marketing 
would not appear to lie in growth of output. There was little rise
in yields or output levels during the 1890s, and the effects of the
adoption of Meiji Noohoo techniques and better pest control methods 
were not felt strongly until after the turn of the century. What 
occurred at this time was a rise in the proportion of output marketed. 
In the early 1890s, marketed rice represented about 20% of the crop
on average, but by the end of the decade this had risen to 40%
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Table 4. 1
NUMBERS OF EMPLOYEES OF THE MITSUBISHI SHIPBUILDING CO. 
IN NAGASAKI, 1889-1936.
1889 1,224
1892 1,532
1897 3,935
1901 5,226
1907 10,191
1912 8,778
1917 15,405
1922 13,571
1931 6,127
1936 13,421
Source: Isobe, 76, p.30.
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Chart 4»lrt Rice Shipped out of Prefecture, 1892-1935»
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(calculated from SKTS,86). The most obvious explanation of this 
would be the improvements in communications brought about by the 
opening of the railway connections to Saga City in the 1890s- This 
meant not only easier access to distant rice markets but also 
greater possibilities for buying inputs and consumer goods previously 
made at home. So the incentive for acquiring cash income may have 
risen along with the ease of marketing rice.
Rice marketing remained at a roughly constant level 
during the 1900s, but.as industrialisation and urbanisation in 
northern Kyuushuu speeded up, it began to affect the demand for 
locally-produced rice. Its impact can be seen in the chart in the 
rapid increase in rice marketing during the 1910s, from levels of 
around 55-60,000 tonnes during the 1900s to a peak of 95,000 tonnes 
around 1917. Growth in output in this and the previous decade 
contributed to this rise, but the proportion of the crop marketed 
(for the prefecture as a whole), which had declined somewhat to 
levels of about 35% during the 1900s, rose to over 50% in the boom 
years of the late 1910s.
The influence of the demand side is confirmed by the
switch in the main markets to which Saga rice was sent. In the
closing decades of the nineteenth century, most of Saga's rice had 
been shipped to the main industrial areas of Japan which at that 
time were outside Kyuushuu, chiefly to the Osaka/Kobe area and to 
Tokyo. By 1914 these areas were taking only 40% of the rice sent out 
of Saga, and by 1921 the Osaka area took only 12.7% and Tokyo 6%.
Only 24.8% went outside Kyuushuu at all, while Nagasaki took 44.8% 
and Fukuoka 30.2% (see Table 4.2) . Thus it came about that Saga 
became almost exclusively a supplier of rice to the north Kyuushuu 
industrial areas. Factories in Nagasaki and Fukuoka made special 
contracts with Saga farmers to supply the rice for their workers and
Saga's position as a major supplier is clear from the table. Almost
80% of the rice coming into Nagasaki Prefecture was from Saga.
The reflection of these trends can be seen in the
available data on the price of rice in the Saga market, shown in
Table 4.3 and plotted in index form in Chart 4.3. Prices remained 
relatively stable during the 1900s, but rose rapidly in the 1910s 
as the increase in demand came to be felt.
How was Saga able to fulfil this role as specialist
rice supplier to the north Kyuushuu urban areas? As we have seen,
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Table 4.2
THE MARKET FOR SAGA RICE,
Total Imported Quantity Percentage Percentage 
from Other coming from coming from of Total sent
Destination
Fukuoka
Prefecture
Nagasaki
Prefecture
Kyuushuu
Total
Kyoto, Kobe, 
Osaka
Tokyo, 
Yokohama
Non-Kyuushuu
Total
Total
Fukuoka
Prefecture
Nagasaki
Prefecture
Kyuushuu
Total
Kyoto , Kobe 
Osaka
Tokyo, 
Yokohama
Non-Kyuushuu
Total
Total
Prefectures
(tonnes)
Saga
(tonnes)
Saga out of Saga
A v e r a g e  1 9 1 9 - 2 1  
77,850 22,050 28.3
40,950
150,150
361,200
806,550
32,700
54,900
9,300
4,350
79.8
36.6
2.6
0.5
1,686,300 18,150 1.1
1,836,450 73,050 4.0
A v e r a g e  1 9 3 4 - 3 8  
138,000 38,100 27.6
51,750
214,350
438,900
981,300
1,986,000
2,200,350
41,250
79,500
10,050
6,750
18,450
97,950
79.7
37.2
2.3
0.7
0.9
4.1
30.2 
44.8
75.2
12.7 
6.0
24.8 
100.0
38.9 
42.1
81.2 
10.3
6.9
18.8
100.0
Source: Isobe, 76, p.24, taken from two national surveys of the
trade in rice,.carried out by government departments.
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Table 4.3
THE PRICE OF RICE IN SAGA CITY, 1899-1937
(Yen per Koku = 150 kg.)
1899 9.2 1919
1900 11.0 1920
1901 12.3 1921
1902 1*1.8 1922
1903 13.2 1923
1904 13.1 1924
1905 12.0 1925
1906 14.3 1926
1907 14.3 1927
1908 14.3 1928
1909 12.2 1929
1910 13.0 1930
1911 17.5 1931
1912 19.5 1932
1913 19.8 1933
1914 14.4 1934
1915 11.9 1935
1916 * 19 36
1917 17.8 1937
1918 30.7
42.7
41.8
27.0
31.2
28.4
34.9
37.0
34.4
30.2
26.2 
26.2
16.1 
16.0
20.5
20.5 
20.8 
28.7 
30.1
31.6
* not available.
Source: SKTS, 86.
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environmental conditions were, within limits, favourable to rice 
production on the Saga Plain, and, within these limits, output was 
increasing after the turn of the century. But leaving aside for the 
moment Saga's technical ability to meet the demand, there are three 
factors, arising from the structure of the market in which she oper­
ated, that made Saga's position a particularly favourable one:
i. The rice which Saga Plain farmers were able to produce 
in large quantities was not of particularly high quality. The risk 
posed by the rice-borer inhibited the use of high-quality, as well as 
improved, seed varieties. But beyond this, the technical and economic 
structure of Saga agriculture was designed to produce large quantities 
only of low-quality rice. Higher-quality rice would have required more 
careful cultivation and better preparation for market, all of which 
would have demanded more labour than was available at the right times 
under the technology. However, the consumers who made up the demand 
side of the North Kyuushuu market were industrial workers and their 
families, who could not afford high-quality rice. The cheap rice of 
Saga was therefore ideal for them.
ii. Rice from southern Kyuushuu was of a higher quality 
than Saga rice. Therefore, not only was it at a disadvantge from the 
point of view of communications and transport costs, but it was also, 
of itself, more expensive. This reduced the competition from domestic 
sources that Saga had to face.
iii. Perhaps the most interesting of these three points 
arises from the fact that Saga rice sold at about the same price as 
imported Korean and Taiwanese rice, and, as a result, little foreign 
rice entered the North Kyuushuu market (Isobe,76,p.27). Hayami and 
Ruttan ascribe a major role in causing the stagnation in Japanese 
agriculture during the inter-war period to the depressing effect on 
prices of the large-scale import of colonial rice (Hayami and Ruttan,
55). Saga farmers, with their product so perfectly adapted to its 
market demand, did not feel this effect so strongly, though, of course, 
by the same token they failed to gain some of the benefits which farmers 
elsewhere obtained from more intensive, higher-quality production. In 
as far as a high and stable level of demand was a factor influencing 
subsequent technical and structural change, then the fact that Saga 
farmers did not suffer severely the effects of increased colonial 
supplies in their market must be of relevance. Comparison of the 
development of Saga agriculture with that of the rest of Japan in this
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light adds weight to Hayami and Ruttan's thesis, but too much should 
not be made of it because Saga was very different from the rest of 
Japan in many other respects as well. While it might be possible to 
argue that, had the price of Saga rice fallen more as a result of comp­
etition from imports in the '20s and '30s, the incentive to invest in 
new techniques would have been greatly reduced, this involves assuming 
away the whole structure of environmental and technical conditions 
which determined that Saga rice would be of low quality.
From the point of view of the village economy, the 
industrialisation of northern Kyuushuu provided Saga Plain farmers with 
a large and easily accessible market for their rice. This affected 
both the quantity and the nature of the product they marketed and 
brought the Saga village economy firmly into the sphere of the 
commercial economy. In the'- second half of the nineteenth century,as 
we have seen, the village economy was largely self-sufficient. Even 
the bigger landowners, who were selling rice in the market, were still 
producing subsistence crops to supply themselves with food and clothing. 
The extent to which this had changed by 1917 is clear from Table 4.4, 
which shows some of the results of a detailed survey on "Levels of Rice 
Production and Consumption" carried out in Saga Prefecture in 1917. By 
this time cultivators in Saga City and County were selling 74% of the 
rice which they retained after paying rent, on the assumption that all 
rental rice was sold commercially. This represented 58% of all the 
rice marketed from Saga City and County. Commercialisation had ad­
vanced much further in the Plain area than in the rest of the prefect­
ure. For the prefecture as a whole, farmers were selling only 51% of 
their rice crop. The hill areas of Saga had neither the geographical 
conditions nor the transport facilities which enabled the Plain farmers 
to develop into specialised commercial rice producers (1).
Increasing contact with the towns and with commercial 
markets brought with it not only greater opportunities to sell products 
but also greater opportunities to buy them. Household goods 
previously made at home came to be bought in the market and the farmer's 
cash requirements increased along with the increase in his cash income.
(1) The divergent development paths of the hill and plain areas of Saga 
Prefecture is a subject of considerable interest, inadequately dealt 
with here. The comparison is made simply for the purpose of pointing 
out the extent of commercialisation on the Plain.
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Table 4.4
PROPORTION OF PRODUCED RICE SOLD, 1917. 
(Tonnes)
Saga City Saga
& County Prefecture
A. Output
B. Rent
C . Retained by 
Farmers
D . Consumed by 
Farm Households
E. Sold by 
Farmers
F. Sold by 
Landlords
G. Total Sold
37,500 166,950
13.200 55,050
24,300 111,900 (a -B)
6,300 54,300
18,000 57,600 (C-D approx.)
13.200 55,050 (B approx.)
31.200 112,650 (E+F)
% of Retained
Output Sold 74 51 (E/C)
By Farmers
% of Total 
Output Sold
% of Marketed
Output Sold 58 51 (E/G)
by Cultivators
83 68 (G/A)
Source: Isobe, 76, p.28.
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The nature of the market which Saga came, almost 
exclusively, to supply also influenced the type of product she sold. 
The consumers in the north Kyuushuu industrial area did not demand 
high quality rice and Saga farmers did not try to produce it. The 
authorities tried hard to do as other prefectural authorities were 
doing and raise the quality of marketed rice. They were anxious that 
the price of Saga rice, almost the only product that Saga had to 
sell to the rest of Japan, should not fall relative to that of rice 
from other areas. But Saga farmers could not be induced to grow 
uniform good varieties. Neither would they pack their rice in the way 
used elsewhere or use the standard size of bag adopted almost 
everywhere else after 1913. Saga was also one of the prefectures 
with the lowest levels of storage capacity (Isobe,76,p.24-6). Such 
efforts to improve rice marketing failed in Saga because the market 
conditions which farmers faced put them under no pressure to produce 
good quality rice and there was insufficient competition to force 
them to change their marketing practices.
To summarise, then, the analysis of the effect of 
industrialisation on the product market side, the expansion of 
industry and urbanisation in northern Kyuushuu provided a huge 
opportunity to sell rice for consumption by the new industrial 
workers. The Saga Plain was in an ideal position to meet this 
opportunity both because it was environmentally suited to rice 
cultivation on a large scale and because of its easy communications 
by rail and boat with the major markets. This gave it considerable 
advantages in competition with other rice-producing areas, as did the 
quality of rice which it was technically suited to produce. So it was 
that Saga Plain farmers switched their existing marketed rice from the 
industrial areas of mainland Honshuu to those of northern Kyuushuu, 
expanded their rice marketing and became specialised producers of rice 
for a rapidly expanding market.
2. The Demand for Labour.
Saga villages were major suppliers of labour to the 
factories of Fukuoka and Nagasaki. Although farmers in Saga were not 
as poor as those in some other parts of Kyuushuu (e.g. Kagoshima, 
Miyazaki), these poorer areas were more remote and did not possess 
the excellent means of communication which linked Saga with the major
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industrial areas. Labour did not really begin to flow out of these 
other areas until the mid-1920s. In the early stages it was from 
villages in neighbouring prefectures that most of the new industrial 
workers came. Table 4.5 shows that Saga was the main source of labour 
for the chief industrial cities, apart from the prefectures in which 
they were located. In 1924, 7.4% of the workers at the Yawata iron­
works in Fukuoka came from Saga, putting Saga fourth among prefectures 
supplying labour to it (after Fukuoka itself, Oita and Kumamoto) , and 
6.4% of workers at the Mitsubishi shipyards came from Saga, so that 
Saga was here the second largest labour-supplying prefecture after 
Nagasaki itself (Isobe,76,p.27).
How did this outflow of workers affect the village labour 
force and economy? It has been pointed out that the village labour 
market during the second half of the nineteenth century was by and 
large a closed one. But it was also true that those who were able to 
find any seasonal work outside the village did so. Thus there were 
workers who were used to travelling to the towns to find work. When 
employment opportunities began to expand rapidly during the 1910s these 
contacts smoothed the way for many workers to leave their villages to 
find industrial employment. At first individual workers began to leave 
and the number of farm workers on the Saga Plain began to decline from 
about the 1890s. The progress of this decline is plotted in Chart 4.2, 
from which it can be seen that the number of farm households began to 
fall rapidly from about 1912, as workers became established in the 
cities and took their families with them. By 1921 the number of farm 
households had declined to 80% of its 1892 level. The number of 
workers had reached 80% of the 1892 level by 1907 and by 1921 had 
reached 50% of it. The total population of Saga Prefecture rose from
510,000 in 1883 to 700,000 in 1915, but after that the rate of outflow 
began to exceed the rate of natural increase and the population ceased 
to increase. Between 1920 and 1940 Saga had the second highest 
population outflow rate in Japan (Kyuushuu Noosei Kyoku, 35, p.22).
This labour outflow meant that the number of farm 
households in Saga reached a peak and began to decline earlier than 
was typical in Japan. This is particularly interesting in the 
light of Professor Sawada's finding that a significant correlation 
exists between the date at which the number of farm households in 
a prefecture began to decline and the level of rice yields in that 
prefecture in 1903-7. The earlier the number of households began to
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Fukuoka
Prefecture
Fukuoka
City
Nagasaki
Prefecture
Nagasaki
City
Sasebo
City
Table 4.5
POPULATIONS OF FUKUOKA AND NAGASAKI PREFECTURES 
BY PLACE OF ORIGIN, 1930.
Of which Position of
born Of which Saga among
Outside born Labour-
Total Prefecture in Saga supplying
Population A. B. B/A x 100 Prefectures
2,527,119 539,052 71,554 13.2 3
228,289 60,785 13,226 21.8 1
1,233,362 174,500 ' 57,775 33.1 1
204,626 42,150 9,932 23.6 1
133,174 66,760 27,223 40.8 1
Source: Isobe,76,p.31, from census data.
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Chart 4 »2 : Agricultural Workers and Households, 1890-1938* 
(indices of 5 Yearly Averages, 1890=100)
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Source: Calculated from data in Saga-ken Tookeisho (8 6), 
shown in Appendix Table 3«
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decline the higher the rice yield to be expected in 1903-7. Sawada 
used data for 41 prefectures and in only 6 of them did the number of 
households begin to decline earlier than it did in Saga (1).
Although the most significant rises in yields in Saga occurred after 
1903-7, the existence of the relationship is revealing and much of the 
subsequent description and analysis of this and later chapters will 
be concerned with showing how, in this particular case, the relation­
ship between a declining agricultural labour force and a rise in rice 
yields worked.
We have seen that the village structure on the Saga Plain
contained a class of small-scale farmers unable to make a living
without working for outside employers. It was clearly from this class 
that most of those who left agriculture in this period came. The 
result was a decline in the labour force available for hire within the 
village. The structural impact of this will be examined in detail 
in the next section, but the immediate effects can be seen in the 
rapid rise in wages for hired agricultural labour, especially towards 
the end of the 1910s, which is shown in Table 4.6 and plotted as an 
index in Chart 4.3.
What was most relevant to the structure of the village
economy was the relationship between the two effects of industrial­
isation described here, that is between changes in wages and changes 
in the price of rice. This is shown in Chart 4.3. Also shown is an 
index of wholesale prices, to give a rough idea of the real effect 
of the changes. Until about 1905, wages and prices rose slowly in 
parallel, leaving real wages roughly constant. In 1907 wages rose 
sharply above the rice price, showing the first disturbing impact of 
the outside labour market in Saga. But then they dropped back again 
for a while. After 1915 both wages and prices began to rise fast.
The rice price hit a peak in 1919, but after this began to decline 
almost continuously until 1931. Wages continued to rise until 1922, 
and it is significant that the period 1919-22 was a crucial one in the 
development of new techniques. After this, wages declined a little, 
but to nowhere near the same extent as prices. Nominal wages, 
especially those of the annual employees, held up much better than
(1) Data kindly given to me by Professor Sawada and used by him for 
the correlations reported in Sawada,69.
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Table 4.6
WAGES OF MALE AGRICULTURAL LABOURERS IN SAGA (Yen) .
Nenko 
Per Year
Day Workers 
Per Day
1906 91 .37
1907 156 .58
1908 156 .58
1909 113 .55
1910 100 .50
1911 100 .50
1912 100 .55
1913 100 .55
1914 95 .55
1915 80 .45
1916 * *
1917 100 .70
1918 130 .70
1919 200 1.27
1920 275 1.50
1921 250 1.20
1922 275 1.85
1923 250 1.60
1924 252 1.65
1925 * 1.90
1926 * 1.20
1927 250 1.50
1928 275 1.25
1929 275 1.25
1930 230 1.25
1931 200 1.20
1932 250 1.00
1933 175 1.10
1934 150 1.20
1935 150 1.20
1936 150 1.20
1937 180 1.55
Source: SKTS, 86. * not available.
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Chart 4*3: Indices of flakes and the Price of Rice in Saga 
Prefecture. (1910-14=100)
index
j
i Pay labourers 
|j wages
200 " Rice price 
Nenko wages
100
1900 '0 5  '1 0  '1 5 '2 0  '2 5  '30 '35 m o  192L 24 221
19 2 5 -2 9 185 
1930-34 135
Sources: Rice price and wages indices calculated 1935-58 171
from data in Saga-ken Tookeisho (8 6 ), 
wholesale price index calculated by the 
Bank of Japan and quoted in Lockwood (16),
p. 3 0 0.
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the more flexible rice price during the depression years. Both began 
to rise again after 19 31-2 but the divergence was not wiped out. In 
1935 nenko1s wages fell to their lowest point since before their big 
increase and after that the level of daily labourer's wages rose 
faster than that of the nenko reflecting structural changes in labour 
demand. But the real wage for agricultural labour was substantially 
higher after the First World War than it had been before it, as a 
result of the impact of industrialisation on the village, rising 
higher than, and remaining above, the level of the wholesale price 
index, as well as the local rice price.
3. The Impact of Industrialisation on Household Economies.
The previous section has shown how the industrialisation 
of northern Kyuushuu in the first two decades of this century affected 
the villages of the Saga Plain, via a reduction in labour supply and 
rise in wages, and via an increase in demand and high prices for 
agricultural products. This section begins by describing the changes 
in the economic and social situations of different kinds of household 
within the village economy, and the observed responses to them, as 
industrialisation proceded. It then examines what lay behind this- 
the quantitative impact of the changes in relative prices- by using 
the hypothetical accounting frameworks for different types of household, 
discussed in the previous chapter.
i. the small-scale cultivator/agricultural labourer.
Those at the bottom of the size distribution of cultivators, who 
owned or rented only a small area of land (less than about half a 
hectare) and who relied on employment as agricultural labourers for 
their livlihood, were faced with a new choice as a result of the 
expansion of employment opportunities. One of the basic assumptions 
behind the communal village employment system, that there was no 
alternative employment outside the village, no longer held. The 
choice was, by and large, a simple one, between remaining a farmer, 
possibly with higher wages, and leaving the land altogether to 
become an urban industrial worker. The distance between Saga 
and the major cities was enough to make commuting to work from 
the family farm difficult. The scope for industrial part-time 
employment within agriculture also did not develop much on the
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Plain (1). Therefore, this group of farmers was faced with a straight 
choice between agriculture and industry, and it is clear from what we 
have seen that, despite the rise in agricultural wages, farming could 
not match the stable employment and higher wages offered by industry. 
The productivity of labour, under the existing technology, was not 
enough to be able to provide an income comparable with an industrial 
one. Although at first people left singly, once it became clear that 
industrial employment was easily available and stable in supply, 
whole families began to leave, as we have seen, giving up their hold­
ings in agriculture altogether. Thus it was that the agricultural 
work force in the Saga Plain area dropped by about a half between the 
1890s and the 1920s.
For those small farmers who remained behind conditions 
also improved. Their wages were rising and, because there was now 
alternative employment, they were less dependent on their employers 
and landlords. Relations between employer and employee became more 
strained and Kamagata argues that the social position of the 
smaller farmer and his social relationships with bigger farmers were 
much changed (Kamagata,34,p.183). Employer/employee relationships 
became much more commonly governed by written contracts. In any case, 
the traditional employment system was broken down by this impact of 
the commercial economy on the village, and it is clear that 
employer/employee relations were ceasing to be governed by the 
community employment principle. They were now determined by market 
laws of supply and demand. The employee class had chosen the market 
system and abandoned the community employment principle, now that 
one of its fundamental assumptions no longer held and it had ceased to 
offer them the better alternative.
ii. employer farmers. The choice was not so clear-cut 
for those owned larger amounts of land and other assets tied to 
agriculture. The greater a farmer's income from the ownership of 
land and capital, as well as from his labour, the less was 
industrial income able to compete with it. Furthermore, with the 
price of rice rising fast, the more such farmers had to sell, the 
greater their incomes could be. The problem was the supply
(1) In the hill areas of Saga Prefecture, however, increase in the 
availability of side-employment was the major way in which industrial­
isation affected agriculture.
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of labour - both its price and its availability.
As we have seen, almost all farmers cultivating more 
than a hectare or a hectare and a half needed to hire labour. Given 
the technology in use, their demand for labour was for virtually 
permanent, skilled, male labour. The long period of heavy work 
required by the rotation meant that workers must be locally resident 
and available for the major part of the year. Therefore, with the 
available labour force falling so fast, it became very difficult to 
find workers of this sort, and the technology made it impossible to 
tap other sources of labour in Saga or further afield. The structure 
of the labour market was such that wage rises may not have reflected 
adequately the disequilibrium between supply and demand for this kind 
of labour. The relationship between the nenko and his employer was 
not strictly a market one, and if the nenko felt that the ties between 
them were strong enough to prevent him leaving, then the wage he 
received may not have been a competitive market one. So, especially 
for the farmer who had to hire a good deal of labour, the problem was 
not only one of rising wages but also one of the availability of 
the kind of labour required by the technology.
Two kinds of response to this situation were observed 
amongst those who remained in agriculture. Firstly, every effort 
was made to save on hired labour and to substitute family labour for 
it. This was especially so amongst middle-sized farmers who did not 
need to hire a great deal of labour in the first place. Women had 
to work the wheels and children returning from school were sent 
straight out to pump (Kyuushuu Noosei Kyoku,35,p.236-7). Farmers re­
sorted to the expedient of removing soil from the fields to lower 
their level. This meant that water did not have to be pumped so far, 
so that fewer wheels were necessary. But it also meant that the 
field was harder to drain and therefore to use for a second crop.
This was not such a severe drawback, however, since not planting a 
second crop was another means of saving on hired labour. It meant 
less need to have labour available in the autumn for harvesting the 
rice crop and planting the second crop in the available time. So 
temporary workers for the spring and summer could be substituted for 
the permanent nenko. The result of this can be seen in the fact 
that the area planted to second grain crops in Saga Prefecture 
declined from 30,000 ha. (out of a total cultivated area of
50,000 ha.) to 23,000 ha. between 1916 and 1919, and had fallen to
-128-
below 20,000 hectares by 1923 (Kamagata,34,Table 16,p.239).
The second type of response, made particularly by those 
at the top end of the size distribution, was simply to reduce the 
area cultivated. The effect of this on the overall size distribution 
will be examined in the next section, but it is clear that larger- 
scale landowner/cultivators were either selling their land, or 
splitting it up and giving it to branch families, or renting it out 
to tenants. This would yield them a return in the form of rent and/or 
labour services. The decline in the number of really big landowners 
especially was accentuated by the collapse of the post-World War I 
boom, as a result of which they lost many of the assets they had 
invested in banks and other enterprises outside agriculture. But 
basically the problem was that, without the community employment 
system, which had depended on the non-existence of alternative 
employment opportunities, the larger cultivator could not go on 
farming from year to year with security.
The link, at the level of the individual farm, between 
these observed responses and the changes in relative factor prices 
and availabilities can be filled out by making use of the information 
on farm household economies presented in the last chapter. Table 4.7 
is an attempt to show, through hypothetical accounts, the impact of 
the changing structure of relative prices on farms of different sizes, 
between 1913-15 and 1922. The period 1913-15 has been chosen because, 
as can be seen in Chart 4.3, it represents a relatively stable period, 
from the point of view of price changes, before the dramatic rises 
set in, and because the data available in the Rice Economy Survey 
(see Table 3.3) cover this period. 1922 was a year of relatively low 
rice yields, but it was a crucial year, as we shall see, as regards 
the decisions of farmers to invest in new techniques.
The columns contain estimates of the effects of actual 
price changes on incomes and expenses for different sizes of farm, 
within a highly simplified and hypothetical accounting framework.
The half-hectare farm represents the mass of very small cultivating 
households, some of whose members would have been working out as 
nenko. The one hectare farm represents the average-sized cultivation 
unit, depending, for the most part, on family labour alone. The two 
hectare farm is a relatively large-scale cultivating unit like 
Family S. The five hectare farm is a very large unit, of which there
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Table 4.7
CALCULATIONS OF HYPOTHETICAL CHANGES IN EXPENSES AND INCOMES
OF iSAGA PLAIN FARMERS BETWEEN 1913-15 AND 1922
1 9 1 3 - 1 5
Area Cultivated ha h 1 2 2 5
Rice Yield kg/lOares 373 373 373 373 373
So, Rice Output kg 1865 3730 7460 7460 18,650
Price of Rice ¥/100kg 10 10 10 10 10
So, Value of 
Rice Output ¥ 186.5 373.0 746.0 746.0 1,865.1
Total Labour persons/ 2 4 5 a 8Requirements year U
Family 4 4 4 4 4
Hired -2 0 1 2 4
Wage Rate ¥/year 92 92 92 92 92
So, Hired 
Labour Cost
¥ + 184 0 -92 -184 -368
Fertiliser Cost ¥ 46.6 93.2 186.5 186.5 466.2
Total Net Income ¥ 323.9 279.8 467.5 375.5 1030.1
1 9  2 2
Area Cultivated ha h 1 2 2 5
Rice Yield kg/lOares 355 355 355 355 355
So, Rice Output kg 1775 3550 7100 7100 17,750
Price of Rice ¥/100kg 20 20 20 20 20
So, Value of 
Rice Output
¥ 355 710 1420 1420 3550
Total Labour persons/ 2 4 5 5 8Requirements year
Family 4 4 4 4 4
Hired -2 0 1 2 4
Wage Rate ¥/year 275 275 275 275 275
So, Hired 
Labour Cost ¥ +550 0 -275 -550 -1100
Fertiliser Cost ¥ 88.7 177.5 355.0 355.0 887.5
Total Net Income ¥ 816.3 532.2 790.0 515.0 1562.5
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were few, but it represents perhaps the upper limit of cultivated 
acreage, and we have Family N as a model for it.
The yield data show average yields for Saga-gun, taken 
from SKTS. The farmers in the Rice Economy Survey obtained somewhat 
higher yields than those shown, but for the sake of comparison the 
county average is used. As stated earlier, there is no evidence to 
suggest that yields varied with area cultivated, so the same figure 
has been used for all farm sizes. The rice price is the average for 
the year in Saga City, as are the wage rates, and both come from SKTS.
The estimates of labour requirements are based on the 
scattered information presented in the previous chapter. It is 
assumed that two adult workers would be enough for a half hectare farm, 
since we know that one was sufficient to do almost all the pumping, 
and the family members who worked outside would probably have been 
able to help on their own farm. The same kind of reasoning, as 
regards pumping, lies behind the assumption that a labour force of 
four was necessary for a one hectare holding. A hectare seems to have 
been about the limit to what a family labour force could manage.
The estimate for the two hectare farm is the most difficult. The Rice 
Economy Survey households vary enormously in the size of their labour 
forces. But taking into account that Family S employed two nenko, in 
addition to family labour, on a farm of a little less than two 
hectares, six seems a reasonable estimate. However, the calculation 
is repeated for a labour force of five, in order to show the effect on 
a two hectare household's income of reducing its hired labour force. 
Household N, farming five hectares, employed three nenko in addition 
to the family labour force, but also a considerable amount of 
temporary labour. The six hectare farm in the Rice Economy Survey had 
a labour force of nine. Eight therefore seems a reasonable figure to 
assume for a five hectare farm. The assumption of a family labour 
force of four (say, a couple plus older children or dependent relatives, 
male or female) for all sizes of farm may be unrealistic. The 
larger-scale farms would almost certainly have had larger numbers of 
dependent relatives. But judging from the village studied by Isobe 
in 1939, these would probably have had more effect on reducing income 
per family member than on removing the need for hired labour.
Fertiliser expenses are the only other input it is 
possible to estimate, and this is done very approximately by taking 
25% of the value of rice output. This is the value given in the Rice
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Economy Survey. We have some figures for the value of fertiliser input 
and rice output in Saga-gun in the 1920s (in SKTS), and the relationship 
between them varies from around 19% to 29%, so there seems to be no 
reason to assume that the proportion had changed by 1922.
The calculation is forced to ignore the cost of other 
inputs, such as the use of horses, and it assumes all farmers own 
their land so that rent does not enter the picture. Output from 
non-rice crops is also ignored. It could be argued that their 
inclusion would tend to accentuate the change in the relative position 
of the larger-scale farmer. He was more likely to have been double­
cropping initially, since he probably owned horses and better-drained 
land, and was therefore more likely to have had to reduce his double­
cropping as labour became more scarce and expensive.
The calculations show both the declining relative 
position of the larger-scale farmers, and the pressure on the upper 
middle-sized farm to reduce its labour force. Comparing the two 
periods, with a doubling of the rice price, an increase in the 
wholesale price index used earlier from 100 in 1910-14 to 164 in 
1915-19 and 221 in 1920-24, and a slight decline in yields, the 
dramatic rise in wages has meant that the income of the small-scale 
household, with two members working outside as nenko, has increased 
by 150%. That of the one hectare farm has risen by 90%. The income 
of the 2 hectare farm employing 2 nenko, on the other hand, increased 
by only 37%, and even if it only employed one nenko, the increase is 
still less than that of the one hectare farm at 68%. The increase 
for the 5 hectare farm is 52%.
The very small farm with labour to hire out has benefitted 
enormously from the rise in wages. By 1922 its total household 
income is greater than that of all except the 5 hectare household.
This must involve some exaggeration because of the neglect of rent, 
second crops, etc.. But assuming that urban wage rates were higher 
than those of nenko, it is clear that the incentive to give up farming 
and enter full-time paid employment was very great for such households.
Turning to the very large-scale farmer, he has seen his 
wage costs rise from just under 20% of the value of his rice crop 
to over 30%, and the difference between his income and that of the one 
hectare farmer or the two hectare farmer with one nenko become smaller. 
Most significantly, if he were to rent out one hectare of his land, 
creating a one hectare sized farm, at a rent equal to half the value
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of the rice crop (which is approximately what rents were) , he would 
in 1913-15 have received an amount equal to 68% of the per hectare 
income on land he cultivated himself. By 1922 this had risen to 85%.
So the incentive to let out land, reducing the cost and trouble of 
managing a labour force which was becoming increasingly difficult to 
hold, was great. If he was prepared to sell land, he would find that 
the price of a hectare of middle-grade paddy land had risen from 
about 2,800 yen in 1913-15 to 7,140 yen in 1922 (see Table 4.10), so 
that his return, in terms of his income from rice production per 
annum as a proportion of the value of his land, had fallen from 7.3% 
to 4.4%. Added to this is the fact that, taking Saga-gun as represent­
ative, the labour force on the Plain had declined by about a quarter 
over the period, so that recruitment of nenko must have been hard 
even given the rise in wages. The situations of the one and two 
hectare farms show the increasing pressure to save labour in the medium 
scales. With the substantial rise in his family income and the rising 
price of rice, the one hectare farmer had every incentive to try to 
increase the area he cultivated to the absolute limits of the family's 
labour force. Meanwhile, the two hectare farmer employing two nenko 
was, by 1922, actually making a lower total income from rice 
cultivation than the man with only one hectare. Reducing the hired 
labour force as far as possible was therefore imperative, making a 
very large difference to family income. It was worth doing even if 
it meant reducing the area cultivated, since more could be earned on 
one hectare without employing nenko than on two, if two nenko were 
necessary. These forces would explain the strain on the family 
labour force, as farmers in the middle ranges tried to save on hired 
labour, the pressure from both sides pushing farmers into the 1-2 
hectare range, and the desire to press for new labour-saving techniques.
4. Changes in the Size Distribution of Holdings.
How did this differential impact of industrialisation 
on the economies of the various types of household within the village 
affect the distribution of cultivated land? Table 4.8, based on the 
prefectural data shown in Appendix Table 4, summarises the observed 
trends in the size distribution of cultivated land. It clearly shows 
an increase in the numbers of households cultivating ^-1 hectare and
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Table 4.8
CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BY AREA 
CULTIVATED IN SAGA PREFECTURE 
(units = households)
Cultivated 
area (ha)
1908 change
1908-18
change
1918-28
change
1928-38
1938 change
1908-3!
Under 0.5 25,480 -4274 -2837 -1843 16,526 -3954
0.5-1 24,892 + 452 - 405 -4074 20,875 -4017
1-2 12,927 +3992 + 1858 +2564 21,341 +8414
2-3 5,889 -1362 - 149 + 688 5,066 - 823
3-5 1,587 - 503 - 335 + 188 934 - 653
Above 5 323 - 224 - 62 - 11 26 - 297
Total 71,098 -1909 -1933 -2458 64,768 -6330
Source: Kamagata, 34, p.185, from basic data as in Appendix Table 4.
1-2 hectares in the 1908-18 period, matched by declines in both the 
total number of households and the numbers cultivating less than half 
a hectare and more than two hectares. The changes in the cumulative 
distribution are plotted in Chart 4.4, and the comparison between this 
and Chart 2.2 shows that the trend towards concentration in the 
middle ranges of the size-scale was more marked in Saga than in the 
country as a whole. For the Plain area itself, Yamada and Oota 
(Yamada and Oota,46,p.299) give the following figures for the 
distribution of households by area cultivated in Saga-gun between 
1920 and 1924:
Area cultivated 
in hectares
Percentage of 
Households
under .5 .5-1 1-2 2-3 3-5 over 5 total
20.9 25.8 35.4 14.1 2.7 0.1 100
If we compare this with the picture of the distribution of holdings 
in the second half of the nineteenth century, as described in 
Chapter 3, we can see the shift towards the middle ranges of the 
size-scale.
This trend was accompanied by an increase in the propor­
tion of households falling into the owner/tenant category. Table 4.9 
shows that, for the Plain area, the period up to 1910 witnessed an 
increase in the number of households who were either pure tenants 
or pure owners of the land they cultivated, but this trend was 
sharply reversed after 1910, with the proportion of owner/tenants 
rising from 37 to 52% in the 1910-20 period. The same trend is visible, 
though less distinctly, in the data for the prefecture as a whole, 
shown in Appendix Table 2. So the increase in the numbers farming 
middle-sized holdings was matched by an increase in the proportion of 
households who both owned and rented in land.
It is easy to see that these trends are the result of 
the differential impact of industrialisation and its effect on the 
dynamics of the size structure of holdings. The decline in the 
proportion of very small cultivators must be due simply to out­
migration. But the increasing concentration in the medium-scale, 
owner/tenant group can be seen as the result of the forces described 
in the last section. Let us take,to begin with, the case of a small 
farmer cultivating less than half a hectare who does not leave 
agriculture and finds that his income from employment is rising as is 
his income from cultivation (as the price of rice rises). He
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Chart 4»4; Cumulative Percentage Size Distrihution of
Cultivated Holdings, Saga Prefecture, 1908-39.
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Table 4.9
MOVEMENTS IN NUMBERS OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS BY TENURE 
STATUS IN SAGA COUNTY AND SAGA CITY.
(units = people)
Owners % Owner/
Tenants
% Tenants % Total
(100%)
1900 19,260 36. 3 26,593 50.0 7,241 13.7 53,094
1905 17,101 38.0 18,664 41.5 9,194 20.5 44,959
1910 17,763 39.0 16,870 37.0 10,956 24.0 45,589
1914 9,709 30.7 15,031 47.4 6,970 21.9 31,710
1920 7,788 27.5 14,902 52.6 5,629 19.9 28,319
1925 7,883 29.8 13,276 50.2 5,261 20.0 26,420
1930 8,064 28.7 14,915 53.0 5,167 18.3 28,146
1936 7,403 26.2 15,684 55.4 5,231 18.4 28,318
Source: Isobe, 76, p.30, calculated from SKTS.
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begins to accumulate a little capital with which he is able to buy his 
own or a similar holding if he does not already own it. Because he is 
making profits he considers expanding the area he cultivates and 
finds that there is land available, both because others are leaving 
agriculture and because big landowners are anxious to reduce the area 
they cultivate. So he increases the size of his holding by renting 
in land and becomes an owner/tenant. Eventually, if he is competent 
and no disaster strikes him, he will, as long as the rice price 
stays high, expand to the point at which he cannot farm any more land 
without hiring extra labour to supplement that of his family. This 
would be at around the one hectare level. Hiring labour would prove 
difficult and would raise his costs greatly, so his expansion would 
tend to come to a halt within the 1-2 hectare range. At this point 
he would probably be an owner/tenant.
Consider now a larger farmer cultivating three, four or 
five hectares. As labour becomes increasingly scarce and expensive, 
he finds it harder and harder to cultivate his land efficiently, 
and increased wage costs eat up the extra revenue he receives for his 
rice. He notices also that smaller farmers are not suffering so 
badly from the labour shortage and are doing well from the high 
rice price. He could sell up his whole holding and go to the city, 
but he has no guarantee that he could, with the capital he thus 
acquired, earn an income equivalent to what he could earn as a 
cultivating fanner. His more likely course, under the incentives 
suggested by the hypothetical accounts, is to try to rent out some 
of his land to some smaller-scale farmer, or sell off some of it, 
or establish some relative or dependent as a branch family, farming 
part of the original holding independently but, hopefully, helping 
out the main household with labour. He will reduce his holding until 
he reaches the point where he can farm using only the labour of his 
family with perhaps help from his branch households and a little 
temporary hired labour. This would tend to put him too at around the 
1-2 hectare level.
We can see this process happening in the increasing 
level of land sales through the 1910s. Banks in the Plain area 
reported a rush to borrow money to buy land (Isobe,76,p.32).
Villagers would come together to form "mutual financing associations"
(tanomoshi-ko) to secure loans to buy land. Many farmers, who 
borrowed money to buy land in the good years before the collapse of
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the post-World War I boom, were thrown into difficulties by the 
decline in the rice price, but still this continued purchase by * 
smaller-scale cultivators and landowners formed the basis of the 
expansion of the middle-sized owner/tenant class, and is reflected in 
the rising price of land shown in Table 4.10.
5. Disequilibrium in Structure and Technology.
It is now possible to bring together the structural 
changes brought about by industrialisation and the technical system 
described in the previous chapter. It can then be seen that the 
balance within and between the economic and technical structures was 
disrupted (as it had not been by the technical change and output growth 
of the Meiji period) so as to raise pressures for change.
We saw in the last chapter how the traditional 
technology of the area, based on creek irrigation with treadle-wheels, 
the two parallel rotations and the necessity for meticulous horse 
ploughing, was overlaid, but not fundamentally altered, by the new 
techniques which were spreading through Japan during the Meiji 
period. In particular, the input of commercial fertiliser was 
increasing, and, to complement this, new seed varieites were beginning 
to be used, and improved cultivation techniques adopted.
In this chapter we have seen how the industrialisation 
of northern Kyuushuu rapidly opened up the village economy to the 
influence of the outside world. Farmers were drawn into the commercial 
economy by the expanding demand for their ouput as well as by their 
increased purchase of commercial inputs and consumption goods. They 
became producers of a specialised product for a particular market.
In addition, labour had been drawn away from the village, wages had 
risen and the small-scale cultivator/agricultural labourer had 
become a better paid, more independent worker or was moving up to 
become a medium-scale farmer.
As a result of these changes, the middle-scale farmer 
became the one who could operate most efficiently with the given 
technology. Small-scale cultivators had new, non-agricultural 
opportunities opening up to them, and large-scale cultivators were 
being driven, by the outflow of labour and collapse of the traditional 
employment system, to reduce the area they cultivated. But, in order
-139-
Source :
Table 4.10
THE PRICE OF LAND IN SAGA PREFECTURE, 
(yen/10 ares of middle-grade paddy)
1913 293
1914 286
1915 271
1916 177
1917 347
1918 416
1919 671
1920 677
1921 658
1922 714
1923 614
1924 640
1925 625
1926 613
1927 635
1928 668
1929 645
1930 621
1931 509
1932 511
1933 498
1934 498
1935 519
1936 544
1937 646
1938 710
Isobe, 76, p.33, taken from a survey of land 
sales made by the Hypothec Bank of Japan.
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for the middle-scale farmer to reap the benefits of the new situation, 
he had to stretch the factor substitutability of the technology to its 
limits if he was to operate it under the changed conditions of factor 
availability. Land and family labour power were being substituted for 
hired labour as far as possible within the structure of the old 
technology. But the scope for doing this without reducing output was 
not great enough to avoid severe strain on the family labour force. 
Yield-increasing practices, like careful weeding and insect control, 
not to mention double-cropping, had to be abandoned if pumping labour 
demands were to be met. Pumping labour could be reduced by lowering 
the level of the field but this lowered yields and made double­
cropping difficult. The old technology could not be operated 
effectively within the new structure.
Thus we have seen how the impact of industrialisation via 
its differing effect on the economies of the households within the 
traditional village structure brought about changes in that structure. 
We have seen how industrialisation opened up the internal village 
labour market to the influence of the commercial economy, thereby 
breaking up the traditional community economy. We have seen how the 
expansion of the demand for marketed agricultural output, which 
industrialisation brought about, provided a necessary condition for 
these changes. But we leave the economies of Saga Plain villages in a 
somewhat unstable state. The traditional technology remains in its 
essentials unchanged, with its fundamental problems unsolved. But 
it is now being utilised under conditions of quite different 
relative factor supplies from those under which it developed, and 
without the traditional village organisation which made it operable 
in the past. The ways in which this disequilibrium was overcome are 
the subject of the following two chapters.
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CHAPTER 5
The Development and Introduction 
of Mechanised Irrigation Pumps
In terms of the framework of Chapter 1, we have now 
reached the point at which the outside economy has come to influence 
the initial conditions (Arrow 1). The effect has been to disrupt the 
equilibrium of social and economic arrangements existing within the 
initial conditions. The change in relative prices and factor 
availabilities has brought about shifts in the distribution of 
cultivated land and has broken up the traditional economic and social 
relationships between households. This has resulted in the emergence 
of the middle-scale owner/tenant household as the predominant type of 
farm unit, but has left such farmers operating a technology designed 
for a different set of factor prices and structure of relationships 
between households.
This chapter concerns the development and introduction 
of a technical change which came to transform the whole technology 
and to generate the increases in yields and in labour productivity 
which made Saga famous. The questions it seeks to answer are how ancf 
why was this particular technique developed. It was designed to deal 
with the problems of one particular part of an overall technology, 
and the first stage in answering these questions is to consider how 
this specific problem point emerged from the interaction between the 
change in factor availabilities and the technology of the initial 
conditions. The specific problem to which a technical solution is 
sought cannot be predicted solely from knowledge of changes in factor 
availabilities and prices, without understanding how these changes 
relate to.the initial technology. Neither can the characteristics of 
the solution developed be predicted without bringing in the forces 
within the initial conditions which influence their choice. The first 
section will therefore consider what determined the specific problem 
to which a solution was sought, and describe the factors within the 
initial conditions influencing the choice of the characteristics of 
the solution. Subsequent sections will describe the way in which the 
choice was made and the resulting new technique diffused. They will 
show how the middle-scale owner/tenants played the role of the 
initial innovator group, as described in Chapter 1.
1. The Emergence of the Problem.
The first point to make is that, by the late 1910s, the 
existing technology was placing definite limits on farmers' ability 
to respond to the changed situation of demand and relative prices.
With expanding demand and rising prices farmers had every incentive 
to try to produce and market more rice. This could have been done 
either by expanding holding sizes and cultivated area per worker, or 
raising the output of a given holding by applying more inputs to it. 
But the existing technology, based on the need to deal with the 
problems of the rice-borer and the labour demands of the irrigation 
system, made the scope for any such factor substitution limited.
Where the family labour force was already fully utilised at the times 
of peak labour demand, holding size could only be expanded by 
increasing the labour force and this was extremely difficult now that 
the number of small-scale cultivators/agricultural labourers had 
declined so sharply. The more intensive cultivation methods available 
were difficult to apply to the extent that they required increased 
labour input, since the family labour force was fully occupied 
throughout the spring and summer with ploughing and pumping.
Fertiliser input could be expanded and, to complement this, improved 
seed varieties could be planted. But the profitability of such 
investments in more expensive inputs was reduced by the risk of damage 
by the rice-borer, and limited by the failure to adopt wholeheartedly 
complementary labour-using techniques. As the labour shortage 
worsened it became necessary to adopt measures, such as lowering the 
levels of fields and abandoning double-cropping, which reduced output 
and made it even harder to respond to demand pressures.
If we combine this situation with what we know of the 
existing technology, we can see how the focus of the problem was the 
technique for pumping water. In the first place, the effect of all 
the measures taken to try to deal with the labour shortage was to 
reduce the amount of water which needed to be pumped and/or the 
distance through which it had to be raised, or to utilise what family 
labour time was available to substitute for other sources of labour 
for pumping. From this it is clear that the labour shortage hit 
Saga farmers most sharply through the labour requirements for pumping, 
which absorbed such large amounts of time in a simple manual operation 
when the demand for skilled and meticulous labour for other operations 
was at its peak. But secondly, the water-wheel technology was also
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the bottleneck preventing farmers from producing more to meet the 
rising demand. In part this was because it inhibited the adoption of 
some parts of the available package of new techniques, both where 
they were incompatible with existing water conservation and pest 
control methods, and where the required labour was not available.
In part, also, it was because it prevented the adoption of the only 
known method of removing the risk of pest damage. Thus the problems 
caused by labour shortage, combined with the incentive of increased 
demand, focussed on the labour requirements for pumping. If these 
could be substantially reduced, then the skilled labour of the family 
and the remaining hired labour could be concentrated in the areas 
where it could contribute most to the maintenance and expansion of 
output. The change in factor availabilities had thus created a 
specific problem within the existing technical and institutional 
environment.
The difficulties caused by this problem became more 
pressing as the decade of the 1910s progressed, as the labour outflow 
continued and wages went on rising. But as long as the price of rice 
kept increasing in line, the situation was not desperate. Then in 
1919 the rice price hit its peak and began a decline which lasted 
throughout the depressed years of the '20s until after the Great 
Depression in 1930-31 and which was not matched by the decline in 
wages (see Chart 4.3). This made the discovery of a solution to the 
farmers' problems a matter of urgency.
For the reasons described above, such a solution implied 
a change in the technique of pumping which would reduce the labour 
required. This in turn implied the substitution of some form of 
capital equipment for labour, some mechanised means of raising water 
onto the fields. Since capital was the production factor which was 
becoming more abundant in the industrialising Japanese economy at 
this time, this involved the substitution of a factor which was 
growing relatively cheaper for one which was growing relatively more 
expensive, in line with the theory of induced innovation. But the 
crucial question for those concerned with the choice of technique was, 
as we shall see, the form in which the capital was to be embodied, 
the characteristics of the machinery to be introduced. We will 
consider here four aspects of the general background conditioning the 
choice, and in the next section look at how it was actually made.
First of all, the general economic development of
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Japanese agriculture up to this point placed limits on the choice of 
technique, by making it unlikely that any large-scale machinery could 
be developed. Attempts to develop large-scale, Western-type farming 
methods in Japan had been abandoned early in the process of modernis­
ation, so that the technical knowledge necessary to construct 
suitable machinery had not been developed. The substitution of land 
for labour, increasing the area which one man could cultivate, was 
feasible, but only to a certain extent. Even in Saga, where land 
reclamation was still taking place and where families were leaving 
agriculture at quite a rapid rate, the cultivated area did not expand 
at any great rate relative to the number of farm units. Aside from 
economic considerations of relative factor supplies, the physical 
nature of the Japanese countryside and of the irrigation system 
made the use of large-scale mechanised techniques problematic.
Secondly, the limitations on the scale of machinery were 
re-inforced by the changes in the economic organisation of Saga 
village life brought about by industrialisation. The middle-scale 
farmer had become predominant, so any technique to be diffused widely 
would have to be such as could be acquired and utilised by a household 
with relatively limited financial resources and only a family labour 
force. The significance of this will be clearer later, when it is 
shown that leadership of village organisations had now passed to the 
middle-scale owner/tenant group, and that these organisations played 
an important role in the development and introduction of the new 
techniques.
The third factor also relates to the capacity of Saga 
farmers to adopt new techniques, especially mechanised ones. By the 
1920s, most of the male members of the agricultural labour force 
would have received a number of years of primary education and would 
have been literate (1). This obviously made the diffusion of new 
techniques easier, for instance by making it possible to use written 
materials in publicising improved methods. But few Saga farmers were 
likely to have received education beyond the primary level, and their 
technical training was limited to what they could learn from 
extension officials. Furthermore, they had little opportunity for 
gaining experience in the use of machinery in general, given the highly 
labour-intensive methods used in agriculture, and in almost
(1) School attendance became compulsory in 1886.
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everything else, in rural areas of Japan at this time. In 1920, - 
there were only 1,785 petrol engines and 683 electric motors in the 
whole Japanese agricultural sector (Ogura,21,p.414). Embree's study 
of a village in Kumamoto (one of the prefectures bordering on Saga) 
in the 1920s showed that the only machines with which villagers had 
any contact were bicycles, and sometimes pedal-driven threshers and 
other foot-powered machines for preparing grain (Embree,5,pp.34-37) .
So the ability of Saga farmers to operate and repair machinery must 
have been limited as yet.
The fourth conditioning factor was the role which the 
government and research authorities had created for themselves in the 
economic and technical development of Saga agriculture. This, it will 
be shown, provided the link between the economic situation of 
farmers, represented by village organisations, and the choice of 
technique. The research and extension officials had, over the course 
of many years, built up both their knowledge of and their contact 
with the economic life of Saga villages. They had been instrumental 
in the introduction of earlier new techniques and their success in 
this had given them a certain standing with cultivators and a 
responsibility for them. The story of their role in the development 
of the mechanised pump will show that the improvement of Saga 
agriculture was a duty, for which many were prepared to labour in the 
face of opposition and setback. From this arises the fact that it was 
the actions of the research authorities which largely determined 
the characteristics of the new techniques developed and diffused, but 
that, in these actions, they were aware of farmers' needs. Thus they 
made the bridge between the economic situation of Saga agriculture 
and the actual choice of technique made.
2. The Research Authorities and the Development of the
Mechanised Pump (1)
It is clear that the research authorities had become 
convinced of the argument that the introduction of some form of
(1) The descriptions of the development and introduction of mechanical 
irrigation and of the new rotation, included in this section, are 
derived mainly from Miyajima,36,pp.35-55, and Yamada and Oota,46, 
pp. 329-346.
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mechanised pump was essential to the development of Saga agriculture 
by the late 1910s. For them, it was vital both in order to do away 
with treadle-wheel pumping, and all the labour and misery that that 
involved, and to make it possible to irrigate all the land at the 
same time, hence to plant one crop in late June. There would then be 
no early crop on which the rice-borer larvae, hatched from the eggs 
laid the previous year, could live, and hence no moths hatching out 
to lay eggs in the late crop. The introduction of a mechanical 
irrigation method of itself would bring immediate benefit to the 
farmers of the Plain. It would relieve them of the terrible labour 
of pumping and free them to adopt improved cultivation methods which 
demanded labour time. But in the minds of the officials who had seen 
the failure of the late-planting experiment, it was indissolubly 
linked to the possibility of introducing that change.
By 1918 the Agricultural Land Department of the 
prefectural authorities had begun to plan the development and 
introduction of some form of motor-driven pump on the Saga Plain. In 
the description which follows of the process by which this was achieved, 
two characteristics are of major importance. The first is the close 
working relationship between the research workers and the manufactur­
ers of the pumps and motors. The second is the constant interchange 
between the authorities and the farmers themselves. In both respects 
we see the fruit of the authorities1 work in gathering knowledge about 
the conditions of the area and in building contacts with the farmers.
It was this which enabled them to guide the research and development 
work of the manufacturing company and continually to test research 
results by the farmers' experience and capabilities. It was this which 
made it possible to produce machinery exactly suited to the farmers' 
needs.
Since the First World War, Japan's industrial capability 
had improved considerably. Japanese machine-building firms now had 
sufficient expertise to develop and produce the sorts of motors and 
pumps required. Without this, the possibility of mechanical 
irrigation could not have been conceived or realised. But by now 
engineering capacity had reached a sufficiently high level and Saga 
was not the only place in Japan where such pumps were being developed 
and introduced. In neighbouring Fukuoka Prefecture a mechanical 
irrigation project was already in operation. Under this scheme a 
30-50 h.p. engine was being used to irrigate an area of reclaimed land.
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The authorities took farmers from Saga to look at this project and to 
comment on it, a first step in the process of consultation and 
propaganda whereby a suitable pump was developed and farmers were 
persuaded to acquire it.
Against this background of improving industrial capability, 
the research authorities approached the Masaki Iron Company, which 
had its factory in Saga City, and commisioned it to develop and manu­
facture a suitable motor and pump. Apart from the experience of other 
areas, the company also drew on the lessons learnt from an attempt to 
establish mechanical irrigation in Saga. In 1920 one village tried 
to use a large, static diesel engine to pump irrigation water. The 
scheme required the destruction of some of the cultivable land in order 
to create all the channels necessary to connect it to the fields, and 
it did not prove a great success because the engine did not work well. 
The farmers were not able to manage it and they eventually abandoned 
the attempt.
With this experience in mind, the company decided that, 
rather than develop such a relatively large-scale machine, they would 
initially produce small, moveable pumps driven by petrol motors, such 
as were used to pump water on ships. They manufactured 100 of these 
and they were distributed to farmers who tried them out. They proved 
to be difficult to move about and troublesome for the farmers to 
manage and maintain.
At this point, officials from the Prefectural Agricultural 
Society and the Agricultural Department came up with a suggestion for 
small-scale electric motors driving static pumps. These could be run 
continuously and cheaply and could make use of the existing water 
channels without the need to create new ones on the scale required by 
larger equipment. Further experiments were carried out and proved 
successful. In 1921 the final model, a 2-3 h.p. electric motor with 
a centrifugal pump, was put on exhibition in Saga (see Fig. 5.1).
It was relatively simple to operate and had the added advantage that 
the motor was not heavy and could be removed when not needed for 
pumping and used to operate other machinery.
However, as the authorities realised, there were problems 
with this type of pump. Firstly, in order to make it worthwhile to 
build electricity supply facilities, the pumps would have to be 
installed over a wide area all at once. This was essential also if 
their introduction was to be linked to the enforcement of uniform late
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Fig. 5.1
THE DESIGN OF THE PUMP
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Part of an advertisement appearing in a magazine 
in 1953, showing pumps of basically the same design as those 
introduced in 1922. They were manufactured in Saga.
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planting. Secondly, each pump set could supply enough water for 
several average-sized holdings. With farmers' holdings, furthermore, 
scattered throughout the village, it was essential that they share 
the use of pumps if they were to be diffused at all widely. These pumps 
will be considered in greater detail from the village side later.
From the authorities' side, it is enough at present to point out that 
these characteristics combined to make some sort of communal village 
organisation of the installation and operation of the pumps essential. 
But it was not unnatural, given their knowledge of and relationship 
with the village society, that they should assume that such a thing 
could be organised.
Furthermore, the organisations necessary for carrying 
out such a scheme already existed in the form of the irrigation 
associations (suiri kumiai) which existed in each village to manage 
the irrigation facilities (timing of the opening of sluices, etc.) 
and to which all cultivating members of the village belonged. The 
irrigation associations of all the villages in the central Plain 
area were linked together in an overall organisation called the Oide 
Irrigation Association. In 1921, the head of this organisation 
proposed a scheme to convert the Oide area to mechanical irrigation. 
Electric motors and pumps were to be installed over the entire 4,500 
hectares covered by the Oide Association, under its general supervision 
and guidance. Under the scheme, the Oide Association would plan the 
siting of the pumps, the supply of electricity and so on over the whole 
area. Individual village associations would be responsible for the 
purchase of the pumps and their installation at the local level. Each 
village would buy the number of pumps necessary and organise their 
use on a communal basis. All cultivators would be required to take 
part in the scheme and it was aimed to convert the entire cultivated 
area covered by the Oide Association to mechanically-powered irrigation. 
The vastness of the scheme overwhelmed the delegates to the meeting 
of the Oide Association when it was presented to them and they did 
not fully understand or accept it at this stage.
The research authorities, however, did not give up and, 
with the completion of the machine in 1921, they began a large-scale 
campaign to advertise the merits of the new pumps. Officials and 
"conscientious farmers" tramped the countryside lecturing and demon­
strating. Parties of farmers were brought to see the exhibited 
machines and all kinds of propaganda were disseminated. The authorities
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negotiated with the local electricity company which agreed to construct 
the electricity supply network necessary for the Oide scheme. By 1922 
the member farmers of the Oide Association were persuaded and agreed 
to the scheme.
Construction work began, laying the electricity supply 
lines, installing the pumps and where necessary altering the water 
channels. 465 pumps were installed and 185 km. of electricity supply 
cables laid. Other areas soon followed suit under the impact of the 
authorities' campaign. The Oide scheme finally covered about 5,000 ha. 
and a survey carried out in 1928 found a further 3,000 ha. of the Plain 
area irrigated by electrically-driven pumps (Miyajima,36,p.46). In 
other areas, petrol-driven motors and pumps were adopted. The number 
of petrol motors in Saga Prefecture rose from 107 in 1923 to 533 in 
1927, and continued to rise rapidly after that (1). The treadle-wheel 
disappeared and the landscape of the Saga Plain became characterised 
instead by the little wooden huts built to house the motors and pumps.
The diffusion process will be looked at in greater detail 
from the point of view of the farmers and their economy later. But 
before we leave the research authorities we must also tell the story 
of their role in implementing their scheme for the planting of one late 
crop, which was closely connected, for them, with the introduction 
of mechanised irrigation.
During 1922 while the installation of the pumps was 
progressing, important officials of the research authorities began to 
revive their cherished scheme to beat the rice-borer. The main 
proponents were the head of the planting section of the experiment 
station and the chief technicians of the Prefectural Agricultural 
Department and the Prefectural Agricultural Society. Around the end . 
of 1922, these men began to lobby farmers at the conscientious farmers' 
discussion societies and to develop a following amongst them. This 
culminated in the holding in Saga City of a large conference of 
representatives of every area of the Plain (choo and mura). About
1,000 people were present and they heard the officials explain the 
results of their 20 years of research on the rice-borer and the effects 
of planting one late crop on yields, seed varieties, planting methods, 
labour use and so on. They painted a picture of the benefits farmers
(1) See Table 6.3 and p.171, where the later development of this 
trend is discussed.
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could gather from abandoning their old customs. According to Miyajima 
there was much discussion among the delegates and some disagreement, 
but in the end the assembly agreed to adopt the achievement of one 
late crop as a concrete aim for 1923. After heated discussion about
what date to select, it was agreed that regulations should be passed
prohibiting the planting of rice over the Saga Plain area before 
June 20th..
As a means to this a number of resolutions was passed.
It was agreed that conferences should be held in each county (gun) in 
January, attended by official technicians, heads of administrative 
village areas (mura), mura agricultural associations and village 
(buraku) agricultural associations. In February there was to be a 
conference in every administrative village area to arrange methods 
of implementing the scheme. Finally there were to be general meetings 
of village agricultural associations to make the detailed arrangements 
Thus the purpose of the prefectural authorities was to be spread down 
through every layer of the rural administration.
Opposition to the scheme was, however, stronger among the
people of the villages than it had been amongst the more advanced
conscientious farmers. Some more remote areas had never suffered so 
badly from the rice-borer and wanted to keep their traditional ways. 
Some areas grew types of second crop that would be hard hit by the 
timing of the new rotation. In places officials were threatened and 
attacked. But if the scheme was to work, there could not be 
exceptions to it. The officials pushed patiently on with their task 
and seemed in the end to have persuaded the majority of the farmers 
as to the benefits of the scheme.
However, it seems to be agreed that its implementation 
was not achieved without the use of a certain amount of force. In 
February 1923 the prefecture issued the necessary regulations. In 
order to enforce them, five new agricultural offices were set up, 
each covering a particular area and manned by full-time resident 
technicians. A hint of the pressure applied on the farmers can be 
gathered from the fact that, among the 58 people who made up the 
prefectural insect control department, 11 were prefectural officials, 
20 were county (gun) officials and 22 were police officers (Miyajima, 
36,p.53). Technicians, meeting at a conference in April, generally 
expected some areas not to comply with the regulations and they 
devised procedures for reporting and punishing offenders. They also
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agreed on measures to enforce the strictest insect control procedures 
on areas which did plant early, to prevent any spread of the insect. 
More and more regulations were issued, increasing the complexity and 
detail of the scheme, and making it possible to punish offenders with 
fines or improsonment.
Nevertheless, despite the pessimism of these technicians, 
the mixture of the genuine conviction of many farmers that late 
planting would solve the rice-borer problem with the simple obedience 
to pressure from above of many others, and the effect of the threat 
of force on the rest, resulted in the scheme's almost total success.
In 1923 only 4% of the 20,000 ha. to which the regulations applied was 
planted with early crops, and a total of 18 people were punished for 
disobeying the regulations (Miyajima,36,p.54). The harvest that year 
was somewhat hit by heavy rain in July, but the rice-borer hardly 
appeared at all. The number of insects caught by the experiment 
station's luring lamps dropped dramatically. Furthermore, without 
exception, the areas where early crops were planted were badly hit 
by the rice-borer. No pressure from above was needed to make them 
plant only a late crop in 1924.
Thus the traditional parallel rotations, which had been 
carried out on the Plain for generations, were abolished almost at a 
stroke and the authorities had achieved a dramatic success which 
considerably enhanced their reputation with the farmers. But, by 
contrast with the movement towards the adoption of mechanical 
irrigation, it is clear that the achievement of late planting was 
carried out much more by administrative pressure from above. Although 
it met the needs the farmers had expressed to the authorities and most 
of them accepted it, yet its implementation involved far less of the 
interchange and consultation which had characterised the development 
of the motorised pump. Nor, when we return to considering the village 
level, will we find, corresponding to the late planting movement, the 
kinds of local initiative and organisation which went with the 
introduction of the mechanical pumps. It was a measure which relied 
for its success rather more on the efficiency of the administrative 
machine and the acceptance of and the obedience to the will of 
authority on the part of the farmers, and rather less on co-operation 
between the farmers and authorities.
Nevertheless the shift to the planting of a single rice 
crop after the 20th. of June was a change of profound importance to
both the technical and economic structure of Saga agriculture. As we 
shall see in the next chapter, it provided a great stimulus towards 
further technical change and, together with mechanical irrigation, 
broke the vicious circle of stagnation which the old technology had 
created.
3. The Diffusion of Mechanised Pumping in the Villages.
This section will consider the implementation of the 
mechanical irrigation scheme from the point of view of the village 
and its member farmers. Two themes need to be brought out. The 
first concerns the role of village community organisation in the 
widespread diffusion of the motors and pumps. The second concerns 
the part played in this organisational process by the middle-scale 
owner/tenant farmer group. Through this we can see how the development 
and diffusion of this innovation was related to the structural changes 
in the agricultural economy which were described earlier.
To understand the incentives to adopt the new techniques 
we need to consider the returns they offered to the individual farmer. 
These accrued in three ways: (1) in the reduction in the cost of 
pumping involved in the substitution of machines for the hired labour 
made necessary by the old pumping technique; (2) in the freeing of 
family labour time from pumping, enabling it to be used for more 
intensive cultivation of existing land or for farming a larger area, 
and (3) in removing the physical burden of pumping.
Estimates of the reduction in the cost of raising water 
suggest that it was very large. According to Yamada and Oota, the 
initial capital costs of the installation of the pumps and motors 
under the Oide scheme worked out on average at 15.77 yen per 10 ares. 
The construction of water channels cost a further 4.86 yen/10 ares 
(Yamada and Oota,46,p.337). So the investment cost per hectare would 
just about have been covered by one nenko1s annual wage. Miyajima 
estimates. that the cost of generating electricity under the scheme 
worked out at 0.70 yen/10 ares, for 90 days of irrigation. Irrigation 
association costs added another 0.30 yen, so that total running costs 
came to about 1 yen per 10 ares. This compares with his estimate of 
approximately 13 yen/10 ares as the cost of labour for pumping under 
the old irrigation system (Miyajima,36,p.44). The farmers involved 
in the project whose accounts are considered later paid a little more
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than this, 1.70 yen/10 ares, in pump running costs. But, at any rate, 
the reduction in the cost of raising water was very significant. ‘
In addition the innovations freed family labour time, 
where this had been used for pumping. This meant that the limit to 
the area a family could cultivate with its own labour was increased, 
and was now set by the new peaks in labour use created by the change 
to unified late planting. These were at the times of transplanting 
and harvesting.
So the effect of the changes in technique was to reduce 
the costs of pumping and to increase the area a family labour force 
could cultivate before it needed to hire labour. This corresponds 
closely to the needs of the farmers in the one and two hectare 
categories in the hypothetical accounts, who were under pressure both 
to reduce wage costs and to produce more by farming larger areas. Now 
they no longer needed to hire labour to be able to irrigate and, apart 
from the very busy peaks at transplanting and harvesting times, family 
labour was freed to be applied to yield-increasing, labour-using 
techniques, or to cultivating a larger area.
As for the other types of farmer, the small-scale 
cultivator benefitted similarly from being able to use his family 
labour more intensively, but he gained less from the saving in hired 
labour costs, since these would not have been great for him before. 
Relief from the burden of having to work the treadle-wheels was an 
inestimable benefit to him, as to all cultivators. For the larger- 
scale farmer, mechanical irrigation was not a sufficiently labour- 
saving innovation to make it possible for him to continue to cultivate 
on a large scale. Even the middle-scale farmers still had to hire 
temporary labour at planting time, and the new limit to the size of 
the family farm was certainly below two hectares. So the pressures 
for the really large-scale cultivator to split up his holding were not 
reduced.
Those who benefitted most, therefore, from the intro­
duction of mechanical irrigation and unified late planting were those 
who had already reached the limits of what their families could 
cultivate without hired help under the old technology, i.e. the 
middle-range, predominantly owner/tenant farmers who had either risen 
from the ranks of the small cultivators or declined from those of the 
large. But by what mechanism were they able to exert an influence on 
the timing and direction of technical change in order to achieve this?
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The answer to this question will provide us with a link between the 
preceding structural changes and the present technical ones. To ‘answer 
it we need to describe the way in which the introduction of mechanical 
irrigation was organised at the village level.
The authorities had recognised, as we have seen, that, 
if the pump was to be diffused at all widely, its introduction could 
best be organised communally at the village level. This arose from 
their recognition of the possibilities and limitations of two sets of 
factors. Firstly, although the motor was not large, it was too big 
for the requirements of the average farm. It was conceivable that 
richer farmers could have bought the pumps privately and hired them 
out to others, as happened with horses. But as the technically 
superior pumps were also static ones, this would not have been easy.
The pumps needed to be installed over a wide area to make it worthwhile
for the electricity company to build the supply facilities. When the 
authorities considered the scale of the pump in relation to the scale 
of the land holdings and capital assets of the majority of the farmers, 
they realised that widespread diffusion would depend on the extent ,to 
which the costs and use of the pumps could be shared among farmers.
But secondly, they were already faced with well-developed 
village organisations and a traditional communal approach. We saw in 
Chapter 3 how Saga villages were held together by the complex structure 
of economic and social relations, built round the hiring of land, 
labour and horses. The leaders of village society had come from the 
larger-scale, labour-employing, cultivator/landlord families who 
might be assumed to have acted in their own interests. But as long as 
they remained dependent on this village structure for their input 
supply and as long as their holdings were scattered around the village 
and dependent on a common irrigation system, part of that interest
lay in the prosperity and security of the village as a whole. Although
part of the economic basis of this communal system had disappeared, 
it was within this context that farmers had grown up and developed 
their approach to agriculture. Even today, the communal approach 
remains, and government agricultural policy still uses communal 
village-level organisations as a base.
Furthermore, it was through communal village organisations 
that the authorities had already built up their relationship with the 
villages. The co-operatives, agricultural societies and agricultural 
discussion groups, with the leaders of which the authorities consulted,
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negotiated, carried out experiments and so on, almost always covered 
all the cultivators within the village. It was through them that the 
authorities had worked to spread new techniques, their leaders whom 
they had consulted about the development of the pump, and, naturally, 
to them that they turned when considering the widespread introduction 
of the pump.
Thus, on the one hand lay the economic necessity for 
widespread, shared diffusion of the pump, and on the other the well- 
developed village organisations and communal approach which the 
authorities were already using in their efforts to spread new 
techniques. The authorities put these facts together and proceded 
to work through communal village organisations, notably the irrigation 
associations, to diffuse the pump. Under the Oide scheme, we have 
seen that the Oide Association (the overall organisation of the 
irrigation associations of constituent villages) planned the siting 
of the pumps, organised the electricity supply and so on. The 
village associations were responsible for the installation of the 
pumps, the digging of the new water channels and the subsequent 
running of the pumps.
Perhaps most significantly, though, they were also 
resposible for the financing of the scheme in their villages. Within 
the Oide scheme, a large part of the cost of pump installation was met 
by loans from the Hypothec Bank of Japan (Nippon Kangyoo Ginkoo) (1) . 
These loans were made to individual irrigation associations. The 
security for the loans and the responsibility for repayment was 
divided amongst the members of the association in proportion to the 
amount of land they cultivated. Thus the investment was made by the 
cultivators, not by landowners. Additional expenses and subsequent 
running costs were met by the members themselves, again in proportion 
to the area they cultivated. The irrigation associations which 
organised subsequent mechanical irrigation schemes outside the Oide 
Association's area were able, by calling their projects land
(1) Before 1909, agricultural credit banks like the Hypothec Bank were 
run as private joint-stock banks and tended to make loans to landlords 
with' good security, who did not always use them for agricultural 
purposes. After 1909, the government gave these banks funds to lend 
as unsecured loans to land improvement societies, co-operatives and 
other village organisations. See Katoo,63.
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re-organisation schemes, to obtain government subsidies under the. 
Agricultural Land Re-adjustment Law, which had been ammended in 19 23 
to make subsidisation of irrigation projects easier. This meant 
that they bore less financial responsibility than the early innovators 
under the Oide scheme. For all projects, however, communal financing 
made it possible for the smaller and less credit-worthy farmers to 
take part in mechanical irrigation schemes. Without it, it is diffi­
cult to see how they could have found the finance or the organisational 
capability to adopt mechanical irrigation.
An example might give a clearer impression of the 
financial organisation of the scheme at village level. Yamada and 
Oota give figures for a mechanical irrigation scheme carried out in 
one village on the Plain and begun in 1923 (Yamada and Oota,46,p.341). 
It was organised, in the village, by a so-called Land Re-adjustment 
Association (Koochi Seiri Kumiai), to which all cultivators of paddy 
land belonged. The association was responsible for taking out loans 
and for meeting all the expenses of the project. In the first year 
it paid out a total of ¥57,000, the bulk (¥43,000) on construction 
expenses, the rest made up of administrative expenses and other extras, 
along with ¥3,000 running costs for the pumps. The large part of 
these expenses was met from a loan of ¥45,000 from the Hypothec Bank. 
The association also received subsidies from the prefectural and 
mura governments and from the gun agricultural society. The remaining 
¥7,500 had to be supplied by members, who paid at the rate of ¥4.33 
per 10 ares cultivated. In the second year (1924), there were more 
expenses to be met (some further construction costs, running costs 
of the pumps, interest on the loan) and no loans or subsidies,so the 
members had to meet these expenses at the rate of ¥7.70 per 10 ares.
In subsequent years they began to repay the loan, and their contri­
butions varied from year to year in the region of ¥5-10 per 10 ares.
Having seen how the projects were organised at the village
level, we can now go on to look at the role played within this 
organisation by the middle-scale owner/tenant farmers who, as we have 
seen, appear to have had most to gain from such schemes. From the 
examples outlined below it is clear that it was farmers from this 
group who took the initiative in promoting the schemes and provided the 
leadership for them.
We can begin with an example given by Isobe (Isobe,76, 
p.36). The village in question, which was situated within Saga County,
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had a land re-organisation (i.e. mechanical irrigation) association, 
and in May 1922 a tenants' association was also founded, with the'aim, 
amongst other things, of supporting the land re-organisation 
association. The membership of the tenants' association consisted of 
170 owner/tenant households and 98 tenant households. The relation of 
this to the whole village structure can be judged from the available 
figures for the composition of the same village in 1939, when there 
were 91 owner-farmer households, 143 owner/tenant and 105 tenant. In 
the month of its foundation (May 1922) the head of the tenants' 
association became head of the land re-organisation association and 
in September of that year he became village head. This gives some 
indication of the political rise of the owner/tenant group, and of 
how they were taking over the drive for mechanical irrigation.
The extent to which the middle-scale, owner/tenants 
provided the leadership of the mechanical irrigation movement can be 
seen in greater detail in two examples given by Yamada and Oota (Yamada 
and Oota,46,p.341 and pp.352-3). The first concerns the village whose 
finances were described earlier. Here, the officers of the association 
which organised the mechanical irrigation project numbered 14 and the 
areas of land they owned are set out in Table 5.1. The largest 
landowner owned 2.1 ha., 5 owned more than lha., and 5 owned less than 
^ha.. The largest landowner in the area was an absentee landlord who 
owned 7.2 ha., but he took no part in the association at all. Thus 
there seems to have been no connection between large-scale landowner- 
ship and influence over the mechanical irrigation project. The leaders 
were cultivators who, by and large, owned little land.
Details of the second example are set out in Table 5.2, 
which shows the land area cultivated and owned by officials of the 
irrigation association of Kuroihon village at the time of the 
introduction of mechanical irrigation. From this table we gain some 
idea of the balance of influence within the mechanical irrigation 
movement. The three special officials and the members of the 
construction committee were the leading organisers of the project. We 
can see that, for the most part, they were the larger cultivators in 
the village and did not rent in much land. These were the leading 
village households, who had been labour employers, according to 
Yamada and Oota. Almost all the other full-time farmers belonged to 
the consultative committee. They were smaller-scale cultivators and 
tended to be renting in more than the organising group. What is known
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Table 5.1
OFFICERS OF THE LAND RE-ORGANISATION ASSOCIATION 
OF SAKAINO VILLAGE.
Position Area Owned (ha)
Association Head 
Deputy Association Head 
Committee Member 1 
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10 
11 
12
0.582 
0.212 
2.120 
0.691 
1.350 
1.610 
1.840 
0.782 
0.702 
1.293 
0.491 
0.060 
0.003 
0.122
Source: Yamada and Oota, 46, p.341.
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Table 5.2
THE PROMOTION OF MECHANICAL IRRIGATION IN KUROIHON VILLAGE
A. Officers of the Irrigation Association.
Area Head Man
Committee Member
Assembly Member
Construction 
Committee Member 1
2
3
4
5
Consultative 
Committee Member 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10 
11 
12 
13
Area 
Cultivated (ha)
1.6- 1.7 
Less than 1.0
1.2- 1.3
1.7-1.8
1.0 
1.0
1.6- 1.7
1.7-1.8
1.0
1.0 
0.4-0.5 
0 .6-0.7 
0.7-0.8
1.2- 1.3 
0.7
1.3-1.4 
0.7 
0.8 
0.7
0.7-0.8 
1 .2- 1.3
Area Owned (ha)
1919
1. 21
0.40
1.49
1.71
1.00 
1.00 
2.27 
0.12
0.35
0.19 
0.14 
0.35
1925
1.55
0.40 
1.80
1.32
1.00
1. 19 
2.27 
2.02
0.35
0.43
0. 19 
0.14 
0.35 
1.47 
0.30 
0.14
1.30
1.43
1934 Owned 0.11 
1934 Owned 0.17
1934 Owned 0.12
/contd.
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Table 5.2 (Continued)
B. Other Residents.
Cultivated 
Area (ha)
0- 0.1
0.1-0.3
0.3-0.5
0.6
Unknown
N a t u r e  o f  S i d e - e m p l o y m e n t
Nenko Nenko
Stone-
Mason
Straw
Weaver
Black­
smith
Factory
Worker
Nenko
Prefectural
Employee
Specialist
Farmer
Unclear
Disabled
Nenko
Straw
Weaver
Unclear
None
Unknown
Straw
Weaver
Unclear
Nenko
Carrier
Straw
Weaver
Unknown
Carpenter
Source: Yamada and Oota, 46, pp.352-3.
-162-
of the other residents of the village is indicated in the second part 
of the table. Altogether, we can see that the main promoters of the 
project were those households who were about at the limits of the area 
they could cultivate with their own family labour and who, as was 
argued earlier, stood to gain most from the investment. They were 
backed up by the smaller farmers who had more of the character of 
tenants and who also, as has been seen, stood to gain from the project, 
though their need was not so urgent as that of the somewhat larger-scale 
households.
To conclude this section the points made at the beginning 
need to be re-emphasised. Firstly, it is clear that the communal 
village organisation of mechanical irrigation projects played an 
important role in speeding up and widening the process of diffusion.
It enabled smaller farmers to gain access to the pumps and to obtain 
the necessary finance. It made it possible, through the co-ordination 
of village organisations, under the Oide scheme, to introduce the pump 
over a wide area and to create the necessary infrastructure with speed 
and efficiency. It may have involved coercion of the smaller by the 
larger, but one cannot avoid the impression that the desire to be 
relieved of the labour of pumping water was so great that little 
persuasion would have been needed.
Secondly, the role of the middle-scale, owner or owner/ 
tenant householders as innovators in the process has emerged clearly 
from the above examples. We saw earlier how they became economically 
the most powerful group within village society as a result of the 
structural impact of industrialisation. Now we have seen how they 
came to hold political power in the village and to control the 
village organisations which expressed the village's needs to the 
authorities. Furthermore, we have seen how the characteristics of the 
new technology met their needs quite well and how they provided the 
initiative and organisation at the village level for its introduction. 
Thus the impact of industrialisation has.worked its way through to 
the technology of agriculture.
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CHAPTER 6
The Development of a New Economic Structure, 1923-39.
We have now reached the stage at which a new innovation, 
plashed through by the initial innovator group (the middle-scale owner/ 
tenants) who stood to gain most from it and whose problems most in­
fluenced its characteristics, had been diffused into the existing 
technical system. However, as we shall see in section 1 below, its 
introduction disrupted this system and caused a number of problems 
within it. This is the sort of situation which would generate Hayami 
and Rattan's dynamic sequences of innovation and adaptation, and 
section 2 is concerned with looking at how these operated and how 
they were influenced by interaction between farmers and research and 
extension workers. We can then go on to see, in section 3, how the 
new technology itself influenced the economic and social situation of 
villages to create overall a new equilibrium within them. All this is 
to say that this chapter elucidates arrows 5 and 6 of the framework 
diagram.
1. The Immediate Impact of Mechanical Irrigation
and Late Planting.
After the somewhat glowing account of the successful 
process of technical innovation in the last chapter we need to come 
down to earth to the realisation that mechanical irrigation and unified 
late planting disrupted the pattern of the old technology without of 
themselves affecting basic cultivation methods. This meant that there 
had to be further change, both to adapt the rest of the technology to 
the new rotation and irrigation method, and to realise the potential 
created by the reduction in the labour required for pumping. This 
section will describe the immediate impact of mechanical irrigation 
and late planting in order to show the areas in which pressure for 
change was created.
As expected, the mechanisation of irrigation achieved 
the desired reduction in the demand for labour at pumping time.
Labour required for irrigation amounted to 7 days per 10 ares in 1909, 
whereas, by 1938, it had fallen to 2h days (Isobe,76,p.10). The 
effects of this spread through to other aspects of labour utilisation.
Now that water was easily raised onto the fields, tokojime ploughing 
was no longer necessary. This further reduced labour requirements and 
made the specialised skills of the nenko redundant. Yamada and Oota 
regard this effect as being more important than the reduction of 
labour demand for pumping (Yamada and Oota,46,pp.357-364). This is 
because pumping could always be carried out by unskilled labourers or 
women and children, whereas ploughing necessitated the hiring of
strong, skilled men. At any rate, the combined effect was to remove
the need to hire labour on an annual basis. The phenomenon of the 
nenko disappeared almost immediately.
However, this did not mean that labour supply had ceased 
to be a problem or to place limits on the area a family could cultivate. 
Under the old rotation, the activities which had to be carried out at 
the busiest times of the farm year - planting and transplanting and
the harvest - had been spread out over relatively long periods. With
the new rotation, the spring/summer peak had been compressed from 
two months into one, and the effect of this on the pattern of labour
use through the year can be seen in Table 6.1. This shows that, in
the village surveyed, farmers had to put 5-6 times as much labour per
10 ares into rice cultivation during the June/July peak as they did
in the slack periods of the year. Furthermore, rice harvesting 
combined with second^crop planting created another, slightly smaller, 
peak in total labour requirements around November/December.
These sharp variations in the intensity of labour use 
created both problems and potentials for Saga Plain farmers. In the 
first place, they meant that hired labour was still essential for 
many farms. The difference was that now it only needed to be hired 
for a relatively short period, basically for planting out the paddy 
field. The skills involved in transplanting were known to all rural 
dwellers, and women, young or old, could perform it as well as men.
So instead of the skilled,permanent, strong male nenko, who had to be 
resident in the local area, it was now possible to manage with 
temporary workers from other areas where transplanting had already 
taken place and labour was consequently more available. Groups of 
workers, men and women, came over from villages on the other side of 
the river in Fukuoka Prefecture in a manner which became sufficiently 
established for them to be called Chikugo-san (Mr./Mrs. Chikugo), 
after the river they had crossed to reach the Saga Plain. So, 
although the nenko disappeared and labour-hiring ceased to be part of
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Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
June
July
Aug.
Sep.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
Total 
Source:
Table 6.1
THE DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR TIME THROUGHOUT THE YEAR 
IN A SAGA PLAIN VILLAGE, 1931.
(Units = hours per household)
Labour Time in 
Total Labour Time in Rice Production
Labour Time Rice Production per 10 ares
475.3 203.8 11.1
392.7 98.7 5.4
430.9 89.7 4.9
617.0 217.1 11.9
580.0 146.4 8.0
750.6 373.8 20.4
687.9 522.9 28.6
461.1 195.6 10.7
433.5 91.2 5.0
457.6 130.2 7.1
514.9 296.0 16.2
546.4 145.1 7.9
6,347.9 2,510.5 151.8
Isobe, 76, p. 37, from "A Survey of Labour Conditions in 
Farm Households in Saga Prefecture", covering 15 villages 
in the prefecture, and carried out in 19 31 by the Saga 
Prefecture Industrial Society.
the complex of village inter-relationships, wages for hired workers 
remained quite a large proportion of total costs for medium- and 
larger-scale farmers. They reaped their benefits through greater 
ease in the recruitment and management of their hired labour forces 
by being able to tap a wider labour market. The pressure to try to 
reduce peak labour demands remained, though in a different form.
The second set of problems was created by the compression 
of the autumn peak in labour use under the new rotation. This meant 
that the length of time available for harvesting the whole rice crop 
and planting a second grain crop in time was very short. The wheat 
and barley seed varieties available would not mature in time for the 
seedlings to be able to survive the winter if they were planted even 
a little while late. Many farmers simply could not plant a second crop 
in time with the available labour supply, and this meant that double­
cropping could not return to the levels it had reached before the rise 
in nenko wages.
A third result of mechanical irrigation and late 
planting was not so much a problem as the creation of a potential 
which could not be realised as things stood. The concentration of 
peak labour demand into two points had the corresponding effect of 
creating idle periods at other times. Saga farmers now found them­
selves at times distinctly under-employed. This, as we shall see, 
enabled them to find ways of intensifying their labour use both 
within rice cultivation and in other occupations. But it also 
relieved them somewhat from the pressures of the long growing season. 
Before, every job had had to be fitted precisely into the long 
sequence of activities. Now there was time to catch up if something 
were missed, and it seems that farmers never again had to work under 
the sort of pressure they had known before, so that they were able to 
take some of the gain from their increased labour productivity in the 
form of a less frantic pace of work.
The removal of the problem of pumping also brought to 
the fore other problems connected with the irrigation system. Although 
water could now be raised easily onto the fields, this did not solve 
all the problems connected with Saga's peculiar environment. Droughts, 
flooding, inadequate drainage and water control still stood in the way, 
at times and in places, of the kind of intensive fanning which was 
now feasible in other respects. This meant that land which had 
previously been highly prized because of its low level, hence easy
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pumping, now became less valuable than higher land which drained 
better. The need for improvement in other aspects of irrigation was 
thus intensified by the results of the solution to the pumping 
problem.
All these problems, though small in comparison with 
those already solved, needed to be dealt with before some kind of 
equilibrium between technology and economic organisation could be 
re-established. As a result, Chart 2.1 showed that there was no 
dramatic rise in yields immediately following 1923. It took a 
number of years more to adapt the technical system and produce the 
innovations necessary to exploit fully the potential created by 
mechanical irrigation and late planting, and the processes whereby 
this was done will be described in the next section.
2. Technical Change after 1923.
There were two directions in which farmers and 
researchers could move in order to solve the technical and organisa­
tional problems described above, and to use the potential of mechanical 
irrigation and late planting to raise incomes. On the one hand, ways 
could be discovered for making more intensive use of the family's 
more-or-less fixed factors: the family labour supply and the land it 
could cultivate without hiring extra labour. This involved, in 
effect, 'catching up' with the technical advances made elsewhere during 
the Meiji period, the essence of which involved raising the output of 
a given area of land by increasing inputs of previously idle family 
labour time and of variable capital (improved seeds, fertilisers, etc.) . 
This would result in increased land productivity (yields) but not 
necessarily increased labour productivity in terms of output per 
labour hour or day.
The second possibility involved expanding the area of 
land which the family labour force could cultivate without hiring 
extra labour. Under the old technology, the limiting factor was the 
labour required for pumping. Now it was the labour requirements at 
the two most busy times in the early summer and in the autumn. It 
might prove possible to reduce labour requirements by smoothing out 
the peaks over a longer period of time. But the scope for this was 
limited by the necessity of planting rice after June 20th.. Beyond
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this, labour requirements could only be reduced if some other factor 
(e.g. fixed capital) were substituted for labour at these times. 'This 
would result in an increase in labour productivity.
Both these courses were followed by Saga Plain farmers.
This was made possible by the continued efforts of the research 
authorities, who followed up their success in mechanical irrigation 
and late planting with the development and diffusion of a series of 
less spectacular innovations. The reputation and the close contacts 
which they had built up with the farmers over the course of the earlier 
programmes helped them in this, as did the enthusiasm for change 
which the success of the earlier innovations had produced among the 
farmers. The two courses of change outlined above were closely 
linked, or involved identical developments at a number of points but, 
for the sake of clarity, they will be considered separately here.
(i) the intensification of land and labour use.
The essence of the so-called 
Meiji Noohoo (Meiji Agricultural Methods) involved a complementary 
set of improved techniques and new inputs: high-yielding seed varieties, 
commercial fertilisers, deep ploughing, more careful (labour intensive) 
cultivation methods like thinly-planted seed beds and check-row 
planting. As was described in Chapter 3, these methods did spread to 
the Saga Plain, but their adoption was somewhat haphazard as a result 
of conflicts between them and the old technology. Now, the methods 
of the Meiji Noohoo were quickly and successfully diffused throughout 
the Plain, as farmers and researchers set about exploiting the 
potential of the removal of these conflicts.
To begin with, the Experiment Station set about estab­
lishing which were the best rice seed varieties for the new conditions. 
The seed selection tests were completed in 1928 when the authorities 
announced that three varieties, Shinzan, Shintoku and Asahi No.1, 
had proved highest yielding and most suitable. By 1932 90% of the 
cultivated area of Saga County and Saga City was planted with improved 
varieties and so was 86.4% of the cultivated area of the prefecture (1). 
Shinzan had the most suitable characteristics for the Plain area. It 
was high-yielding, absorbed plenty of fertiliser, and did not produce 
very high quality rice. About 70% of the cultivated area of Saga
(1) Isobe, 76, Table 24, p.37, from a survey by the Experiment Station.
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County was planted with Shinzan after its recommendation by the 
authorities (Miyajima,36,p.57). Thus from the situation which existed 
before the removal of the rice-borer problem, when a wide range of 
varieties (some improved, some not) had been planted, a complete change 
to the widespread planting of one or two improved varieties had 
taken place.
The new seeds were in large part better than the old 
because they would absorb more fertiliser. So along with the almost 
universal use of improved seeds went an increase in fertiliser 
input, largely in the form of higher inputs of commercial organic and, 
to some extent, chemical fertilisers. The data available for Saga 
County in the prefectural yearbook is presented in Table 6.2.
Continuous series breaking down total fertiliser consumption into its 
components are not available, but it is clear that the most 
significant increases were in the use of commercial chemical 
fertilisers. The consumption of chemical fertilisers in Saga County 
increased from 1,543 tonnes in 1921 to 3,908 in 1929, and the use of 
compound fertilisers increased from 1,149 tonnes in 19 30 to 6,156 in 
1937 (SKTS,86). Isobe notes the connection between this increasing 
use of chemical fertilisers and the widespread diffusion of improved 
seed varieties (Isobe,76,p.36). All this implied sharp increases in 
the purchase of commercial inputs from outside the agricultural 
sector. (For data, see Appendix Table 8).
This process was assisted by the work of the research 
authorities. As a result of their experiments, they issued 
recommended fertiliser applications for every village and distributed 
them to each household. Farmers were trained in the use of fertiliser 
through fertiliser discussion groups and training courses run by the 
authorities, for which there was a huge demand (Miyajima,36,p.58).
The authorities supplied fertiliser themselves and through co-operat­
ives, and with it advice and instruction. In Chapter 3 we saw how 
improved cultivation techniques, which required greater labour input 
of a more precise and careful kind, were not always wholeheartedly 
applied on the Plain before the changes of 1922-3. Afterwards, 
however, they spread almost everywhere and thinly-planted seedlings, 
check-row planting and so on became standard techniques.
But perhaps the most significant shift towards more 
intensive cultivation occurred after 1927, when a short-soled plough 
suitable for heavy land was developed. This made deep-ploughing
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Table 6.2
CONSUMPTION OF FERTILISER IN SAGA COUNTY.
Quantity
(tonnes)
Real Value* 
(1,000 yen)
1921 126,496 1,062
1922 127,229 1,016
1923 128,846 1,177
1924 133,772 1,006
1925 123,838 1,051
1926 134,674 1,229
1927 133,920 1,293
1928 130,173 1,269
1929 137,576 1,420
1930 138,652 1,462
1931 145,146 1,471
1932 147,155 1,302
1933 167,069 1,326
1934 162,520 1,452
1935 192,081 1,713
1936 182,847 1,599
1937 195,405 1,570
Source: SKTS, 86.
* Value of fertiliser consumed, from SKTS, 86, deflated by the
fertiliser price index (1934-6 = 100) for the whole country given 
in LTES, 84, Table 19, column 6.
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possible on the Saga Plain, and it spread rapidly. With this, and the 
fact that tokojime ploughing was no longer necessary, the whole process 
of land preparation could be greatly simplified. The three types of 
plough and the skilled ploughman became redundant. The horse was still 
essential, but the*number of ploughings and the complexity of the 
operation could be greatly reduced. Furthermore, deep ploughing with 
the short-soled plough meant better absorption of fertiliser and was 
indeed a necessary condition for the success of heavy fertilisation.
Irrigation and drainage were not such severe problems 
now for those covered by the'electric irrigation schemes. But for 
those who farmed in areas away from the central part of the Plain, 
some other form of energy was needed to drive irrigation pumps. Those 
at the extremities of the creeks, whatever form of irrigation they used, 
also found drainage difficult. In times of drought, water shortage 
could still be a problem everywhere. 1933, for instance, was a bad 
year because of drought. Furthermore, the best methods of 
cultivation involved raising and lowering the water level in the field 
at various points during the growing period. This also required good 
irrigation and drainage facilities. For all these reasons farmers
began to buy petrol engines and vertical pumps, as primary or
additional means of irrigation or drainage. The number of petrol 
engines in Saga Prefecture rose from 107 in 1923 to 13,483 in 1941, 
and that of privately-owned pumps from 721 in 1927 to 7,748 in 
1941 (see Table 6.3) . As a result of the spread of auxiliary 
irrigation facilities large areas avoided damage in the severe drought 
of 1939.
In these ways farmers were able to exploit the potential 
of currently available techniques to the full. But, as we have seen, 
the introduction of late planting and mechanical irrigation produced 
their own problems within the technical system, in the form of new 
peak labour demands which continued to make double-cropping difficult. 
These imbalances in the technology could not be solved with existing 
available techniques and led to the Saga research authorities1 looking
for new solutions to the problems.
With existing seed varieties, the rice crop which had 
been planted in June had to be harvested and threshed and the second 
grain crop planted within a very short space of time if the crops 
were not to be damaged. The same thing was true at the time of second 
crop harvesting and threshing and rice-planting. The Experiment
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Table 6.3
NUMBERS OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINES, SAGA PREFECTURE.
Petrol Mechanical
Engines Pumps Threshers
1923 107
1927 533 721 83
1931 867 792 86
1933 948 788 121
1935 1,516 1,279 151
1937 5,347 4,521
1939 7,860 5,112 7,289
1940 10,236 9,851
1941 13,483 7,748
Source: Isobe, 76, Table 28, p.39, from a study of the 
diffusion of agricultural machinery in Saga 
Prefecture, made by the Saga Prefecture 
Agricultural Labour Research Institute in 1943.
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Station therefore set to work to develop wheat and barley seed 
varieties which would mature in a shorter time. This involved not 
merely selecting varieties but also cross-breeding, and reveals the 
increasing levels of technical and scientific skill acquired by the 
research workers in the course of the 30 years' life of the Experiment 
Station. By 1935 a significantly improved variety had been 
developed. It matured more quickly with only a slight reduction in 
yields and was given the name Noorin 20. Cross-bred varieties of 
naked barley were also produced and these were named after Saga.
These new seed varieties, combined with the improvements in 
irrigation and drainage resulting from the use of auxiliary pumps and 
motors, permitted the double-cropping rate to return to the levels 
it had reached before ,the labour outflow had set in.
These technical changes made it possible to raise yields, 
and hence output, by increasing the input of family labour time 
(by improved cultivation methods, double-cropping, etc.) and of 
current inputs (seeds and fertilisers). Their quantitative impact 
on yields was shown in Chart 2.1, but can be seen most dramatically 
in the village-level yield data assembled by Isobe from local 
surveys (Table 6.4) . They show that throughout the 1910s and 1920s 
the majority of villages in normal years achieved yields in the range 
of 375-450 kg./lO ares, but that the early 1930s saw a shift in 
which nearly all villages rose into the 450-525 kg./lO ares category.
Before leaving this section we might also note some of 
the other ways in which Saga households increased the utilisation 
of their given family labour time. These trends became much more 
marked after the war but their beginning can be seen in the changes 
occurring after 1923. On the one hand, farm households began to 
diversify their agricultural activities. As far as their crops were 
concerned, they remained specialist grain producers, but they began to 
move into activities such as silk-production, horse-breeding and 
dairying, which required increased capital and family labour inputs 
but did not affect land utilisation. Before 1923 it had been a common 
practice to send work horses away into the hills to be looked after 
during the winter, because it was difficult to grow enough fodder 
crops for them. But now, with the revival of double-cropping, farmers 
began to keep the horses throughout the year and to grow fodder crops 
for them and breed from them. In 1925 78 horses were bred in Saga 
Prefecture, in 1936, 165 (Yamada and Oota,46,ch.9,section 3).
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Table 6.4
VILLAGE-LEVEL DATA ON RICE YIELDS IN THE SAGA PLAIN AREA 
(Numbers of villages obtaining given yields,
Plain areas of Saga-gun)
225-300 300-375 375-
1912 4 14
1915 6 12
1916 4 13
1917 9 9
1918 10 8
1919 1 11
1920 1 13
1921 4 12
1922 5 12
1923 15
1924 11
1927 2 15
1928 8 8
1929 1 10
1930 1 13
1931 9 8
1932 2 11
1933 1
1934 2
1935 1 12
1936 8
1937 2
1938 1
1939 2
/ 1 0 a r e s  
450-525 525-600 600-675 Total
18
18
1 18
18
18
6 18
4 18
2 18
17
2 17
6 17
17
1 17
6 17
3 17
17
4 17
15 1 17
14 1 17
4 17
8 1 17
13 2 17
12 4 17
6 7 2 17
Source: Isobe, 76, p.6.
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On the other hand, farmers were also diversifying into 
non-agricultural part-time occupations. During their relatively .free 
winter times they began to do more straw-weaving work. More began to 
do part-time jobs away from home. By the present time a majority of 
Saga farmers are part-time farmers, earning more from non-agricultural 
work than from agricultural
(ii) mechanisation.
We can now turn to the other 
means of raising income which lay open to Saga farmers - expanding 
the area which the family labour force could cultivate. This meant, 
as we have seen, reducing peak labour demands, i.e. substituting 
some other input, more readily available, for labour at those times. 
With their experience of mechanical irrigation, farmers and research 
workers had already developed interest and expertise in mechanical 
agricultural methods. The increasing capacity and technical 
sophistication of Japanese industry was keeping down the relative 
cost of machinery. Further substitution of capital for labour 
seemed therefore the most likely method for dealing with the problem.
The most complete process of mechanisation which 
occurred was in the operation of threshing. Traditionally, 
threshing had been carried out using a simple wooden tool called 
a senba which was rather like a large comb on a trestle. Using it, 
between three and five people took a day to thresh the grain from 
ten ares. This labour was required at the spring and autumn 
peaks to thresh the two grain crops just when land preparation 
and planting were making their heaviest demands for labour. The 
first step towards the mechanisation of threshing was the development 
of a pedal-driven thresher which spread rapidly after about 
1920. It reduced labour requirements to two men per ten ares 
worth of grain per day. But around 1931 there became available 
a mechanical thresher, driven by a petrol engine. The same 
engine could be used to drive a thresher and a drainage or 
irrigation pump and the increase in the number of mechanical 
threshers in Saga Prefecture from 83 in 1927 to 9,851 in 1940 
was closely associated with the spread of privately-owned pumps 
(see Table 6.3). Mechanical threshers both for wheat and for 
rice were developed and with them six people could thresh the grain
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from 50 ares in a day (1).
Weeding machines were also developed and diffused 
everywhere. Towards the end of the period hulling machines became 
available and were bought by larger-scale farmers or by groups. We 
have already noted the spread of individual motor-driven pumps. All 
these machines, but especially the threshers, reduced peak labour 
demands and by the time of the outbreak of war a family could 
manage 2 or even 3 hectares without hiring much temporary labour.
The Experiment-Station played its part in this process 
too. It tested and experimented with the new machines which came 
on to the market in order to be able to advise farmers. From 1922 
onwards it adopted the practice of holding open days at which farmers 
could see machinery and demonstrations and manufacturers could exhibit 
their new designs. In this way the research station continued to act 
as a co-ordinator between agricultural machinery manufacturers and 
farmers, just as it had done in the case of the irrigation pumps.
The changes described in this section are brought 
together in Fig. 6.1, which summarises the technology in operation 
on the Saga Plain in the 1930s. It represents the pioneering 
technology developed in Saga, as a result of which the’30s came to 
be known as the Saga stage (Saga Dankai) of Japanese agricultural 
de velopment.
3. Changes in the Structure of the Farm Household
Economy and the Village Community.
The technical changes described in the previous section, 
along with mechanical irrigation and late planting, combined to create 
what we shall call a new technology. It was not, of course, a complete, 
unchanging, equilibrium technical system, any more than was the initial 
technology described in Chapter 3. But it did represent, as it were, 
the stage achieved by the working through of the changes with which 
we have been concerned, before the process became confused by new and 
equally great upheavals. So, for our purposes, it can be regarded as 
the final outcome of those changes. In previous sections, we have
(1) See Eguchi, 33, from which the previous figures for labour 
requirements were also taken.
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Fig. 6,1: The Saga Dankai (Saga Stage) Technology,
showing how the aspects of the technology combined • 
to raise output and to increase the area a 
household could farm.
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looked at the ways in which changing agricultural organisation affected 
the direction and timing of the development towards this new technology 
This section is concerned with the reverse relationship - the response 
of the village economy to the new technology, the ways in which the 
structure of the village economy and society adapted and changed. We 
shall begin by looking at the farm household economy operating the new 
technology and consider the new input/output relations of the farm unit 
which would determine the differential impact of the new technology on 
different types of farm. We can then go on to look at changes in the
communal village economy and at the effects of the new technology on
the social and economic structure of the village.
(i) the farm household economy.
First let us consider the input 
patterns of farm households on the Saga Plain in this period.
i. Land. Table 6.5 shows the changes in the size
structure of holdings in the period between 1922 and the war. Yamada
and Oota have collected the figures for Saga County from a number of 
different sources, so that the trends are not very clear. However, the 
general tendency which stands out is the continued increase in the 
numbers farming middle-sized holdings. This is also clear in Chart 4.4 
for the prefecture as a whole. The number of households in the two 
smallest categories continued to decline, although this trend does not 
appear very clearly in the county figures. There seem to have been 
increases in the proportion of households in all three categories 
between 1 and 5 hectares, and in the later years the number of 
households at the upper end of this range showed quite a marked 
increase. As the cases falling into the category of holdings above 
5 hectares are few, the figures are somewhat erratic. But the very 
large landowner certainly seems to have continued to decline. In 1924 
there were three landowners owning more than 50 hectares in Saga City
and six in Saga County. By 1930 there remained only one in Saga City,
and three in the county. By the next year the last one in the city 
had also disappeared (1) .
Table 6.6 shows the trends for one particular village in
the latter half of the 1930s. Although we do not know into or out of
(1) Isobe,76,p.43, using a national survey of landowners with more 
than 50 hectares, and SKTS,86.
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Table 6.5
MOVEMENTS IN NUMBERS OF HOUSEHOLDS BY SIZE 
OF HOLDING CULTIVATED 
(Saga County, %)
O-^ha ^-lha l-2ha 2-3ha 3-5ha Over 5ha Total
1920-4 20.9 25.8 35.4 14.1 2.6 0. 1 100
1933 21.5 25.3 35.2 13.8 4.1 0.1 100
1934 21.0 25.5 33.8 14.8 4.6 0.3 100
1934-6 23.4 23.9 33.9 18.3 4.6 0.2 100
1940 18.7 18.7 36.2 20.0 5.5 0.1 100
Source: Yamada and Oota, 46, p.380.
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Table 6.6
CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BY SIZE OF 
HOLDING IN A VILLAGE 4 KM. SOUTH OF SAGA CITY. 
(Households)
1934 1939
Over d^ sha 5 2
2h to 3ha 1 3
2 to ZHha. 5 8
lh to 2ha 11 7
1 to l^ha 4 7
^ to lha 2 3
Under ^ha 8 6
Total 36 36'
NB. During this period 4 households left the village 
and 4 new ones were established.
Source: Isobe, 78, p.133, from village records.
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which categories new households were established or old ones left, the 
Table certainly suggests that households in this village were moving 
into the 2-3 hectare category from above and below it. The numbers of 
households at both extremes of the distribution were declining. The 
total picture therefore is one of continued concentration within the 
middle range of holding size, and within that range, of concentration 
at the upper end. Table 6.7 compares the stage reached in Saga in 1938 
with that of the rest of the country. Again the same tendency for 
comparative concentration within the middle range, and especially 
towards the upper end of that range, is revealed for the Saga Plain.
A number of points arise from the picture made up by this 
data. Firstly, the division of village society into two more-or-less 
distinct groups - the larger-scale cultivating employer/landlord and 
the small-scale employee/cultivator groups - has disappeared. The 
majority of farmers now fall into the middle-scale categories. On 
average, no more than a quarter of households are outside the ^-3 
hectare band. Thus differences in available land input per household 
have been much reduced and land, as a basis for wealth and status, has 
become much more evenly distributed. Of course, differences in income 
and status remained, but they were variations about one more-or-less 
standard type, the 1-3 hectare middle-range farmer. It is no longer 
possible to divide the village households into two distinct types as we 
did before. This change will be reflected in many other attributes of 
village society.
However, despite this trend towards the equalisation of 
holding size, the average area cultivated on the Saga Plain remained 
comparatively large. The proportion of households in Saga County 
farming more than a hectare, and especially of those farming 2-5 
hectares, is well above the national average. The tables also provide 
evidence for the proposition that the upper limit to the area of the 
family farm was rising. Increasing proportions of Saga Plain households 
were falling into the 2-3 and 3-5 hectare size scales. The 
comparatively large and expanding size of the family farm on the Saga 
Plain is evidence of the relatively rapid rate of mechanisation there 
in relation to the rest of the country, and of relatively low labour 
input per hectare. This would lead us to expect output per man to be 
higher in Saga than elsewhere.
However, the ability to expand the area cultivated by the 
average farm depended on the availability of land. The data given
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Table 6.7
DISTRIBUTION OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS BY AREA CULTIVATED
(1938, %)
Whole Saga Saga
Country Prefecture County
Under ^ha 33.9 24.1 21.7
3s to lha 34.9 33.8 25.0
1 to 2ha 22.6 32.8 34.6
2 to 3ha 5.7 7.8 14,2
3 to 5ha 2.3 1.4 4.4
Over 5ha 1.4 0.1 0.1
Source: SKTS, 86, and Kayoo, 83.
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above compound two kinds of area within the Plain region - areas where 
newly-reclaimed land was available and areas where it was not. In the 
former the tendency towards concentration in the middle ranges was 
less marked. There was more emphasis on building up large farms and 
more scope for establishing new small farms. In the latter, the 
creation of large holdings or the establishment of new households was 
only possible to the extent that farmers were leaving agriculture, so 
that in these areas intensification of labour use within the middle 
ranges of the size distribution was more important (Isobe,78).
However, in areas where land reclamation was possible the 
nature of the projects carried out after 1923 provides further 
evidence for the importance of the initiative of the middle-scale 
farmer and of his desire to expand the area of the family farm under 
the impetus of the newly-available technology. In earlier times the 
pressure on the land and high rents had provided the main motives for 
land reclamation projects. But in the period after 1923 rents did not 
rise in line with increasing yields. The rental rate on the Plain 
probably declined from about 50% of the crop in 19 23 to 35% in 1937 
(see Table 6.8). Furthermore, the number of households was not 
increasing. The motive for land reclamation now lay in the middle-range 
farmer's desire to increase the size of his holding, and it was from 
such farmers that the initiative for projects in the 1920s and '30s 
came (Yamada and Oota,46,chapter 9, section 12) . There was some 
tendency for the middle-sized farmers to lose financial control of the 
projects they had initiated, especially during the depression, so that 
they ended up renting rather than owning the new land. But their 
position remained strong as the large-scale owners of the land were 
weakened by falling rental rates and land prices and by the problem of 
finding tenants when the number of farm households was on the decline.
Through all the complexities of the land-use structure, 
however, one feature remains clear and can be re-emphasized. This is 
that, from the point of view of land holdings, the development of the 
new technology does indeed appear to have re-inforced the tendency 
towards concentration in the middle-size group and equalisation of 
holding size, which was set up by the labour exodus at the beginning 
of the century, by strengthening the economic position of the members 
of that group.
ii. Labour. The most marked change in labour use patterns 
after 1923 was, as previously noted, the almost complete disappearance
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Table 6.8
RENTAL RATES IN SAGA COUNTY
(per 10 ares of middle-grade paddy)
1909 1923 1937
Rents (kg) 180 193 193
Yields (kg) 370 375 549
Rental Rate 48.6 51.6 35.2
(% of crop)
Source: Isobe, 76, p.42, from Saga Prefecture
Government Report (1909), a survey by the prefectural 
interior department (1923), and a survey by the Hypothec 
Bank (1937).
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of the nenko. This is evidenced by the changing structure of wage 
rates in Chart 4.3, where the effect of the decline in demand for 
annually-hired workers is revealed in the slower growth of their wages 
relative to those of daily workers in the '30s. After the introduction 
of mechanical irrigation, the average household was still hiring 450 
hours of labour per year (Isobe,76,p.37), but it was temporary labour 
for the peak periods, from outside the village, and not the more-or-less 
permanent nenko labour. With the mechanisation of threshing and the 
improvement in rotations, the amount of labour hired continued to 
decline. With the spread of the power tiller after the war, the need 
for hired labour was even further reduced.
The changing structure of labour input shows how the 
progress of intensification of family labour use, combined with 
reduction in the amount of hired labour, was achieved. Table 6.9 is 
a condensation of data put together by Isobe to show changes in the 
labour input required by the various operations involved in rice 
cultivation. The reduction by about a half in the labour days required 
between 1857 and 1941 is concentrated in weeding and fertilising, 
irrigation and grain preparation. Comparing 1909 with 1938 or 1941, 
the impact of mechanical irrigation is obvious, but the effects of the 
mechanical thresher and the weeding machine can also be seen. Labour 
saved in all these operations reduces the summer and autumn labour 
demand peaks. On the other hand, labour input remained roughly 
constant and in places increased in seedling-raising and transplanting 
and in harvesting. This is the effect of improved methods of seed 
preparation, check-row planting and also of bigger harvests. Apart 
from harvesting, these were not operations for which there were narrow 
time limits and they offered scope for increased use of family labour. 
Thus the effect of the technology on labour input patterns also tended 
to strengthen the position of the medium-scale farmer.
iii. Capital. In previous sections, the growth in the 
ownership of machinery was described. These machines were added to the 
stock of buildings, tools, horses, cattle and so on already owned.
Table 6.10 shows the distribution in 1937 of the ownership of the main 
items of mechanical equipment among households farming different-sized 
holdings and with differing tenancy status. Here we begin to see that, 
although inequality in the distribution of the use of land had 
declined, it had nonetheless been re-inforced by inequality in the 
ownership of capital assets. Small-scale farmers in general, and pure
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Table 6.9
CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF LABOUR USE 
IN RICE CULTIVATION 
(Saga Plain area, days per 10 ares)
1 8 
Village 
A
5 7 
Village 
B 1888 1909 1938 1941
Land
Preparation
6.72 3.56 4.50 3.80 3.72 2.30
Raising
Seedlings
0.33 1.70 0.85 1.28 0.90
Transplanting 1.58 1.75 1.50 2.10 1.78 1.70
Weeding & 
Fertilising
10.00 6.50 8.00 8.50 3.67 4.30
Irrigation & 
Drainage
10.00 15.00 * 7.00 2.26 0.50
Harvesting 4.50 4.50 4.70 5.00 4.93 5.20
Preparation 
of Grain
6.87 6.00 4.80 2.00 1.05 0.60
Total 40.00 37.31 (25.20) 29.25 18.69 15.50
* probably about 7.
Source: Isobe, 76, p.10, from Yamada, 81, covering two villages
in 1857; Survey of Agriculture in Saga Prefecture (1888),
for Saga-gun; Saga Prefecture Government Report (1909),
for Saga-gun; Survey of Conditions in Agricultural, Forestry
and Fishing Villages (19 38), covering 17 Plain villages;
and the Imperial Agricultural Society's Survey of Agricultural
Methods (1941), for Saga-gun.
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Table 6.10
DISTRIBUTION OF THE OWNERSHIP OF MACHINERY 
BY AREA CULTIVATED 
(10 villages in Saga County, 19 37, % of households)
A = petrol engine; B =
owners
A B C
Under ^ha 1.5 0.0 1.5
h. to lha 3.2 2.0 2.2
1 to 2ha 19.4 17.9 12.4
2 to 3ha 50.6 47.7 32.6
3 to 5ha 75.0 71.5 52.3
Over 5ha 116.6 100.0 115.0
chanical thresher; C = pump, 
owner/tenants tenants
A B C A B C
1.7 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.9
5.8 4.0 3.1 3.3 2.4 2.1
20.0 15.9 11.6 13.2 10.0 9.3
46.5 42.1 29.6 29.5 26.5 21.0
78.9 71.6 56.2 52.4 48.8 33.3
00.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Yamada and Oota, 46, Table IX.18, p.388.
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tenant farmers in particular were far less likely to own any of the 
major pieces of capital equipment. Owners and owner/tenants, 
however, show much the same pattern. It is to be expected that 
small farmers would tend to use their family labour as intensively 
as possible rather than attempt to invest in larger-scale machinery. 
But it is interesting to note also that over 70% of owner and 
owner/tenant households in the 3-5 hectare category owned both 
petrol engines and mechanical threshers but that only about 50% 
of pure tenant households of the same scale did so. This unequal 
distribution of machinery appears as another source, besides 
varying holding size, of differential access to production inputs 
between farmers and within the middle range of the size-distribution. 
In part this was simply the result of the larger farmers' substitution 
of capital for labour and of the fact that the capacity of the 
machine was more than necessary for the small farmer, so that 
hiring the machine was more profitable. But, on the other hand, it 
also must have arisen from the inability of the smaller farmer, 
especially the tenant, to accumulate enough capital, and the 
reduced gains from mechanisation which a tenant could achieve. As 
we shall see when we come to look at the economic structure of the 
village, the necessity on the part of the lower-level middle-scale 
households of borrowing or hiring machinery created ties of 
dependence between households not unlike those which existed 
under the old technology.
We turn now from consideration of individual inputs to 
the structure of inputs, output and income as a whole within the 
farm household economy. As the wide divergence in available inputs 
between larger- and smaller-scale households had disappeared, we 
no longer need to describe the economies of two kinds of household. 
Instead the data to be examined concern the more-or-less typical 
middle-scale farmers. The economies of smaller or larger households 
would not have differed markedly from this pattern, except perhaps 
for some substitution of capital for labour by the larger-scale 
farmers, as was suggested earlier.
The data presented here, as Table 6.11, were assembled 
by Isobe from the results of the Rice Economy Survey carried out 
between 1913 and 1915 (as used previously) and the Middle-scale 
Farmers Survey of 1940. On the basis of preliminary surveys a number
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Table 6.11
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE 1913-15 RICE ECONOMY SURVEY AND THE 
1940 MIDDLE-SCALE FARMERS SURVEY FOR THE SAGA PLAIN AREA 
(Income and expenditure expressed as 
proportions of income from rice)
1913-15 1940
Number of Households 5 5
Income from Rice 100.0 100.0
Income from Second Crops 21.8 27.8
Income not from Cultivation 0.0 24.1
Total Income 121.8 151.9
Labour Expenses 25.8 50.8
Fertiliser Expenses 25.0 24.8
Rent 27.0 8.6
Taxes 9.5 4.6
Total Expenses 107.3 121.4
Net Profit 14.5 30.5
Source: Isobe, 76, Table. 12.
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of typical rice-producing households were selected for each area and 
made the subject of detailed surveys (1). The households selected 
for the Saga Plain for 1913-15 farmed 5.98, 2.00, 2.50, 2.00.and 2.60 ha. 
respectively. The figures shown are the averages for the three years. 
The Saga Plain households in the 1940 survey farmed 1.51, 1.92, 1.38,
1.95 and 1.80 hectares respectively. The averages for the two groups 
of households are shown in the table.
Table 6.11 is designed to give some idea of the change 
in the structure of the farm household economy resulting from the 
movement from the old to the new technology. On the income side the 
striking feature is the increase in the importance of income from 
sources other than rice production. Part of this is the result of 
double-cropping but part comes also from the expansion of other 
activities made possible by the freeing of labour time from rice 
cultivation. This is in effect what we have referred to as the 
intensification of family labour use.
On the expenditure side, the most interesting aspect is 
the increase in labour costs relative to income, both income from rice 
cultivation and, to a lesser extent, total income. This has occurred 
despite the adoption of an innovation which drastically reduced 
labour costs in one aspect of the technology. This suggests that it 
was not simply wage costs which provided the incentive to adopt 
mechanical irrigation, but also the change that it made possible in the 
type of labour employed. Labour availability was a problem as much as 
labour costs, and the value of mechanical'irrigation lay not only in 
reducing labour costs below what they would otherwise have been, but 
also in making it possible to tap a much larger supply of labour in a 
geographically wider labour market. So the unskilled, migrant, 
transplanting labour force in the end took at least as large a share 
of the Saga Plain farmer's revenue as the nenko had done, but during 
the crucial period of the '20s and '30s, such labour was available,
(1) The Rice Economy Survey selected households representative of 
large, middle and small scale farmers within each area. It is 
probable that there was some bias towards selection of households at 
the upper end of each size-scale. Since participation in the survey 
involved keeping careful accounts, the surveyors may have felt that 
better-off farmers were more likely to keep accurate books. See 
Oouchi,40.
-191-
while permanent, skilled, male nenko were not.
As for other costs, fertiliser expenses have remained 
proportionally about the same. The increasing input of purchased 
fertiliser was offset by its declining relative price, as Japanese 
industrialisation proceded. Rent, on the other hand, has fallen 
dramatically as a proportion of income. This is the result of constant 
levels of rent in the face of rising yields, and reflects the increasing 
strength of tenants and difficulties experienced in renting out land.
The net result of the changes in income and expenditures 
is a clear rise in the proportion of its income which the average, 
middle-sized household could retain as profit, i.e. income for family 
members.
(ii) the village community.
i. Technology and changes in village social structure.
How did the change from the old to 
the new technology affect the social and economic relationships among 
households within the village? In this section we will consider how 
the coming of the new technology altered the relative economic and 
social statuses of households. In the next we shall look at its impact 
on economic relationships within the community.
Dr. Isobe, in his survey of the economic and social 
structure of a particular Saga Plain village in 1939, has collected 
a wealth of information on the question of the changing position of 
households within the village (Isobe,77). Table 6.12 presents some 
of this data. The households in the village are divided up into 
various categories. A, B and C are categories based on the ownership 
of capital equipment. The column labelled 'household type' categorises 
households according to their lineage relationship with other households. 
The households in the 'honke 1' group are the central families in the 
village. Most of the households in the 'bunke 1' and 'bunke 2' groups 
are branch households of the honke 1 families, that is, the land 
which the branch households farm was once part of the land of one of 
the honke 1 households. The original head of the branch household 
would have been a member of the main family's household (probably, 
but not necessarily, a relative of the head of the main household, e.g. 
a younger brother to the heir of the househead). Household 14 was not 
a traditional honke family, but had risen into the A category from
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Table 6.12 (overleaf)
THE STRUCTURE OP A SAGA PLAIN VILLAGE IN 1939
Source: Isobe, 77, pp.222-3.
Notes:
(1) Asset ownership groups:
A = household owns horse, mechanical thresher, mechanical 
pump, mat-maker.
B = household owns horse, mat-maker.
C = household owns mat-maker.
(2) Honke = main household.
See Chapter 2, section II, 1, (i) .
Bunke = branch household.
(3) 0 = owner, T = tenant, L = landlord.
(4) 0 = farm employing househead couple and their successor only.
(5) 0 = household where more than 60% of members are unable to work.
(6) Members of household employed off the farm:
© = househead
O - successor
X = someone else.
(7) Double-cropping rate = planted area as a proportion of 
cultivated area.
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being a tenant farmer. It was considered by the village to be a most 
remarkable family. Honke 2 households are similar to honke 1 
households in not being branches of any other family, but only one 
has itself a branch household and they are probably declining 
households relative to the honke 1 group. Bunke 2 households, except 
for no. 27 which is the household of the village priest, are branch 
households established later than bunke 1 households and therefore of 
lower status and economic position. Households in the 'other 2' and 
'other 3' categories have no particular relationships with other 
households in the village (apart from the inter-relationship between 
households 13 and 26) .
Let us consider first differences in the inputs available 
to households in the various categories. Honke 1 households were 
traditionally leading village families and had previously been the 
nenkoj-employing households, farming 3 to 4 hectares in the Meiji period. 
This is borne out by the number and status of their branch households 
and by their importance in providing political office holders. The 
area these households now cultivated was, on the whole, not very 
different from that cultivated by the majority of bunke 1 and honke 2 
households, but they still tended to own larger areas of land and 
retain their positions as landlords. They were, however, tending to 
reduce the area which they cultivated. The households of all honke 
families were larger, having more dependents than branch households, 
but they also tended to hire more labour. However, honke 1 households 
alone, apart from household 14, owned mechanical threshers and pumps.
Bunke 1 households farmed similar middle-sized areas to 
the honke households, but with no common tendency either to increase 
or reduce them. However, the typical structure of the bunke 
households contained only the househead couple with their successor and 
his wife and children. The households did not contain the dependent 
grandparents, brothers and sisters and other relatives which the 
traditional main households included, but it was the honke who owned 
the new agricultural machinery and the branch households had to borrow 
it from them.
'Other 2' households owned far less land than the other 
category B households, and they had more of the character of tenants. 
They were, without exception, reducing the area they cultivated and 
were showing the beginnings of a tendency towards becoming part-time
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farmers with other non-agricultural employment. Much the same is 
true of all the households in category C, who, with their small, mostly 
rented holdings and their lack of capital equipment, had little to 
hold them in agriculture and were showing signs of beginning to move 
out.
From this it might be argued that it was the bunke 1 
households who, from the point of view of available input supplies, 
were in the best position to maximise the income of household members 
by the use of the new technology. They had middle-sized holdings, 
compact family labour forces and access to machinery through their 
main households. Honke 1 households with their landlord character­
istics, their rambling families and greater reliance on hired labour, 
do not look as though the objective of maximising income through 
intensive family labour was working as strongly on them, despite their 
ownership of capital equipment. The input structure of the old 
families, the outcome of long family histories, was not so well 
fitted to the task of making maximum use of the central family members' 
labour and of a middle-sized cultivated holding. They had income from 
the property they rented out and they had many household members 
amongst whom to spread the work. Isobe also points out that bunke 1 
households were much more commercially orientated than were honke 
households.
We find this different emphasis reflected in variations 
in the techniques used by the two groups. Bunke 1 households nearly 
all applied more labour per hectare than honke households and had 
higher double-cropping rates. 'Other 2' households also had a 
tendency to farm more intensively than the honke households. But the 
households in category 3, like the big honke households, had neither 
the right input structure nor the incentive to use intensive methods. 
They were tenants, they had little land or machinery and their labour 
was more profitably employed off the farm. However intensively it was 
employed, it could not have substituted adequately for the land and 
capital assets which the household lacked. Thus, we can conclude that 
it was the input structure of the bunke 1 households which most closely 
met the requirements of the new technology and it was they who had 
adopted this technology most comprehensively.
Socially, the greater efficiency of the bunke 1 
households with the new technology was reflected in their increasing 
political and social influence. With one exception, no member of a
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honke household held any of the political offices examined in the table 
after 1926. The connection between the use of an increasingly 
mechanised technology and the rising influence of branch households 
and of younger men is a phenomenon which has been observed elsewhere 
in Japan (Kawamoto,64) , and which became much more marked in Saga 
after the Second World War, the land reform and the introduction of the 
power tiller. The traditions and skills of the old families and the 
old men became obsolete as the old ways were replaced by mechanised 
and scientific methods, and the young learnt to operate the machines 
and thus became more influential. This process became more marked in 
Saga after the war but its beginnings lay in the changes which 
mechanical irrigation ushered in (1).
ii. Community economic relationships.
How did the shift from the old to 
the new technology and the resulting changes in social and economic 
status affect the economic relationships between households? We have 
already pointed out that the employment inter-relationships between 
households, which had characterised the old technology, disappeared 
after 1923, so that, from this point of view, households became more 
independent. But other features of the old community organisation 
remained despite the change in technology. Holdings remained scattered 
and overall land and water management remained a village responsibility 
requiring village organisation. Mud-raising continued to be organised 
by the community as a whole even after a machine was introduced to do 
it in the mid-1930s (2). Mutual assistance outside purely agricultural 
activities, such as assistance at weddings, funerals, childbirth, etc., 
and in tasks like thatching, as well as communal activities like road- 
repairing, were not affected by the disappearance of labour supply 
inter-relationships in production activities.
In addition there are some respects in which the new 
technology created inter-relationships to replace those which it 
destroyed. New agricultural organisations such as the agricultural 
societies, discussion groups and co-operatives were (and still are)
(1) For a study of post-war social change in a Saga Plain village, 
see Yoshida, 75.
(2) Mud-raising machines were purchased by the village as a whole 
in the same way as the electric pumps had been. See Yoshida,
75, pp. 103-4.
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organised at village level. The diffusion of new techniques through 
these organisations increased contacts between farmers and village- 
level solidarity. But in particular the new technology helped 
strengthen the village social structure through the role of groups in 
the purchase of machinery. The original pumps were bought by the 
village as a whole and the subsequent village organisation and 
maintenance added to the list of communally-run activities. The other 
major items of machinery (threshers, pumps, hullers, etc.) which were 
often owned, as we have seen, by the larger, main families, tended to 
be used in common by groups made up of a main family and its branch 
families (Yoshida,75,p.104). Alternatively, they were purchased 
jointly by neighbourhood groups. But at any rate, the traditional 
social groupings of the village were utilised to promote the spread 
of mechanisation and in this sense were strengthened by the new 
technology.
Isobe argues that these relationships generated conflicts 
which led to a dynamic process whereby the diffusion of improved 
technology was further encouraged (Isobe,77,pp.225-6). This resulted 
from the desire of the branch households to be free of their 
traditional dependence on the main families and from their 
consequent efforts to expand the size of their holdings and improve 
their financial positions in order to be able to acquire machines of 
their own. However, when Yoshida made his survey of a Saga Plain 
village between 1955 and 1960, he still found many honke/bunke 
and neighbourhood groups utilising machinery, including the post-war 
power tiller, in common.
Yoshida's survey also revealed how, at a much more 
general level, technical improvement and economic development on the 
Saga Plain helped to preserve the community relationships of the 
village. The whole combination of environmental and technical factors 
which generated relatively high family income levels :.n Saga Plain 
agriculture meant that the younger generations were encouraged to stay 
on the family farm and there was far less pressure to find work, either 
part-time or full-time, outside agriculture. The use of machinery 
added glamour to farming as a career and encouraged families to send 
their children to schools and colleges where they could acquire 
knowledge which would be useful to them in agriculture. Because 
agriculture was prosperous, there was less cause for the village comm­
unity to break up. Thus, after the war, Yoshida found that
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intra-village organisations, such as age-group societies, were much 
more active in the Plain village he studied than they were in the much 
more remote but agriculturally less productive and prosperous hill 
village with which he compared it (Yoshida,75,pp. 110-15) .
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that we should 
not assume that technical change, mechanisation and commercialisation 
necessarily lead to the break-up of community inter-relationships 
in the economic field. Although in some respects households became 
less inter-dependent, in others traditional community relationships 
were strengthened and new ones created as they were utilised to promote 
the introduction of new technology.
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusions
The aim of this chapter is to bring together the major 
themes of the story of agricultural development on the Saga Plain and 
to assess their significance for our understanding of the process of 
technical change in agriculture in an industrialising country. Given 
that the process of technical change described was a successful one 
in terms of its ability to raise output in a particular environment, 
the main elements in the explanation of how this successful development 
was achieved can be brought together, in the context of the original 
framework, in order to see what can be learnt in general from the 
experience of the Saga Plain area.
That the process of technical change was a successful one 
has emerged from the micro data presented in earlier chapters, but is 
confirmed by the major economic indicators available for the area as a 
whole. Official data on output, inputs and factor productivities are 
assembled in Appendix Tables 6, 7 and 8. They show the steady 
increase in rice output and the substantial rise in yields and in 
labour productivity which resulted from the changes described earlier. 
These accompanied a slow increase in the cultivated area, a dramatic 
fall in the labour force, and substantial increases in material inputs, 
especially from outside the agricultural sector. From our point of 
view, the most interesting aspect of the picture is the speeding up 
of growth in the late '20s and early '30s. By about 1930, the new 
technology based on mechanical irrigation and late planting had taken 
shape and most of -its problems and bottlenecks had been solved, or were 
in the process of solution. So the rapid rise in yields and labour 
productivity in the '30s can be seen as testimony to the impact on 
production efficiency of the new technology whose development has 
been described, to the speed with which it was diffused, and the 
success with which it was incorporated into the technical, economic 
and institutional environment so as to give rise to output growth.
The data also reveal the direction which this change took. 
The land-saving bias inherent in the general pattern of technical 
change in Japanese agriculture is apparent in the rise in yields, but 
more striking in the case of Saga is the labour-saving bias which
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accompanied it. Increasing labour shortage must clearly have 
influenced this, and we can see that, in overall terms, Saga's 
experience bears out Hayami and Ruttan's hypothesis that relative 
factor scarcities induce certain directions of technical change.
However, the study has also shown that, at the micro 
level, the link between relative factor availabilities and the 
particular characteristics of innovations is not a straightforward one. 
The conclusions to which this gives rise can best be considered, in 
line with the original framework, under three headings or stages:
1. The initial conditions phase: the ways in which the
economy, society and technology interacted before innovation took place 
and the influence of outside forces on these interactions.
2. The institutional mechanisms through which the 
direction of innovation was determined: i.e. the forces influencing
the choice of technique to be developed, and
3. The phase of the interaction between the change in 
technology and the economic and institutional structure of the society.
1. The Initial Conditions Phase.
It was argued in Chapter 1 that it is useful to view 
agricultural societies in the initial conditions period as balanced 
systems in which technical, economic and social arrangements complement 
each other in attempting to make production and survival possible, 
within a given natural environment and historically-determined 
institutional conditions. This is borne out by what we know of the 
economic structure of Saga Plain villages in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. The techniques chosen were the best available for 
making use of the given factor endowments, under the natural conditions 
of the area, to meet the objectives of village society. But we have 
seen that it was the economic and social arrangements between 
households (employment relationships, renting of land, borrowing of 
horses and equipment, etc.) which made the use of the techniques 
compatible with the initial structure of ownership of production 
factors.
In understanding how technical, social and economic 
systems interlock in traditional agricultural societies, the Saga Plain 
villages appear to bear out the idea that it is useful to view the 
choice of technique and of economic and social arrangements as heavily 
conditioned by the objective of minimising the risk of disaster and
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attempt ing to ensure subsistence level survival for all village 
members. The normal risks involved in irrigated rice cultivation, of 
inadequate or excessive water supply, depending on rainfall conditions 
(which were, in any case, more severe in creek irrigation areas relying 
on river flow than in pond irrigation areas), were intensified in Saga's 
case by the high risk of insect pest damage. As we have seen, the 
technical system was adapted in many ways to try to spread out and 
lessen this risk. It played a large part in determining the rotation.
It justified the use of a large number of different, low~quality, seed 
varieties, of dense planting of seedlings and so on. These practices 
almost certainly resulted in a sacrifice of output, both at the static 
level when the technical choice was determined, and in terms of ability 
to respond to opportunities to raise output. Yields on the early 
planted area were not as high as those on the late planted area, and 
some intervening planting date would have been better than either 
(Miyajima,36,p. 22) , so that the staggering of planting lowered overall 
output (although this is offset to the degree that labour shortage 
would have prevented the cultivation of such a large area without the 
parallel rotation) . We have seen that Saga Plain farmers were not keen 
to adopt improved seed varieties or better cultivation practices which 
raised initial outlays and increased potential risk as well as potential 
output.
The technology developed was also conditioned by the 
problems of labour utilisation with the irrigation methods determined 
by the natural environment. This, combined with the idea of subsis­
tence insurance, helps explain the non-market economic and social 
arrangements between households. Employment relationships between 
households on the one hand ensured the larger farmers the outside 
labour force on which their cultivation depended, and on the other 
hand assured poorer farmers of stable incomes and assistance, when 
needed, from their employers. This was backed up by other economic 
relationships - landlord/tenant ones and those based on the lending of 
horses and equipment, the granting of permission to use mud from the 
creeks, etc. - and by social arrangements - mutual help at difficult 
times, adopting children, arranging marriages, etc.. Thus the technical, 
economic and social systems balanced and complemented one another in 
making production feasible and attempting to ensure subsistence within 
the natural and institutional environment of the area.
A number of studies of peasant agricultural economies and
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societies in countries other than Japan have found it illuminating to 
view the interlocking technical, economic and social arrangements of 
peasant communities in much the same way as is done here. Lipton, in 
his studies of Indian agriculture, has found it easier to explain a 
number of the practices and choices of Indian farmers in terms of the 
objective of maximising the family farm's chances of surviving than in 
terms of simple profit maximisation (Lipton,65). Scott assembles 
evidence to show that the principle of risk minimisation and 
subsistence insurance can be used to explain the attitudes and choices 
of peasant farmers in many parts of South-east Asia (Scott,28) . The 
interest in these studies has generally been either in trying to find 
a rational explanation of failure to adopt new techniques, or in 
explaining the problems met by poorer farmers and agricultural workers 
as the system breaks down during the process of commercialisation.
The study of Saga has shown that, to a certain extent, the economic 
and technical system based on subsistence insurance did inhibit the 
adoption of new methods and inputs. But in the crucial case of the 
pump it did not, neither did the poorer sections of society suffer 
from the commercialisation of agricultural production, and it is 
interesting to ask how this came about.
In part the answer must depend on the characteristics of 
the new technology, to the determination of which we will return later, 
but in part, I shall argue, it depends also on the village's relation­
ship, in the initial conditions period, with the outside economy. The 
conditions under which Saga Plain farmers were drawn into the commercial 
economy were crucial in influencing not only the direction of technical 
change but also the effects of the adoption of that change on the 
structure of the economy and society.
The coming of commercial market relationships into the 
economic considerations of farm societies will tend to lead to the 
disruption of the traditional system which worked to try to ensure 
subsistence for all. In the case of the Saga Plain, farm households 
were drawn into market relationships with the outside world not only 
by the increasing demand for food output, but also by the increasing 
demand for labour. The traditional system was disrupted, not only by 
the increase in profitable opportunities for the sale of output, but 
also by the small farmer/agricultural labourer's finding his prospects 
sufficiently improved by the increase in employment opportunities to 
be able to opt out of the system which had assured him of a living,
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but little more than a subsistence one. In other developing countries 
(though possibly excepting the cases of some now developed countries), 
this is not a typical way in which traditional rural economic systems 
are broken up and farmers drawn into commercial markets. More common 
causes of such changes would be such things as population growth, 
improvements in communications, impositions of taxes, changes in tenure 
and landownership systems, and the availability of new techniques 
itself.
Because the small-scale farmers had alternative 
employment opportunities, and because the resulting labour outflow 
improved the market bargaining position of those who remained in 
agriculture, they no longer had to rely on non-market arrangements for 
their security. With increasing income from the sale of output, 
increasing, as well as secure (as opposed to secure but stagnant) wage 
income, and with potential for increasing the land area cultivated by 
the household, the small-scale farmer could begin to consider 
experimenting with new techniques and with higher levels of commercial 
inputs. Because he consumed the same crop as he sold, however, 
increasing commercialisation did not require the Japanese farmer to 
risk his subsistence base. These factors, combined with the 
characteristics of the relevant technical changes and the institutional 
methods of their introduction, overcame any risk aversion on the part 
of the smaller-scale farmer.
The fact that the disruption and commercialisation of 
economic relationships to some degree benefitted the smaller farmer 
or agricultural labourer meant that it did not result in incentives 
for larger-scale farmers to abandon the tradtional insurance system 
from their side. Thus the hardships suffered by poorer farmers and 
landless labourers when traditional systems are broken up under other 
circumstances were avoided. So, not only the direction of technical 
change but also the social and economic effects of the adoption of 
that change were influenced by the availability of employment 
opportunities as a result of concurrent industrialisation.
2. Determining the Direction of Technical Change.
The usual practice when trying to explain the diffusion 
(or lack of it) of new technology (e.g. Green Revolution technology) in
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agriculture is to assume a certain package of new techniques, whose 
characteristics are defined, and then to ask why farmers do or do not 
adopt the package. This is generally done by comparing the character­
istics of the technology with such things as the availability and 
distribution of production factors, risk bearing ability, education 
and so on. At the other extreme is the study of the determinants of 
the overall direction of technical change in an economy or a sector, in 
terms of concepts like relative factor supplies and prices at the 
macro level. One of the objects of the present study has been to show 
that the institutional links between these two ends of the process, 
which determine the choice of the actual characteristics of the new 
techniques which become available to farmers, are of great importance 
in determining the success of the adoption and diffusion of the new 
technology. It is perhaps useful to begin by summarising what we 
know about these links in the case of the Saga Plain.
It is clear that the underlying pressure for technical 
change in Saga agriculture arose from the labour shortage brought 
about by the industrialisation of northern Kyuushuu. This gave rise 
to changes in the agricultural structure which disrupted the balance 
between it and the economic and technical systems in operation. The 
development of a solution to this problem, in the form of a mechanical 
irrigation method, was precipitated by the change in the relationship 
between wages and the price of rice which set in after 1920.
Thus the position of relative factor supplies in the 
regional economy worked its way through the economic and technical 
structure of Saga Plain agriculture to emerge as a demand for some 
means of saving labour in pumping irrigation water. But this by no 
means determined the actual form of the innovation. Choices still had 
to be made as to the size of the pump, its power source, its mobility 
and so on. These choices were made through the interaction between 
the farmers, the research authorities and the pump manufacturers, as 
they looked at pumps and motors already available and experimented 
with new designs. The result of this interaction was a pumping system 
which was the best that could be devised, within the constraints of 
existing technical knowledge, to deal with the farmers' problems within 
their natural and institutional environment. The authorities were 
then able to devise institutional adaptations to deal with the points 
at which the characteristics of the new technique clashed with the 
existing economic and social systems. So they were able to overcome
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the problems of indivisibilities in the pumps themselves and in the 
supplying of electricity, and also to deal with the provision of 
credit, by using and adapting existing institutions and organisations. 
Thus, because there was feedback between the authorities and the 
farmers, it was possible to develop an innovation which, as far as 
possible, was easy to diffuse in existing economic and institutional 
conditions.
t
It is interesting to compare the development of this 
innovation with those of two rather similar technical changes in other 
countries. The first is the introduction of motor irrigation pumps in 
the Mekong Delta of Vietnam in the 1960s, as described by Sansom 
(Sansom,68). These pumps were adopted in order to be able to use water 
which collected in drainage canals to irrigate a second crop, and were 
technically somewhat different from the centrifugal ones used in Saga. 
They were driven by diesel rather than electric motors. They were 
less expensive than those in Saga but the role they played was very 
similar since, like the Saga ones, they were designed to replace pedal- 
driven water wheels. It is difficult to categorise this invention 
precisely in terms of its relation to relative factor supplies.
Although it was the prohibitive costs of hired labour to meet the 
heavy labour requirements of water-wheel irrigation which prevented 
double-cropping before the introduction of the motor pump, yet the 
result of its use was an overall increase in labour input through the 
cultivation of a second crop. The invention was precipitated by a 
severe drought which intensified the need to be able to use the canal 
water.
The most striking difference between this and the 
introduction of mechanical irrigation in Saga is that, in the 
Vietnamese case, the authorities played no part at all. Although other 
kinds of pump were available, they were large and expensive, and a 
design suitable for widespread diffusion was developed by an individual 
farmer-cum-motor bike engineer. Knowledge of the pump spread by word 
of mouth and, since it cost no more than a pig, it was soon bought by 
many farmers. The result of its diffusion was a substantial rise in 
farm output and incomes. The authorities, both Vietnamese and their 
American advisers, played no part and were if anything opposed to the 
diffusion of the pump both on military grounds and because of its lack 
of engineering purity.
Sansom is concerned that the results of his study imply
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that inventions emerge when the need for them is there ("necessity is 
the mother of invention") and that expenditure on research and 
extension activities contributes little to the process. The case of 
Saga would suggest that research authorities can play a constructive 
role in the generation of inventions by providing a link between 
farmers' needs for innovation and the supply of inventive ability and 
of advancing technical knowledge amongst scientists and industrial 
manufacturers. It suggests that the investment of resources in research 
and development of new techniques can yield results which are 
appropriate to farmers' needs, if the research is carried out within an 
institutional framework which makes scientists aware of the situations 
of farmers. This avoids reliance on the more haphazard processes of 
individual invention, which depend for successful development and 
diffusion, as Sansom points out, on the existence of a literate 
population, good communications and enough individuals with sufficient 
basic scientific knowledge.
Nevertheless, the institutions which condition the 
knowledge research and extension workers possess of farmers' needs and 
potentials are of critical importance, as is revealed by comparing 
Saga's experience with the introduction of the tubewell in the Kosi 
area of Bihar in India, as described by Clay (Clay,47). The disrupting 
influence in this case was simply the need to raise food output in 
India, which had reached a crisis-point in the mid-60s, when the 
decision to promote the introduction of tubewells on a large scale was 
taken. The requirement was for some means of raising food production 
quickly, and the promotion of credit-financed investment in relatively 
small-scale, privately owned tubewells, run by electricity, was seen 
as a way of achieving this. Thus, choice of technique and institution­
al arrangements was circumscribed initially by this decision taken at 
a national level, which ruled out, for instance, larger, publicly- 
owned tubewells or diesel-powered ones. The former would have been 
administratively much more difficult to organise, requiring communal 
regulation of cropping patterns. The decision to use electricity was 
possibly taken on the grounds of saving foreign exchange, but this is 
not clear.
The actual design and technical specifications of the 
tubewell to be used were decided at the state level and the supply of 
credit was tied to the use of this particular type of well, and also 
in theory to the use of a specified rotation of high-yielding seed
varieties. This package was meant to be used throughout Bihar 
(12 million cultivated hectares). Specifying it in this way clearly 
economised on administration and the use of skilled manpower.
However, from the point of view of the Kosi area, the 
technical choice made at the national and state level meant the use 
of wells and pumps which were larger, more durable and considerably 
more expensive than was necessary for the environmental conditions 
there. In most cases the pumps had spare capacity and arrangements 
for the trading of water were rarely possible because the necessary 
canal infrastructure did not exist. Furthermore, making scattered and 
haphazard electricity connections to those farmers who happened to be 
willing and able to take up the loans was expensive and slow, as was 
the installation of the wells. Very few of the farmers who bought 
tubewells used the prescribed rotation because, according to Clay, it 
involved higher risk and clashed with the existing cropping system and 
the economic organisation of the village based on it. Thus, despite the 
potential profitability of the use of tubewells, the actual programme 
was not a great success in promoting their installation or in raising 
food output.
It hardly needs pointing out that this process of rigidly 
specified technical choice from above, without feedback from those with 
knowledge of local conditions, resulted in the promotion of a technique 
which was not quickly adopted or easily diffused at the micro level. 
However, subsequent developments in the Kosi area suggest that the 
authorities did nevertheless play an important role in stimulating 
change. For the demonstration of the profitability of the tubewell 
idea, which the programme did achieve, led local entrepreneurs to try 
to adapt it to local conditions. They began to experiment with the 
use of bamboo pipes, with cheaper methods of boring the wells, with 
locally-made strainers, and with diesel motors which could be bolted 
on to bullock carts and thus used in several places and/or shared or 
hired out amongst farmers. These adaptations resulted in a much 
cheaper and more easily installed tubewell with less of an indivisibility 
problem. The number of installations of this kind of well rose 
dramatically and considerably exceeded those of the officially specified 
type of well. However, it took several years for the authorities to 
respond to these developments and change their programmes and precedures 
so as to be able to encourage the spread of the adapted type of well.
The lessons to be learnt from the comparison of this case
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with that of Saga are thus not that the authorities have no role to 
play - it was they who introduced the idea of the tubewell to the Kosi 
area - but that failure to be aware of and responsive to local 
knowledge and initiative may slow up technical development in costly 
ways. In the Kosi case "the response of analysts and administrators 
alike is symptomatic of an insensitivity to feedback and an unwilling­
ness to doubt the appropriateness of the package selected for the 
farmers." "The engineers were one powerful source of resistance to the 
implications of the feedback which was coming from the agricultural 
extension staff confronted with the problem of selling the package 
and aware of what farmers were actually doing." "The scale of the 
officially promoted package implied that farmers with fragmented 
holdings were somehow to adapt their farming to the technical 
specification of the irrigation equipment rather than vice-versa." (1)
In the case of Saga, on the other hand, the question of 
how the pump was to be diffused and utilised in the given local 
conditions was a crucial influence on the actual technical choice made 
by the authorities. They avoided the costs of investing resources in 
trying to diffuse a model which was difficult and slow for many farmers 
to acquire. They also spread out the fixed costs of making electricity 
connections by organising the communal installation of the pumps. Their 
incentive to do this was clearly heightened by their desire to establish 
late planting in order to destroy the rice-borer. But their success 
in inducing this change in rotations also contrasts sharply with the 
failure of the Indian authorities1 attempts to use the introduction of 
the tubewell to spread changes in rotation. The consultation between 
the authorities and the farmers, the use of local organisations working 
through the structure of village society to persuade farmers right down 
to the individual household level, again contrasts strongly with the 
centralised procedures in the Indian case. Force on top of persuasion 
must not be forgotten in the Japanese case, but it is difficult to see 
how late planting could have been achieved without the consent of a 
large majority of farmers.
In general, this comparison between Saga and other cases 
suggests, firstly, that research authorities can play a valuable role 
in stimulating technical progress - this was so even in the Indian 
case. Secondly, it suggests that the speed and efficiency with which
(1) All three quotations from Clay, 47, pp. 17-18.
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research authorities are able to fulfil this role depends crucially on 
their contact with and responsiveness to local conditions and 
initiatives. Although initially this may involve higher administrative 
costs, it also avoids wasting resources on attempts to promote the 
spread of inappropriate techniques which fail to meet the authorities1 
objectives.
Underlying this, the basic reason why knowledge of and 
response to local conditions is important is that choice of technique 
involves decisions about a range of characteristics of a given 
technology considerably wider than simply its factor proportions. The 
more closely the chosen characteristics can fit into existing 
technical, economic and social systems, the more easily the technique 
will be diffused and the less effort will the research authorities 
have to spend, if they want to achieve speedy and widespread diffusion, 
on organising institutional arrangements to overcome the clashes 
between the new technology and the old systems. However, it might well 
be that the techniques which raise output most are those least able to 
be fitted into existing systems. So the authorities would be faced 
with a trade-off - the greater the output growth, the more must be 
spent on organising institutional changes. At any rate, what is clear 
is that, even if the overall direction of technical change in the 
economy is correct in reflecting relative factor scarcities, it is 
still important that research authorities, if they are to play a 
positive role in promoting and diffusing technical change in 
agriculture, are sufficiently knowledgeable about and responsive to 
local conditions to be able to develop and select the techniques whose 
overall collection of characteristics is as appropriate as possible.
3. The Social and Economic Effects of the Introduction
of Technical Change.
I have argued that the initial diffusion of a new 
technique is determined by its characteristics relative to the social, 
economic and technical structure into which it is introduced. This 
latter controls factors such as the distribution of productive assets, 
access to credit, ability to bear risk, education, etc. which are 
often more specifically cited as determining the diffusion of new 
techniques. What has the case of Saga to teach us about the effects of
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this first stage of adoption and diffusion of a new technique on the 
economy and society into which it is introduced?
Firstly, the experience of Saga clearly illustrates the 
idea of Hayami and Ruttan's dynamic sequences or Rosenberg's problem 
generation and solution process. The introduction of mechanical 
irrigation and late planting solved one set of problems but generated 
others through the potentials produced by the clash between new 
techniques and the old technical system. Hence the need arose to 
develop new seed varieties to solve the labour problems of double- 
cropping within the new rotation, for instance. In the Kosi case also, 
the initial introduction of the tubewell led to further technical 
development and adaptation as farmers and entrepreneurs responded to 
the potentials demonstrated by the new technique. The difference is 
that, in the Saga case, the research authorities played an active and 
positive role in this process, which the Indian authorities were slow 
to do. At any rate, Saga's experience bears out the idea that the 
introduction of a technical change can set in motion a dynamic process 
of its own, generating further technical innovations. Research 
authorities sufficiently aware of and responsive to farmers' needs can 
play a positive role in speeding up the production of the right kinds 
of innovation.
Secondly, what can Saga's experience tell us about the 
factors conditioning the effects on the economy and society of an area 
of the introduction of technical change? Many writers, observing the 
process of introduction and diffusion of technical change in 
agriculture in a number of areas of the Third World have concluded that 
it has tended to strengthen and intensify initial inequalities in the 
distribution of income and assets and, in some cases, to disrupt the 
social and economic organisation of villages, e.g. by leading to the 
creation of a class of landless wage labourers (1). It is concluded 
also that, very often, this is not determined by the characteristics of 
the new technology but by the effects of the initial social structure 
into which the change is introduced. This conclusion could be viewed 
as arising in part from inadequate characterisation of the technology, 
e.g. new seed varieties and fertiliser are divisible inputs, but they 
are technically highly complementary with an adequate and controlled 
supply of irrigation water which is not. Griffin suggests, for instance,
(1) For an exposition of this view and much evidence, see Griffin, 8.
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categorising technical changes as landlord- or peasant-biassed. At any 
rate, over-emphasis of the factor bias and scale economy or divisibility 
characteristics of technologies may conceal other characteristics which 
are also relevant to the diffusion of the technique.
But this is only part of the story. We must also look 
at the other side of the interaction - the social and economic structure 
into which the change is introduced, and the way in which it changes 
in response.
Data do not permit us to say what happened to the distri­
bution of income in Saga, but we can infer much about the relative 
economic positions of different types of household from the information 
on land-ownership and the distribution of cultivated holdings. We have 
seen that the initial innovation was introduced into a structure in 
which middle-scale, owner/tenant farmers were becoming dominant. The 
position of smaller farmers was improving in some respects through the 
expansion of employment opportunities, and that of larger landowners 
and cultivators worsening as labour became scarcer. As we saw, this 
conditioned the direction of technical change through the interaction 
between farmers (whose leaders were now middle-scale owner/tenants) and 
research authorities in the process of technical choice. But the effect 
of the technical change itself was to strengthen the tendencies 
inherent in the initial situation, as reflected in the continued 
expansion of the middle-scale group, since it was this group who could 
profit most from the characteristics of the new technology.
There are two points arising out of the results of 
technical change in Saga, which are interesting in comparison with the 
picture painted of the effects of Green Revolution technical change 
today. Firstly, it would not appear that the process of technical 
change in Saga worsened the relative position of the smaller-scale 
farmer. This is partly, of course, the result of the expansion of 
non-agricultural employment opportunities, which were open to workers 
who became dissatisfied with their incomes in agriculture. But it is 
also true that the institutional organisation of the diffusion process 
was such as to overcome unavoidable indivisibilities and give all 
cultivators, regardless of scale, access to the most important 
innovation. The communal installation of the pumps and the collective 
organisation of the necessary credit were the factors permitting this. 
They were possible because of the nature of the initial conditions, the 
combination of forces making Japanese society what it was.
-212-
Nevertheless, it is possible that subsequently very 
small-scale farmers lagged behind in the adoption of further 
innovations and in general were unable to profit as much from technical 
development as the middle-scale farmer. This would appear to have 
been the case in the village discussed in the previous chapter. But 
it is also clear from that study that such farmers had other employment 
opportunities open to them and were taking them up, although some may 
have been slower than others in doing so.
Among the middle-scale households it would also appear 
that the ability to utilise the new technology was not completely 
equally distributed among households. Ownership of the major items of 
new equipment was concentrated amongst the somewhat larger-scale, 
older-established main households. But it was the somewhat 
smaller-scale, more compact, outward-looking and commercially- 
orientated branch households who were able to profit most from the new 
techniques. This clash between the distributions of asset ownership 
and economic power generated tensions as society adapted itself to the 
effects of the new technology. Thus technology played its part in the 
shift away from a social structure based on the old extended household 
to one based on compact, nuclear ones.
The second point arising from Saga's experience in this 
phase is related to this social change. In the Green Revolution case, 
it is often suggested that technical change, associated with increased 
commercialisation of agriculture, breaks down traditional social 
organisations and institutions (e.g. the kinds of communal insurance 
discussed earlier) and tends to lead to a polarisation of agricultural 
society into landowners and labourers. Although social change did 
accompany technical change in Saga, and traditional village organisations 
and functions did disappear, yet in some respects village cohesiveness 
and co-operation were strengthened relative to the situation in 
villages which had not seen comparable technical development in 
agriculture. Thus the fact that agriculture prospered on the Saga 
Plain, and that this increase in prosperity was felt by the whole
village community, helped to strengthen the communal organisation of
the village rather than put it under strains, such as increasing 
non-agricultural, part-time employment, or decline in the numbers of 
young people in the village, or increasing disparity in incomes. So
the village society was able to continue to function as an aid to the
diffusion of new technology, e.g. through group buying of machinery,
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and this was still the case after the war. The organisation of the 
village community provided a certain continuity as a background 
against which the production techniques and household economies of 
member families shifted dramatically from those of subsistence 
producers to those of highly efficient, specialised commercial farmers.
Perhaps, ultimately, the only practical lesson that can 
really be learnt from the success of the Saga Plain area, or of Japan 
as a whole, in the development of agriculture, is that it depended on 
the discovery of the technology and the institutional framework which 
could best bring about growth within that particular environment.
The story implies that there are no sets of pre-ordained characteristics 
of techniques or of institutions which will, of themselves, bring 
about rising standards of life. What was produced in Saga was a 
solution to its particular problems which reflected its own past 
experience and present aspirations. General theories, such as the 
induced technical change hypothesis, can help to explain the causes of 
events, but, at the micro level, success depends on understanding 
a particular environment and its history and developing new techniques 
whose characteristics are compatible with them and desirable in terms 
of the economic, social and political changes which their diffusion 
will surely, as the study has shown, bring in its train.
t
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Appendix Table 1
RICE YIELDS IN SAGA, 1890 - 1935. 
(5-yearly averages, kg/10 ares)
Saga-gun Saga-ken
1890 294.1 238.0
1891 238.3 204.7
1892 255.7 219.8
1893 243.6 204.5
1894 263.8 222.4
1895 253.7 217.9
1896 312.7 257.9
1897 291.1 254.2
1898 278.5 249.3
1899 254.5 239.4
1900 246.2 248.5
1901 248.1 251.1
1902 271.0 264.5
1903 290.4 274.9
1904 324.3 295.9
1905 366.0 308.5
1906 372.8 319.4
1907 370.5 320.7
1908 369.2 329.6
1909 359.9 326.7
1910 336.5 316.1
1911 337.0 316.5
1912 337.4 322.3
Saga-gun Saga-ken
1913 351.4 329.2
1914 360.2 333.4
1915 368.6 339.2
1916 352.0 328.8
1917 368.9 327.9
1918 377.6 335.6
1919 376.3 328.9
19 20 379.7 330.2
1921 390.3 362.4
1922 387.5 366.9
1923 386.3 362.5
1924 393.3 370.3
1925 401.4 373.6
1926 395.1 339.8
1927 396.7 340.6
1928 395.2 341.6
1929 383.9 332.8
1930 383.5 333.0
1931 402.9 353.7
1932 411.7 360.1
1933 415.4 362.0
1934 431.2 378.1
1935 444.3 389.8
Source: SKTS, 86.
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Appendix Table 2 
RICE SHIPPED OUT OF SAGA PREFECTURE, 1892 - 1935.
(5-yearly averages, tonnes)
1892 23,448 1914 70,246
1893 26,425 1915 78,718
1894 33,477 1916 85,174
1895 37,277 1917 97,086
1896 49,229 1918 84,49 8
1897 54,269 1919 91,001
1898 54,808 19 20 82,492
1899 58,167 1921
00T™to\
1900 58,775 1922 74,455
1901 56,665 1923 77,997
1902 58,524 1924 69,190
1903 60,801 1925 75,489
1904 58,509 1926 73,920
1905 58,118 1937 73,471
1906 60,441 1928 76,754
1907 60,621 1929 83,437
1908 60,035 1930 80,820
1909 57,611 1931 84,495
1910 58,018 1932 93,844
1911 59,786 1933 94,395
1912 56,525 1934 90,947
1913 67,243 1935 95,465
Source; SKTS, 86.
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Appendix Table 3
NUMBERS OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS AND 
HOUSEHOLDS IN SAGA, 1890 - 19 35 
(5-yearly averages)
Workers Households Workers Households
Ken Gun Ken Gun Ken Gun Ken Gun
1890 338.9 53.4 73.2 11.6 1913 272.2 38.0 69.6 10.7
1891 338.4 53.2 73.4 11.6 1914 269.5 35.8 70.4 10.4
1892 338.5 53.7 74.0 11.6 1915 262.9 32.1 70.5 10. 1
1893 339. 1 54.2 74.5 11.6 1916 258.2 32.3 70.7 9.9
1894 342.2 54.3 75.4 11.6 1917 250.1 32. 3 70.8 9.8
1895 342.6 53.8 76.4 11.7 1918 247.3 31.0 70.8 9.6
1896 343.2 53.5 76.1 11.7 1919 239.3 30.4 69.5 9.6
1897 342.0 53.4 75.5 11.7 1920 234.6 29.5 69.1 9.5
1898 338.6 52.7 75.5 11.8 1921 230.2 28.4 68.9 9.4
1899 333.0 51.8 74.8 11.6 1922 225.1 27.3 68.6 9.3
1900 324.8 51.4 73.7 11.3 1923 220.8 26.7 68.5 9.2
1901 316.4 51.1 73.3 11.0 1924 219.1 26.4 68.4 9.2
1902 305.6 49.4 73.1 10.9 1925 217.0 26.5 68.4 9.3
1903 296.8 47.8 73.8 10.8 1926 215.7 26.9 68.3 9.3
1904 290.4 46.8 73.6 10.9 1927 215.0 27.4 68.3 9.3
1905 289.5 45.9 73.4 11.1 1928 214.4 27.7 68.4 9.4
1906 286.2 44.9 73.2 11.2 1929 213.0 27.9 68.5 9.4
1907 289.0 44.9 72.6 11.2 19 30 211.8 27.7 68.4 9.3
1908 288.1 45.1 71.6 11.2 1931 109.9 27.5 67.0 9.3
1909 286.7 45.5 70.9 11.3 1932 208.4 27.4 66.7 9.3
1910 283.5 45.8 70.6 11.2 1933 206.8 27.5 66.4 9.4
1911 280.6 42,9 70.2 11.1 1934 205.3 27.5 66.1 9.4
1912 277.7 40.2 70.0 10.9 1935 203.9 27.5 65.8 9.4
Source: SKTS, 86.
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Appendix Table 4
THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BY AREA CULTIVATED 
(Saga Prefecture, %)
Under ^ha h- lha l-2ha 2-3ha 3-5ha Over 5ha
1908 35.8 35.0 18.2 8.3 1.2 0.4
1909 31.4 33.6 23.3 9.7 1.7 0.2
1910 36.0 34.9 18.3 8.3 2.1 0.3
1911 35.0 35.7 20.5 6.9 1.7 0.1
1912 32.8 38.3 21.2 6.2 1.9 0.1
1913 33.2 38.3 21.0 6.0 1.3 0.1
1914 33. 1 38.0 21.3 6.0 1.4 0.1
1915 32.3 37.8 22.4 5.7 1.6 0.2
1916 33.0 37.8 21.5 5.9 1.6 0.1
1917 31.0 36.2 24.5 6.6 1.6 0.1
1918 30.6 36.6 24.4 6.5 1.6 0.1
1919 31.2 37.7 24.3 5.4 1.4 0.1
1920 31.8 35.7 24.8 5.9 1.7 0.05
1921 29.7 35.5 27.1 6.5 1.2 0.04
1922 27.5 35.0 29.7 6.4 1.0 0.04
1923 29.1 37.1 26.5 5.9 1.3 0.04
1924 29.3 37.2 26.6 5.7 1.1 0.01
1925 28.7 37.3 27.2 5.6 1.0 0.02
1926 27.5 36.8 28.3 6.2 1.1 0.04
1927 27.4 36.7 28.2 6.4 1.2 0.05
1928 27.3 37.1 27.9 6.5 1.1 0.06
1929 26.7 35.0 29.6 7.1 1.4 0.05
1930 26.0 35.3 30.3 7.0 1.4 0.03
1931 26.3 35.4 30.6 6.5 1.1 0.02
1932 25.6 34.3 32.6 6.6 1.2 0.05
1933 25.0 33.8 32.9 7.0 1.3 0.04
1934 24.4 34.2 32.8 7.2 1.4 0.06
1935 24.3 33.5 33.1 7.7 1.3 0.07
1936 24.1 33.8 32.8 7.8 1.4 0.05
1937 25.5 34.0 32.0 7.0 1.4 0.04
1938 25.5 32.2 32.9 7.8 1.4 0.04
1939 25.5 31.0 33.8 8.0 1.6 0.03
1940 25.9 30.9 33.3 8.2 1.6 0.06
Source: Kayoo, 83.
Appendix Table 5
DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS BY STATUS 
(Saga Prefecture, %)
Owner/
Owners Tenants Tenants
1891 34.7 36.0 29.3
1895 32.5 44.8 22.7
1900 34.9 46.3 18.8
1905 33.4 44.3 22.3
1910 31.3 45.1 23.6
1915 31.1 46.3 22.6
1920 30.6 47.0 22.4
1925 30.3 47.2 22.5
1930 31.4 47.2 21.4
1935 29.0 50.7 20.3
1940 29.0 50.5 20.5
Source: Kayoo, 83.
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Appendix Table 6
OUTPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN SAGA.
(Indices of 5-yearly averages centring on years shown,
1888-92 = 100)
Rice output
Rice yields Rice output per worker
Saga-ken Saga-gun Saga-ken Saga-gun Saga-ken Saga-gun
1890 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1895 91.5 86.3 91.1 85.4 90.1 84.8
1900 104.4 83.7 105.8 83.1 110.3 86.3
1905 129.6 124.4 130.8 125.0 153.1 145.6
1910 132.8 114.4 135.5 116.5 162.0 135.9
1915 142.5 125.3 146.8 130.2 189.3 217.0
1920 138.7 129.1 147.1 133.1 212.5 240.7
1925 157.0 136.5 166.6 138.5 260.1 279.1
1930 139.9 130.4 152.1 135.6 243.5 261.4
1935 163.8 151.1 179.3 162.3 298.0 315.4
Source: Calculated from SKTS, 86.
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1890
1895
1900
1905
1910
1915
1920
1925
1930
1935
Appendix Table 7
INPUTS AND FACTOR COMBINATIONS IN SAGA-KEN AND SAGA-GUN
(Indices of 5-yearly averages centring on year shown,
1888-92 = 100)
Cultivated
area
Saga-ken Saga-gun
100.0 100.0
101.8 97.9
102.7 100.6
103.0 100.7
102.4 101.7
103.3 102.7
104.5 103.0
106.3 101.6
103.0 102.8
103.8 105.9
Agricultural 
workers 
Saga-ken Saga-gun
100.0 100.0
101.1 100.7
95.9 96.3
85.4 85.8
83.6 85.8
77.6 60.0
69.2 55.3
64.0 49.6
62.5 51.9
60. 1 51.5
Land/labour 
ratio 
Saga-ken Saga-gun
100.0 100.0
100.5 97.4
107.3 104.8
120.5 118.8
122.4 118.8
133.2 171.5
151.2 186.8
165.8 205.3
164.9 198.7
172.7 206.1
Source: Calculated from SKTS, 86.
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Appendix Table 8
CURRENT INPUTS IN SAGA PREFECTURE
(5-yearly averages centring on year shown, 
1934-6 prices, million yen)
Inputs of 
agricultural 
origin
Inputs of 
non-agricultural 
origin
1905-7
1910
1915
1920
1925
1930
1935
2.63
2.70
2.43 
2.42
2.44 
2.54 
2. 73
1.70
2.68
3.01
2.83
5.18
6.33
7.13
Source: Workbook for LTES, 87.
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